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Abstract 
This thesis aims to challenge the conventional assumption about the irreversibility of 
the decline of the textile industry in developed countries. It is argued that the decline 
can be reversed if mature textile firms can break away from their traditional routines 
and practices and radically and continuously change their technologies, markets and 
organisational structure to adapt to the rapidly changing business environment. 
Using the European textile industry as a case study, this thesis shows that a number 
of European countries, including Germany and The Netherlands, have managed to 
bypass the maturity-trap -a phenomenon commonly found in large mature firms 
because of an inability to adapt to changing external conditions- through industrial 
reconfiguration from the 1960s onwards. The majority of the industry, however, has 
been in relative decline over the past decade as the market has become much more 
competitive and consequently made their old strategies obsolete. Under such 
circumstances, there is an urgent need to turn the industry around. 
Learning from the failure of the Courtaulds (UK) and the success of Ten Cate (NL) 
and Freudenberg (DE), the thesis illustrates how the maturity-trap can take hold and 
how the process of de-maturity can be initiated at the firm level. The case study of 
Marzotto highlights how the danger of the maturity-trap is now no longer just a 
British phenomenon. This once highly successful firm is now in great danger of 
falling into the maturity-trap. The issue at stake is the long-term survival of the 
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The textile industry is one of the oldest manufacturing industries which grew 
rapidly during the Industrial Revolution in Britain. The long history of the industry 
and its transformation is arguably an invaluable case-study when analysing the 
process of economic change. Indeed, the industry has been characterised by 
changing industrial leadership since the 200' century which has swung increasingly 
in the favour of countries from the East. Following the supremacy of the Lancashire 
cotton industry in the 19th century until the first decade of the 20th century during 
which it dominated 80 per cent the global cotton product market, Japan emerged as 
the new dominant power in the global textile trade between the 1930s-1970s. The 
1980s witnessed the transition period where a number of developing countries, 
notably Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and China, emerged as the major 
competitors in export markets. Since the 1990s China has proceeded to gain an 
increasing share in the textile and clothing export markets which was reinforced 
further by its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and the 
cessation of the protectionist trade regime at the end of 2004. 
The changing industrial leadership appears to confirm the conventional 
assumption which contends that that the developed economies should cede mature, 
traditional manufacturing industries to the developing world (see for example 
Froebel, et al., 1980). The assumption is based on the supposition that the 
developed countries cannot be competitive in the industries which are labour 
intensive, low technology and cost driven. On the contrary, the developing countries 
with their low-wage labour can supply cost-sensitive markets with significantly 
lower priced products. Consequently, the developed economies have assumed they 
should transfer their traditional manufacturing industries to the developing countries 
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and establish service industries. In other words, the decline of the British and the 
European textile industry in general is `irreversible'. 
The central purpose of this thesis is to challenge this conventional view. In 
contrast to the traditional view, Abernathy et al. (1983) argued that maturity could be 
arrested and, even more, reversed so that the developed countries could regain their 
competitive advantage in mature industries. The concept, known as de-maturity, 
suggests that firms need to radically change the characteristics and performance of 
the existing products or to create new markets that lead to the formation of new 
sectors or industries (Abernathy, et al., 1983). The concept suggests that the process 
of maturity is not inevitable provided that firms can move up the value chain, and 
continuously produce higher value added products in demand (often through product 
and technology diversification) and manufacture them efficiently and effectively. 
Indeed, following the collapse of the British textile industry, the German and 
the Italian textile industries emerged as the new leaders in the textile market in the 
1970s. Unlike the British textile firms that focused on the low value-added market 
segment, the German and Italian firms offered high value-added products for 
technical applications and the high-fashion market respectively. They constantly 
introduce new trends in their respective markets with Germany focuses on the 
development of new technologies and new materials while Italy on the creation of 
new aesthetic designs. The Dutch textile industry, although its size is much smaller 
than the two leaders, its productivity is higher than those countries. This shows that 
these countries have managed to turn the industry around and initiate the process of 
de-maturity. 
Surprisingly, the concept of de-maturity has rarely been discussed in the 
innovation literature. In fact, innovation studies in the low-medium technology 
sectors, in which the majority of mature industries are classified, have been under 
valued or neglected (Robertson, et al., 2009, von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2006). The 
importance of the study about industrial de-maturity is of major importance to both 
the industrialised and less-industrialised economies. The reason being mature 
industries are still the major contributors to manufacturing output and employment 
(Hirsch-Kreinsen, et al., 2006). The lack of analyses has made factors central to the 
decline of mature industries in the developed countries are largely unknown. This 
may answer the longevity of the conventional assumption about mature industries. 
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According to Abernathy et al. (1983), one fundamental factor which causes 
the decline of mature industries in the developed countries is the phenomenon of the 
`maturity-trap'. They suggest that that large firms operating in mature industries often 
cannot foresee the potential impact of external changes to their position of leadership. 
Even if they recognise the change, they are incapable of making a rapid and adequate 
response due to deeply entrenched values and practices that have been built over a long 
period of time and have brought success to the firms. Whilst observed 30 years ago, the 
phenomenon is very much alive today. The most recent instance is the collapse of 
General Motors (GM) and Chrysler during the global economic recession in 2009. The 
firms with a dominant position in the market became ̀ powerless' when markets they 
operated in changed very quickly. Being rigid and unable to change sufficiently and 
rapidly has cost the American government $70 billion (£49 billion) without any 
guarantee that the firms will thrive in the long run. Other firms in different industries 
including RCA and Philips (colour televisions) and Motorola (mobile phones) have also 
fallen victim to the trap. These examples confirm that the maturity-trap has become a 
chronic ̀ disease' affecting various industries that has never been properly addressed. 
If such large and dominant firms are vulnerable to the same trap, it is 
therefore very likely that the European textile firms are also vulnerable to such a 
trap. The central issue here is whether there is any `solution' to bypass the maturity- 
trap. The obvious pre-requisite is innovation. Encouragingly, it has been shown that 
the textile industry is in fact far more dynamic and innovative than has widely been 
assumed. The industry constantly upgrades and adopts new high technologies to 
provide improved or new products for their customers (von Tunzelmann and Acha, 
2006, Sandven, et al., 2005). However, the process and the extent of firms' 
innovativeness and dynamism required to initiate de-maturity needs to be 
investigated as neither von Tunzelman and Acha nor Sandven discuss the issue. Sull 
(2000) finds that firms do respond to a changing competitive environment through 
the adoption of new technologies and product development. However, the responses 
are often simply not sufficient or too late. Innovation to reduce costs alone is often 
insufficient to escape from the maturity-trap. On the other hand, the adoption of 
advanced technologies without the ability to successfully exploit them will not 
generate competitive advantage for the firms. Sull argues this is the underlying factor 
that caused the decline of Firestone, the incumbent in the tire market, in the face of 
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new competition from Michelin that introduced radial tires to the market. This is also 
one of the factors that precipitated the demise of Courtaulds, the largest textile group 
in Britain. At the industry level, the Lancashire cotton industry, once the world's 
largest cotton industry, was the first victim of the maturity-trap. 
1.1 The Objective of the Thesis 
It was discussed earlier that a number of the EU countries, notably Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands, have succeeded in transforming their traditional textile 
making capabilities into the production of high value added textiles. The process of 
transformation required a long process of transition in knowledge, technology and 
market and the creation of new competencies. The process was driven by the 
adoption of advanced textile and material processing technologies and the creation of 
new markets. 
The objective of the thesis is to examine the textile industry, particularly in 
the EU, and show why it does not fall into the category of a mature industry. In fact, 
the industry is highly dynamic and flexible in parallel with the high-technology 
industries. It is true that the traditional market of this industry has reached maturity; 
however, maturity is not necessarily an irreversible process as it has been widely 
believed. This conventional belief has led to the assumption that industrialised 
countries should let their textile industries `migrate' to developing countries. It is 
argued that this is not always the case and the process of maturity can be reversed. 
To explain the argument, it will be shown that traditional textile firms have to 
break away from or bypass the maturity-trap to initiate the process of transformation 
and become R&D-led textile firms. De-maturity can only be achieved if firms 
possess certain levels of innovative capabilities to create new competencies away 
from their current competencies and to adapt to a changing business environment. 
Such a strategic redirection not only requires technological capabilities but also 
organisational capabilities (Doz and Prahalad, 1988). Those which cannot or are not 
willing to initiate the process of de-maturity are very likely to fall into the maturity- 
trap. This will increase the likelihood of bankruptcy or being acquired by other 
firms. 
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The second objective of the study is to examine the efficacy of the EU 
initiatives for the rejuvenation of the textile industry. The government should play an 
important role to accelerate the process of building up the innovative capability. It is 
highly crucial as the long-term competitiveness of the EU textile industry depends 
on the capability of textile firms to initiate the process of de-maturity and, 
furthermore, undertake continuous change. The introduction of the `European 
Technology Platform for the Future of Textile and Clothing -A Vision of 2020' in 
2004 to promote the scenarios and strategic development agenda for the long-term 
competitiveness of the industry shows the government's serious intention to change 
the industry. It is argued here that the initiative whilst crucial is not sufficient to 
rejuvenate the industry. The reason being the majority of the EU textile firms lack 
the necessary capabilities to allow them to initiate strategic redirection. This is 
discussed in Chapter 3,5,6 and 7 that technological innovation should be 
complemented with organisational capabilities that include entrepreneurial 
management and good leadership. These are in fact the major factors that contribute 
to the decline of the Lancashire textile industry as argued by Lazonick (1981,1983). 
1.2 The Importance of the Thesis 
The past decade has been a challenging period for the EU textile industry. 
The industry has suffered from steady decline where textile output fell by 28 per cent 
and clothing output declined by 30 per cent between 2000-2008. Employment in the 
EU shrank by 443 000 (20 per cent) which forced 19 568 (18 per cent) firms out of 
business between 2000-2004. Turnover dropped by 12.5 per cent during the same 
period. At the national level, the performance appears to be less encouraging. In 
2006 Britain employed 155 000 people or only 22 per cent of its employment level 
in 1963, while turnover declined sharply by around 33 per cent between 2004-2006. 
In Germany employment declined by 68 000 (36 per cent), while turnover dropped 
by 21 percent during the same period. Italy employment fell by 30 000 (five 
percent), while production and turnover levelled off during the period although the 
longer term trend showed a steady decline. More alarmingly, the value of imports 
showed an upward trend. Between 1990-2000,80 000 textile/clothing firms 
disappeared in Italy, and an additional 13 594 firms went out of business between 
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2001-2006. To make matters worse, the global economic recession in 2008 hit the 
Italian textile industry very badly. In October 2008, Versace, one of Italy's most 
prominent luxury fashion brands announced it was to cut 30 per cent of its workforce 
and production due to plunging demand. Gianfranco Ferre, another big name in the 
market, filed for bankruptcy in February 2008. The industry needed ¬35.16 million 
from the EU's Globalisation Fund (EGF) in December 2008 to support 6000 Italian 
textile workers who were made redundant from a combination of an increase in 
outward processing and an increase in imports of cheap textiles from low-wage 
economies. 
It suggests that the industry has been snared in the maturity trap of once 
competitive products developed between the 1980s-1990s, shorter product lifecycle, 
and rapid changes in market and technology. Obviously, the protectionist measures 
under the Multi Fibre Agreement which was in operation between 1974-2004 did not 
halt the decline. The industry needs to embark on radical change just like it did in the 
1960s-1980s in order to regain its competitive advantage. The radical change should 
affect every aspect of the business organisation including technology and production 
systems, products and markets, and organisational structure and routines. Such 
radical change is critical as being stuck in the maturity-trap and unable to change 
sufficiently in the current competitive environment has more devastating impact than 
it did in the 19th century given the intensity of competition, complexity of technology 
and market demand. The industry needs to heed the lessons of the past and examine 
the efforts made by the firms in the 1960s-1980s to transform the textile industry. 
The lesson from the decline of the British textile industry, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, is relevant to the current environment. The EU should avoid 
the mistakes made by its predecessors. Rather than protecting the industry, the 
government should encourage firms to be more dynamic and innovative in their 
response to a changing competitive environment. Firms should be able to read the 
likely changes in the future, understand the impact of such changes on their 
leadership and to respond rapidly and in an appropriate manner. The success of the 
German textile industry in pioneering the development of technical and performance 
textiles in the 1970s could be used as an initial point of reference to initiate the 
process of de-maturity. 
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Industrial de-maturity can only be achieved if the majority of firms in the 
industry can rejuvenate their organisations. Therefore, the diffusion of technology is 
critical to the successful initiation of the de-maturity process. The efficacy of the 
current EU initiatives that emphasise on R&D, the creation of networks and 
collaboration between them requires further scrutiny. The development of networks, 
whilst deemed necessary to improve flexibility in the competitive environment 
characterised by rapid changes in technology and demand (Chesbrough, 2006), will 
in all probability face a number challenges in their implementation. Harsh 
competition may impede stakeholders to work together to build up networks of 
alliances for the development and commercialisation of new technologies. This is in 
fact one of the major problems identified by which impeded the formation of an 
integrated structure in the Lancashire cotton industry and caused the industry to 
become technologically backward (Lazonick, 1983). Moreover, the complexity in 
managing the collaboration of diverse teams due to different interests of individual 
firm, different structural and cultural issues as well as the lack of managerial skills to 
manage broad scope of knowledge also needs to be approached properly. 
Furthermore, the initiatives may not be sufficient to address the underlying 
deficiencies, that is, the lack of entrepreneurship to drive the commercialisation of 
technologies and good management. Therefore, efforts should be directed to 
overcome such deficiencies to improve the innovative capabilities of the firms to the 
extent at which they allow a continuous creation, adoption, and commercialisation of 
new technologies. The capabilities should enable them to significantly improve 
current products as well as create new products for existing and new markets better 
and faster than their competitors. Continuity can only be achieved if innovation is 
built as an integral part of the system within an organisation and implemented as 
part of a firm's routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
In brief, the EU textile industry should initiate another cycle of fundamental 
change to create a new competitive advantage away from its current one. In other 
words, the firms have to break away from their traditional values and practices which 
may lead them to fall victim to the maturity-trap. The firms are likely to face great 
challenges due to: the structure and size of the industry, the cost of developing new 
technologies, the harsh competitive environment, the complexity to manage change 
and, most of all, a lack of good leadership. These are in fact the factors that hindered 
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radical change in the Lancashire cotton industry argued by Lazonick (1981,1983) as 
the major contributor to the decline of the industry. Thus, history has the potential to 
repeat itself if Europe does not take the necessary action to overcome the problems 
which impede transformation. As the competitive environment today is significantly 
more intense, in addition to significantly higher cost technology and more rapid 
changing of demand than a century ago, the challenge the European textile industry 
is facing is arguably much greater than the British did in the early 20th century. 
This study is highly relevant to the current condition of the EU textile industry as 
it aims to address such issues. The case studies in Chapter 5,6 and 7 explain the factors 
that determine the result of the firms' attempts to initiate the process of de-maturity. The 
process of change and firm strategy which lead to de-maturity or the maturity-trap are 
also examined. The results can be used to help firms to improve their innovative 
capabilities and to support the development of EU strategy and policy for the 
rejuvenation of mature industries, especially the textile indust y. 
1.3 Methodology 
As discussed earlier and will be elaborated on in Chapter 3, the experience of 
the British textile industry remains relevant for today's environment although it 
involves greater complexity. The study of the decline of the Lancashire cotton 
industry shows that the historical aspects which influenced the evolution of the 
industry can play a significant role in our understanding of the nature of decline. 
Thus, historical approach to industrial evolution is the most appropriate approach 
here. To enable a robust analysis, the case study research method is deemed to be the 
most appropriate because the dynamic nature of the situation throughout the history 
involves a large number of variables to be examined, all of which have complex 
mutually interdependent linkages (Yin, 2003). 
The appropriate unit of analysis that can explain the process of change at the 
necessary degree of detail is the firm level. The experience of the German textile 
industry suggests that the plight of the industry depends on the innovative 
capabilities of the firms to radically change every aspect of their organisations away 
from the maturing or uncompetitive ones. Therefore, a firm level analysis enables us 
to closely examine the manner in which mature firms fall into the maturity-trap or, 
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conversely, create and improve their innovative capabilities and continuously change 
to adapt to a changing competitive environment. 
The study of business organisation as the determinant of the rise and fall of 
an industry's competitiveness has rarely been discussed in the study of changing 
industrial leadership in the textile industry (Mass and Lazonick, 1990). As a 
consequence of this, the literature has failed to interpret the historical context of the 
economic decline in the context of firm strategy. It lacks a comprehensive 
explanation of the inner workings of business enterprises -or the firm level study- 
that in fact, as a collective action, determines a nation's competitive advantage 
(Mass and Lazonick, 1990). Indeed, Robertson, et al. (2009) suggest that there are 
only a few studies which have explained the detailed process of innovation. It is very 
important to understand how firms successfully generate, adopt, use and 
commercialise new technologies that facilitate the diffusion of the technologies and 
the context and the environment in which they operate. This would provide the 
`missing' link that has been neglected by the government in policy development and 
implementation as effective innovation policy is a direct function of their 
understanding of the process. 
These arguments suggest that the firm level study is potentially useful in the 
understanding of the competitive advantage of a nation and the assessment of the 
efficacy of relevant policies. These arguments fit well with the objectives of the 
study explained earlier. The firm level analysis can explain in greater detail the 
factors and processes leading to the maturity-trap or de-maturity and the context and 
the environment which hinder or encourage de-maturity. De-maturity can be 
interpreted as the development of new competitive advantage. 
To achieve the objectives, this thesis analyses detailed case studies of three 
firms from three different countries in Europe with varying degrees of success in 
technological, market and structural transition. Each case study illustrates a different 
path of firm evolution ranging from a firm that is in serious danger of falling into the 
maturity-trap to two firms that have successfully bypassed the maturity-trap through 
different routes. The selection of different national firms is necessary to highlight the 
country-specific history which influences specific evolutionary paths and unique 
competitive advantage. 
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A firm's capability to respond to a changing business environment cannot be 
built up overnight. Therefore, a rigorous study requires a longitudinal investigation 
of the process of capability development and implementation. The selected firms 
have to have a long history of innovative activities. They are selected based on their 
ability to survive as they have been in business for more than a century. These 
criteria can give us confidence that their innovative capabilities have been tested 
over an extensive period of time. 
Data are gathered from multiple resources including semi structured 
interviews with relevant people in the selected firms and industry experts, business 
history articles and books, scientific journals, the firms' official information and 
statistical data. Using these interviews and secondary resources each case study was 
developed independently through an iterative process. To simplify the analysis 
process, each case study is structured in the same manner. Each case study is 
analysed using the frameworks discussed in Chapter 2. 
1.4 Major Developments in the Global Textile Industry 
As argued earlier the historical context of the global textile industry is 
required to understand the current condition of the EU textile industry. The business 
history of the industry provides the understanding of the process of and factors that 
influence the rise and decline of the textile industry in different countries. This 
section provides the background to major developments in the global and European 
textile industries and explains why this is highly pertinent to the future of the 
European textile industry. The lessons from the decline the British textile industry, a 
once formidable competitor, needs be examined carefully if Europe does not want 
history to repeat itself in the future. 
Changing Industrial Leadership 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the history of the global textile 
and clothing industry has witnessed at least three shifts in industrial leadership over 
the past two centuries. Changes in industrial leadership are a feature of a mature 
industry which is characterised by intensive utilisation of labour (particularly for the 
clothing sector) and standardised technology, and is driven by price competition. 
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These characteristics which have led the industry to be regarded as ̀ traditional' has 
allowed developing countries to gain a competitive advantage mainly through the 
exploitation of their abundant (unskilled) cheap labour. Japan, for instance, started 
its industrialisation during the Meiji restoration era in the 1860s through the 
establishment of cotton textile production. Its industrialisation was initiated by 
importing textile machinery from England, training local people which were paid 
much less than those in Britain and sending a number of businessmen and 
technicians to learn from the more advanced countries. The country rapidly 
improved its cotton textile production capability through the development of its own 
high throughput machinery, the creation of new mixed (high and low quality) cotton 
yarns to produce better quality yams at lower cost, and created a vertically integrated 
industrial structure. In the 1880s the country began to export cloths and by the 1930s 
Japan had successfully challenged Britain's dominance in the global coarsest cotton 
textile trade. 
In a similar fashion, China has built up its competitiveness in textile and 
clothing manufacturing. The industry has been one of the main driving forces behind 
the country's success in export markets since the introduction of its Open Door 
policy and economic reforms in 1979. In addition to cheap labour, its immense 
potential domestic markets and its burgeoning middle class have attracted large 
numbers of foreign investors to build textile manufacturing plants in the country. 
Industrial capacity has soared and has helped make Chinese products extremely 
competitive in recent years, but at the same time this has severely reduced profit 
margins and created problems of excess capacity. In response to the situation the 
government has outlined plans to rationalise the industry with the elimination of 
capacity of fabrics manufactured with outdated machinery by 7500 million metres 
and of chemical fibres by 2.3 million tonnes by 2011. 
In the past decade, China has become the dominant power in the international 
textile and clothing trade. Its share (including Hong Kong) in the world clothing 
export market increased from 30 to 40 per cent between 2000-2006, while its share 
of textile exports increased from 19 per cent to 29 per cent during the same period 
(WTO, 2008). The export market which represented 30 per cent of the total textile 
and clothing production accounted for £122 billion in 2007, more than double the 
value in 2000. The industry contributed to seven percent of the country's total 
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industrial value added in 2007 and employed 20 million people. In addition to 
abundant cheap labour, another advantage China has used to great effect has been to 
hold down the value of its currency (relative to the US dollar) to prevent major price 
increases in its export markets (Lau, et al., 2009). These factors have allowed the 
country to dominate the global textile and clothing trade at the lowest end of the 
market segment. 
China's supremacy was badly shaken during 2008-2009 following the credit 
crisis which severely hit its main export markets such as the EU, US and Japan. Over 
capacity which has long been a problem in the industry worsened as the growth of 
the industry declined by 3.7 per cent between September 2008 and May 2009. 
Exports in January 2009 were 17.5 per cent less than a year before and imports were 
down by 43.1 per cent. The appreciation of the currency and rising wages have 
forced exporters to close factories or move large portions of their production further 
inland where labour costs are lower. Others have shifted production to other low-cost 
countries such as Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cambodia (Epstein and Wei, 2008). 
Since the start of 2008, around half of the total number of factories (which reached 
thousands) in the world's fastest growing economic region of Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen have closed down. 
This defensive cost-cutting strategy appears to resemble the same pattern of 
migration of textile producers from New England to the southern part of the US in 
the 1920s. It is not clear, however, whether this strategy will sustain China's cost 
leadership in the longer term. Substantial excess capacity built up during the boom 
period between the 1990s-2000s has very strong parallels with the mistake made by 
the British textile industry in the mid 19th century which accentuated the latter's 
decline. In addition, rising wages, high inflation and currency appreciation will 
increase prices and reduce its relative cost advantage. Although its extensive pool of 
cheap labour may help the country to maintain its cost advantage and its vast 
population may help to maintain demand at a reasonable level for the foreseeable 
future, China cannot afford to become complacent and ignore the possibility that 
other countries may challenge its leadership. Competition at the lowest end of the 
market segment has always been considerably more intense than in the upper 
segments. This exerts enormous downward pressures on costs and forces the 
industry to continuously rely on cheap unskilled labour and outdated equipment. 
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Consequently, this has led Chinese firms to produce poor quality products and 
hindered them from entering premium markets. Moreover, demand in these 
segments is not immune from changing preferences. Issues concerning the lack of 
quality, the use of child labour and the environmental damage from the use of 
outdated equipment may cause demand to shift away from Chinese products 
(Economist, 2009). An over reliance on the lowest end of the market could prove 
potentially fatal for Chinese firms as their competitive advantage is not built on solid 
foundations. 
Protectionism 
Protectionism in the textile and clothing industry is almost as old as the 
industry itself (Owen, 1999). Indeed, textile producing countries, regardless of their 
technological capabilities or the size of their markets, maintain some form of 
protectionism even up to the present day. Protectionism began during the era of the 
British Empire during which Britain who, like other European countries, committed 
to mercantilism. Under this doctrine, domestic industries were protected by tariffs 
while trade with the colonies were limited to commodities which the mother country 
needed for its industries. With the Industrial Revolution in full swing during which 
productivity increased considerably, overseas markets grew in importance as outlets 
for British products. Under these circumstances, mercantilism was deemed to 
impede access to wider markets as protectionism affected the growth of the colonies 
and reduced their buying power. Britain gradually reduced tariffs for cotton products 
between the 1850s-1860s after which a free trade regime was introduced. Free trade 
was expected to accelerate the rate of economic growth of the colonies and improve 
their purchasing power to buy British goods. Britain was the first country to promote 
free trade, while the US and other European countries remained strongly 
protectionist. 
The British cotton industry experienced exceptional growth under the free 
trade regime up to 1914. However, increased competition in the domestic market 
especially from the US and Germany, and in overseas markets mainly because of 
Japan's invasion of Britain's major Asian markets put the free trade regime under 
very serious pressure. Additional problems were experienced in countries such as 
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India and Hong Kong as they started to develop their own indigenous textile 
industries to meet their own domestic demand. The culmination of problems led the 
British industry to suffer from severe overcapacity and job losses which forced the 
government to introduce tariffs in the 1930s. From this point on the liberal trade 
regime in the global textile industry ceased to exist and was replaced by a 
protectionist regime that continues up to the present day. 
Increased competition from low-cost countries encouraged the developed 
countries to take collective action to protect their industries. Protectionism in the 
global textile and clothing industry was institutionalised at the international level 
with the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
1947. The institution which was initially created to reduce protectionism was instead 
used to negotiate greater protection as the idea of freer trade promoted by the US and 
Canada resulted in major market disruptions in the developed countries. 
Protectionism against imports of cotton products was introduced through the 
ratification of the Short Term Cotton Arrangement. This was subsequently followed 
by the Long Term Agreement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles 
(LTA) in 1962 (Owen, 1999). 
Pressures for even greater protectionism mounted in Europe following the oil 
crisis in 1973 and the recession that followed. This crisis caused the textile industry 
in the nine EU countries to suffer from one million job losses, falling profits and 
investment, and surplus capacity (Dolan, 1983). Excess capacity reached 40 per cent 
on average (Tsoukalis and Ferreira, 1980). A number of the European countries 
made an appeal to the European Union (European Economic Community prior to 
1993) to expand the scope of protection to include quotas for products made of other 
fibres (including wool and man-made fibres) in addition to cotton. An agreement 
was reached in 1973 which was stipulated in the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) and 
signed under the auspices of the GATT. 
The MFA was officially arranged to provide the developing countries with 
guaranteed access to markets in the developed countries without causing 
overcapacity, considerable (absolute) loss of market share and employment, or 
`industrial disruption' in the developed countries. The EU countries agreed to allow 
a threshold of six per cent growth for the imported product market. The threshold 
was deemed to allow the European countries to modernise their industries, re-train 
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its textile workers and assist investment that would provide alternative employment 
for the redundant textile workers. In reality, however, the MFA was a means to 
discriminate products from the developing countries as greater protection measures 
were integrated into the agreement throughout the period of protectionism. 
The MFA was renegotiated five times before it finally expired in 1994. 
However, the industrialised countries demanded an extension to allow their 
industries to adjust (to the condition post MFA). In 1995, four countries (Canada, the 
EU, Norway and the United States) signed an agreement to gradually introduce trade 
liberalisation over a 10 year period administered under the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing (ATC). This agreement defined the end of the quota system in 
December 31St, 2004, but included a clause to allow the importing countries to 
impose tariffs. 
Table 1-1 illustrates the process of integration of textiles and clothing into 
multilateral trading system on the basis of a country's import volumes in 1990 
(columns 2 and 3). The last column shows the growth rate of quotas for products that 
continued to be restricted during the transition period. In other words, import 
volumes of the remaining products that were not integrated into GATT increased at 
each phase by a set percentage. 
Date Minimum volume 
integrated ( percent) 
Accumulated volume 
integrated ( percent) 
Remaining quota 
growth rate 
01.01.1995 16 16 16 
01.01.1998 17 33 25 
01.01.2002 18 51 27 
01.01.2005 49 100 Full integration 
Table 1-1. Integration of textiles and clothing into (IA1-1' 
Source: Nordas (2004) p. 13 
The end of the ATC did not necessarily end the protectionist regime, 
however. The EU and the US re-imposed quotas in 2005 against Chinese products 
based on the argument of industrial safeguard permitted by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in the event of a surge in imports which may harm the 
importing country's industry. Under these circumstances, the WTO allows its 
members to restrict imports temporarily to safeguard their domestic industry. The 
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argument made by the EU to impose the new quota restriction was similar to that to 
impose ATC, that is, the industry `deserves' temporary protection to adapt to the 
quota-free environment. Up to 2007, the US and EU markets had been protected 
under a number of quota-based safeguard arrangements with China. Throughout 
2008, a surveillance system was implemented to replace the quota system after 
which all quota restrictions were removed in 2009. However, the transitional 
product-specific safeguard mechanism remains an option until December 11,2013 in 
case of any major market disruption in the importing countries caused by a surge of 
imports from China. 
Protectionism may have slowed down the decline of the textile industry. 
However, it did not halt imports or contribute to the improvement of competitiveness 
of the EU textile industry in the traditional market (clothing and textile clothing 
markets). This can be seen from the trade data which shows that imports grew 
significantly despite the protectionist regime. Between 1973-1980, imports from non 
EU countries increased by 110 per cent (Toyne, et al., 1984). In more recent years 
EU clothing imports have increased by around 260 per cent (in terms of value) 
between 1988-2002 whereas the textile sub-sector performed better although the 
import shows an upward trend as illustrated in Figure 1-1. 
The textile sub sector has been saved by the growing market of high value 
added textiles for technical applications. China's clothing exports to the EU alone 
grew at an annual rate of 20 per cent between 2000-2006 and 12 per cent globally, 
while imports from all other countries to the EU increased by 10 percent. In a similar 
fashion, the annual export markets from China and India to the US increased by 24 
and 11 per cent respectively between 2000-2006, while US exports increased by only 
2 per cent (WTO, 2008). The growth rate of China's export market to the US grew 
by 18 per cent annually in the same period. 
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Figure 1-1. The Evolution of the EU Clothing and Textile Trade (1988-2002) 
Source: Commission of the European Communities Working Paper no 1348 (2003) p. 9 
It appears that despite being given 30 years of protection as well as 
opportunities for industrial adjustment the EU and other developed countries in 
general failed to restore their competitiveness in the traditional textile market. The 
literature has placed the blame on the inability of the European Commission in 
dealing with the different stances among its member countries' which led to the 
ineffective application of the MFA (see for example Dolan, 1983, Tsoukalis and 
Ferreira, 1980). It appears the EU's major mistake was to use protectionism to 
preserve an uncompetitive industry rather than to promote and drive radical change 
to generate a new competitive advantage. For example, the majority of government 
funds were not used directly for rationalization and restructuring, but to subsidise 
prices with no accompanying plan for long-term growth (Tsoukalis and Ferreira, 
1980). Although attempts were made to rationalise and modernise the industry which 
resulted in a significant increase in labour productivity by 25 per cent between 1973- 
1979, these were not sufficient to arrest, let alone reverse the flow of imports. The 
condition worsened as investment fell considerably in 1979 whose level was only 
two-thirds of that in 1973. 
To conclude, protectionism itself may be necessary to protect the economies 
in transition. In fact, as discussed in the next section, the Italian textile industry grew 
1 The EU countries were divided between two opposite stances in the negotiation and application of 
the MFA. The division included the protectionists -Britain, France, Ireland and Italy- and the less 
protectionists - Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. In those countries, considerable 
restructuring and rationalization had already occurred since the 1960s (Dolan, 1983). 
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significantly during the period of protectionism. It gave the industry the opportunity 
to win markets in Europe for its new concept -the ready to wear collection. For 
other EU countries the effects of protectionism varied. In general, it may have helped 
the developed countries to slow the decline but it definitely did not halt or reverse 
the decline. However, protectionism as a strategy to improve competitiveness in the 
traditional textile market where competition is determined by costs in the face of 
growing competition from low-cost competitors appears to be misdirected. 
Advanced machinery on its own proved to be insufficient to offset higher costs to 
compete with low cost competitors. Italy's success at exploiting the protectionist 
regime was not to compete in cost driven markets but in high-quality fashion 
markets where the basis of competition is design and quality. In retrospect, the EU 
textile industry should have focused its efforts on taking advantage of the 
opportunities open to it in the higher value added textile market and where it could 
build and establish a long-term competitive advantage. Unfortunately, this did not 
happen and the majority of the textile and clothing firms continued to produce 
uncompetitive traditional products and service traditional markets which precipitated 
the industry's long-term decline. 
1.5 Europe: The Decline of a Major Competitor 
As mentioned earlier, the textile industry in Europe, notably Britain, had 
dominated the global cotton textile trade for over a century during the 19th century 
up until 1914. The country's old and large textile industry was unable to respond 
sufficiently to the emergence of new competitors who offered significantly lower- 
cost products. The industry lost 40 per cent of its Asian market to Japan in 17 years. 
The British government's solid support for free trade which had helped the industry 
to gain a dominant position up to 1914 became shackled and the industry suffered 
greatly. Other European countries were less affected through the introduction of high 
tariffs. Britain's hegemony in the global textile trade started to erode in 1914 after 
which it needed trade protection to stop imports which dominated its domestic and 
overseas markets. 
Between the 1970s-1980s, the European textile industry underwent a painful 
readjustment to combat the harsh competition from low-cost competitors such as 
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Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, India, Pakistan and Indonesia. Europe lost 
around one million jobs in the textile and clothing industries in the 1970s alone and 
4600 (15 per cent) firms went into bankruptcy (Dolan, 1983). Britain alone suffered 
yet another setback as employment shrank by 30 per cent and production declined by 
30 per cent between 1963-1978 (Toyne, et al., 1984). Germany suffered the worst 
among the European countries in terms of employment with a decline of around 44 
per cent and lost 32 per cent of its firms. However, the country managed to minimise 
the decline in production to only six percent. Meanwhile, Italy saw employment fall 
by 25 per cent yet the country managed to increase production by 15 per cent during 
the same period. 
The different outcomes among the EU countries despite the common trade 
policy were influenced by the different nature of the policies towards industry 
adopted by each country2. The difference was affected by the different nature of the 
crisis faced by each of the member states. As a result of this, market specialisation 
emerged in different countries. In the 1980s Italy replaced Britain as the leader in the 
European textile industry with 11 per cent share of the global textile clothing market. 
The country gained its competitive advantage through specialisation in the high-end 
fashion textile market. Germany, the second largest textile producing country in the 
EU, emerged as the global leader in the technical textile market. Both countries 
avoided markets where competition was driven by costs and preferred to choose 
alternative routes where they could each build up a competitive advantage. Italy built 
up a competitive advantage in product quality and design and Germany in 
technological performance. Up to the present day, Italy has maintained its leading 
position in Europe. It represented 25.5 per cent of the EU's total textile and clothing 
turnover and 37 per cent of the total number firms in the sector in 2006, while 
Germany trailed behind with 19 percent of total EU turnover. 
Italy's relative superior performance compared to the other EU member 
states was driven significantly by its aggressive adoption of new manufacturing 
methods and technologies in the 1950s supported by the US and its Marshal Aid 
Programme (White, 2000). By 1964,86 per cent of the Italian mills had adopted 
fully or semi-automatic looms compared with 37 per cent in Britain and 69 percent 
2 Since the 1970s the EU member countries had to construct trade policy collectively but industrial 
policy remained prerogative of individual member countries (Dolan, 1983). 
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in France. Productivity increased by 350 percent and 400 percent for spinning and 
weaving respectively during this period (Antonelli and Marchionatti, 1998). Italy 
became one of the most progressive cotton industries in Western Europe, with 60 per 
cent higher of productivity rate than that of France and Britain in 1987. 
In addition to the adoption of modern technology, Italy's domination of the 
high-end fashion market is supported by the long standing relationships between 
textile manufacturers and fashion designers dating back to the 1940s and by its 
creative capability built up over the years to satisfy its domestic and European 
market which demanded stylish, high quality and fashionable products 3 The 
relationship allowed designers and textile manufacturers to work together to 
continuously create new designs and to improve product quality. The Italian textile 
industry started to grow rapidly prior to and during the Second World War. During 
the period, exports from other European countries to Italy, particularly from France, 
the leader in the high-end fashion market at the time, were blocked. This provided 
opportunities for local manufacturers to gain market advantages and encouraged new 
designers to emerge (White, 2000). As opposed to France which was prominent with 
its couture (ready-to-make) tradition, Italy, supported by its high throughput 
machinery from the US, transformed its couture capability to pioneer the trend of the 
prei-a porter or ready-to-wear collection led by Benetton in the 1970s. This new 
concept allowed them to capitalise from the combination of fashionable products and 
large scale production. In so doing, Italy avoided price sensitive product lines but at 
the same time escaped competition with France in the couture market. This 
innovative development became a trend worldwide and led to a shift of power in the 
textile and clothing supply chain away from manufacturers to designers. 
It has been argued Italy's distinctive industrial structure has been the key 
factor that supports its success in the ready to wear collection. The industry is 
characterised by a large number of small, family-owned firms with high levels of 
inter-firm collaboration and are clustered in districts concentrated on particular 
segments such as Prato in wool textiles and Capri in knitwear (Porter, 1990, Owen, 
3 In contrast to Britain, Italy did not possess large colonies as the market of cheap textile products. 
Since its market has been predominantly for domestic and European consumption characterized with 
higher quality and variety, the Italian textile industry has built up its design capability and flexible 
manufacturing systems. The market was very different from the main market of the British textile 
industry which demanded standardized and cheap products. 
30 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
1999, Guercini, 2004). The high degree of co-operation among firms in each 
network stretches right across the supply chain. The structure allows for flexible 
production systems a pre-requisite to compete in the fashion market where short 
production runs and rapid responses to changes in demand is the norm. 
The experience of Germany in building up its capability in high-tech 
technical textiles is somewhat different to that of Italy. In contrast to the Italian, 
British and French governments, the German government opposed the idea of 
protectionism. The country led the coalition (together with The Netherlands and 
Denmark) to reject the MFA and instead preferred restructuring and rationalisation 
including outward processing as a means to maintain competitiveness. Germany 
found that protection would impede its growth as 40 per cent of its products were 
exported and 75 per cent of outward processed products came from Germany. 
Although the country finally accepted the terms of the MFA, its industrial policy 
showed its liberal stance relative to other EU countries. In contrast to the British 
government policy which protected uncompetitive firms, German government policy 
forced the industry to rapidly adjust to the new competitive environment and forced 
the uncompetitive firms to leave the business. The restructuring and rationalisation 
programme which started in 1963, much earlier than the other European countries, 
helped Germany to achieve the highest productivity in Europe, which increased by 
60 per cent between 1970-1986 (Nelson, 1987). Such a significant rise in 
productivity permitted the country to compete favourably with low-cost competitors. 
Germany understood that outward processing was only a temporary measure 
as increased wages in the production countries were inevitable. Nevertheless, the 
strategy allowed the industry to retain its current competitiveness while necessary 
adjustment was underway. Outward processing also forced the old, uncompetitive 
firms out of business and left the industry with capital intensive firms. This paved 
the way for a rapid adoption of more modem technologies in which the industry 
invested heavily (the fourth largest in the world in the early 1980s). Interestingly, the 
capital intensity of the textile industry, that is, capital stock per worker, was higher 
than for any other manufacturing industry (including automotive and machine tools) 
in Germany between the 1970s-1980s. This suggests that the industry has 
progressively reduced its labour requirements. 
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In addition to improvements in productivity, the German textile industry also 
pursued a product differentiation strategy by moving up the value chain to replace 
the increasingly uncompetitive mass produced textiles from the mid 1970s. The 
industry built up new capabilities in higher value added products for high fashion 
goods and technical textiles. The underpinning factors that supported such a 
transformation was the close proximity to EU markets (the main market for high 
fashion and technical textiles); an extensive number of highly flexible mid-sized 
firms which were large enough to invest in modem machinery and flexible enough to 
respond to changing demand; and a high quality workforce. The latter was supported 
by the country's well-organised vocational systems which permitted sufficient 
skilled workers to be produced every year to rapidly adopt new technologies and to 
operate, maintain and repair machinery. The trained workforce also allowed the 
industry to undertake quality improvement activities and to progress the transition 
towards flexible production systems. Equally important was the firms' collective 
action in research and promotional programmes to jointly solve problems which 
emerged during the transformation process (Nelson, 1987). 
The specialisation among the EU member states increased in its variety along 
with the enlargement of the Union. The integration of the Southern European 
countries in the 1980s and the Eastern European countries in the 2000s extended the 
fragmentation of the EU textile markets. The Northern and Western parts of the 
region have significantly shifted their textile capabilities to higher value added 
textiles for technical and industrial applications whereas the Southern and Eastern 
European countries largely remained producing textiles for clothing and household 
markets. Within the latter sub-region Italy concentrates on the high-end textile 
market segment, Spain and Portugal on the middle segment with the rest on the 
lower segment. For the traditional textile and clothing industry, such a structure 
favours outward processing due to the proximity between production and markets. 
The increasing tendency for preferential agreements among the EU countries that 
permits imported products duty free is another advantage of the enlargement. For the 
technical textile sector, the new member countries are attractive places to relocate 
the production of products that are on the verge of saturation on the ground of cost. 
The enlargement is also advantageous for market expansion of niche products as the 
size of the EU textile industry is too large to rely on niche markets. The sector needs 
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to sufficiently broaden its market base to generate sufficient revenue to finance 
innovation more generally. 
Arguably, the EU textile industry is unique in that a broadly fragmented 
market structure exists in one large economic area. The industry encompasses the 
manufacture of fabric, apparel and leather goods made of various fibres for 
traditional, home furnishing and high-technology markets. Up to the present day, the 
clothing market stills occupies the largest share as shown in Figure 1-2, while the 
technical textile market although it accounts for the smallest share has been growing 




Figure 1-2. Market structure of the European textile products (2003) 
Source: Euratex-CIRFS 
Enlargement and specialisation has not stopped the European textile industry 
from continuous decline in terms of output, employment and turnover as mentioned 
earlier. Thus, although the fragmentation creates unique industrial dynamism within 
the economy the efficacy of such a structure to improve the competitive advantage of 
the EU textile industry in the long run is not obviously clear. Without a doubt, the 
structure favours the general trend of outward processing as the movement of goods 
within the EU countries is duty free. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the 
experience of the German textile industry outward processing is only a temporary 
strategy to cut costs as an increase in costs in the production countries will eliminate 
any cost advantage. This is already apparent in the major destinations of outward 
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in both countries declined by 50 per cent between 2000-2008 as wages increased 
which reduced their cost advantage (Sura, 2009). 
The fact that the industry has been in relative decline over the past decade, 
including in Germany and Italy, may indicate that the market for higher value added 
textile products developed in the 1960s-1980s have reached maturity. This has 
forced the European textile firms to transfer the production of once high-value added 
products overseas. For example, the production of geotextiles, one of the earliest 
innovations in technical textiles which once saved the Dutch textile industry, 
increased significantly in China in recent years. The Dutch firm, Ten Cate, have 
moved its geotextile production to China which started operations in 2008. 
Meanwhile, another Dutch firm, Gamma Holding, had to move assembly activities 
of its filtration technology to Poland, China and Mexico in 2006. In a similar 
fashion, the overseas production of mid and high-end fashion clothing products 
increased. A number of high end brands such as Versace and Burberry have moved 
their production (mainly clothing) to China and other low cost countries. 
Market maturity also allows the developing countries to produce rival 
products at lower prices that put greater pressures on European products. Although 
the EU textile industry is the second largest textile exporter (in terms of value after 
China) history shows that being large is not sufficient to maintain a competitive 
advantage in the face of changing markets and technology. Therefore, the industry 
urgently requires innovative solutions, probably radical ones, to find a more 
sustainable competitive advantage to survive and grow in the long run and avoid a 
similar catastrophe to the one experienced by the British textile industry. 
The New Paradigm 
Despite the decline, the industry remains an important element of the EU 
economy, representing four per cent of added value manufacturing and nine per cent 
of manufacturing employment in 2006. Therefore, the industry cannot be neglected. 
The EU has realised that its protectionist policy and cost reduction strategy (by 
means of outward processing) cannot provide the foundation for sustainable 
competitive advantage. It has recently made a fundamental shift in its policy away 
from the short and medium-term protectionism to long-term technological 
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innovation driven programmes. The launch of the European Technology Platform as 
mentioned earlier is the first major initiative to create a new period of growth 
through industrial transformation from a traditional to a knowledge-based industry. 
The initiative involves new approaches in R&D and innovation; education, training 
and social issues; environmental issues and consumer protection; intellectual 
property rights; and cooperation with Mediterranean countries to allow production 
relocation and outward processing. Among those programmes, research and 
innovation has shown the most rapid progress. The government provides funding at 
the national and regional level for R&D (through collaborative research) and the 
adoption of modern technologies. In this respect, the EU has set out a Strategic 
Research Agenda which covers three principal areas of concentration: a shift from 
commodity towards speciality products through the development of new specialised 
fibres, materials and production processes, functionalisation of textiles; the creation 
of new textile products for diverse applications and the creation of new markets; the 
development of mass customisation and personalisation of products through new 
approaches in design, production process and technology, logistic and distribution, 
and supply chain. Up to the present day, 31 research projects involving 400 
organisations (private firms and research centres) and -6160 million government 
research funding between 2007-2009 have been created. 
This attempt to transform the industry appears to be a huge mountain to 
climb. As mentioned earlier, the industry which is predominantly populated by small 
and medium-sized enterprises have low innovative capabilities, questionable 
management capabilities and suffer from a lack of financial resources. To make 
matters worse, the majority of large firms in the industry are of a traditional nature. 
This can be seen by the low level of productivity compared to other manufacturing 
sectors (Johansson, 2008). Therefore, the firms may find it very challenging to create 
competitive long-term strategies and manage change. The British experience 
suggests such a structure and characteristics of firms can seriously impede 
fundamental change (Lazonick, 1983). 
Technological leadership alone is by no means sufficient to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage. As Pavit and Soete (1982) argue that whilst 
technological capabilities provide greater opportunity for industrial leadership, it is 
the rate and level of diffusion of the technology into economic use and the market 
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monopoly and profitability which determine the competitiveness of a nation. They 
believe that the dramatic change in the fortunes of the British textile industry was 
largely driven by the slow diffusion of the British technologies into the domestic 
market amid rapid international diffusion of the technologies, the latter of which 
enabled other countries to catch up and eventually surpassed Britain's capabilities. 
As the international diffusion and imitation of technology is inevitable, the argument 
suggests that the leading countries should not only lead the development of new 
technologies but also lead the diffusion and commercialisation of new technologies 
and the creation of new markets. 
Indeed, it is the major weakness of the European textile industry and other 
European industries in general. Colombo (1977) who identified the different 
characters of industrial innovation between the US, Japan and Europe found that 
Europe with its long tradition of scientific research was relatively weak in relation to 
its competitors to direct research in universities towards industrial development. In 
other words, Europe's lack of entrepreneurial spirits has resulted in its lagging in the 
commercial exploitation of technologies and weakness in product development. The 
failure of Courtaulds to maintain its advantage as the first-mover in the 
commercialisation of carbon fibres is a useful example. The firm which used to be 
the largest carbon fibre producer in Europe in 1970s-1980s pursued high volume 
markets (sporting goods and military applications) and refused to diversify into niche 
markets. Its position in the sporting goods market was challenged by low-cost 
competitors (particularly Japanese firms), while its military market disappeared 
following the end of Cold War in 1991. Under these circumstances, the poor return it 
received from its large investment which stemmed from its attempts to establish a 
significant presence especially in the US military market, forced the management to 
sell the business in 1991. Its high capacity made them reluctant to find markets in 
small emerging markets. Ironically, the acquirer, RK Carbon, was successful in the 
market through its diversification into several niche markets including break pads. 
Its main competitor, Toray, was a follower in the market, has become the largest 
carbon fibre manufacturer as it offered better technology (zero impurities) a critical 
requirement in high-value added markets, a route that was ignored by Courtaulds. 
This suggests that despite the lessons, the EU textile industry appears unable to 
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respond rapidly to a changing competitive environment, particularly when it involves 
radical change. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides the background of the 
global textile industry and the position of the European textile industry in the global 
textile trade. The story of the rise, fall, specialisation and fragmentation of the 
industry is presented from which the argument of this thesis, that is, to challenge the 
conventional assumption about traditional industries, is built. Chapter 2 presents a 
review of the relevant literature which underpins the argument. This covers the 
topics of innovation and the economics of technical change, business strategy, 
particularly industrial maturity and de-maturity, path-dependence of technological 
change and lock-in into the existing structure, dynamic capabilities and the open 
innovation. Chapter 3 discusses the debate about the decline of the British cotton 
industry. Various scholars have identified a number of factors that cause the decline, 
all of which gravitate towards the `irreversible' decline. The analysis here is used to 
develop the argument of de-maturity or `reversibility' of the European textile 
industry. 
Chapter 4 discusses the impact of technological change on the development 
of the textile industry. The analysis focuses on the science and technologies which 
have great (radical) impacts on textile technologies, products and markets, that is, 
polymers technology and advanced materials. This chapter shows that the 
development of technology in the textile industry is indeed very dynamic. This 
supports the argument to challenge the conventional wisdom/assumption about the 
maturity of technological development in the industry. 
Indeed, this study finds that a number of traditional textile firms have radically 
changed their technology, market and organisational practices, and managed a long 
period of transition to become technical textile producers. For all intents and purposes, 
these firms have initiated the process of de-maturity and escaped the maturity-trap. The 
three case studies in three different European countries illustrate different paths of 
firms' evolution ranging from: a firm that is in serious danger of falling into the maturity 
trap; and firms that have successfully bypassed the maturity trap. The selection of 
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different national firms is necessary to highlight the country-specific history which 
influences specific evolutionary paths. 
The lessons from the decline of the British textile industry and the failure of 
one of its major players, Courtaulds, indicate that rapid changes in a mature industry 
are often problematic. To achieve the balance between incremental and radical 
change often involves a very complex process. The complexity and the process of 
change at the firm level are discussed in greater detail in each of the case studies 
presented in Chapters 5-7. The case studies reveal that whilst technological 
capability is the key determining factor of competitiveness, entrepreneurial 
organisation and good leadership are equally important to sustain competitive 
advantages because they determine the rate and direction of innovation and change 
at the firm level. Chapter 8 draws the conclusion and policy implication of the study. 
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The Textile Industry: 
A Question of Survival 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews a broad range of literature that provides the necessary 
theoretical framework to analyse the transformation of the European textile industry. 
The framework provides the foundation for the central issue of this study, that is, to 
explain the manner in which mature European textile firms have; 1) failed to retain 
their leadership; and 2) survived and, moreover, prospered -although they have 
experienced enormous economic and technological changes especially during the 
1930s, 1970s and 2000s. The relevant literature intertwines the economic, innovation 
and management fields and is divided into four sections. The first two sections 
present the theories that are fundamental in our understanding of industrial maturity 
and the causes of the maturity-trap. The first section discusses the process of 
maturity and factors that contribute to the maturity-trap. In this section, the cause of 
the decline of the British cotton industry is explained using the maturity and 
maturity-trap framework by Abernathy et al. (1983). The implication of path- 
dependence in technological change and in the evolution of organisational capability 
and its effects on the maturity-trap or inertia are explored in the second section. The 
third section reviews the literature relevant to the phenomenon of de-maturity. This 
concept is the most appropriate for analysing the transition of the European textile 
industry from a mature to a knowledge-based industry. We use the industrial de- 
maturity framework by Abernathy et al. (1983) as the conceptual framework. 
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Although the framework was originally applied to analyse the US automotive 
industry between 1900 and 1979, Abernathy et al. (1983) indicated that the 
framework should also be applicable to different industries. 
The fourth section concerns a framework which discusses a shift of 
innovation paradigm in high-technology industry. The framework, the Open 
Innovation Paradigm (Chesbrough, 2006), provides the basic understanding of 
innovation paradigms that should be adopted by firms to compete in a rapid 
changing business environment in the 21St century. The framework is useful to 
analyse a shift in innovation paradigm experienced by a number of textile firms in 
Europe, from being entirely dependent on their suppliers prior to the 1970s to 
strategically placing research and development as the major source of competitive 
advantage. 
The thesis of maturity and de-maturity examine provide the analytical 
framework for our basic argument. However, they do not provide sufficient 
explanatory foundation for the process or the nature of continuous change in 
technology, markets and organisation undertaken by innovative firms aimed at 
shifting the competitive factor away from cost reduction to product performance or 
technological leadership. The last section is dedicated to review literature that 
complements the de-maturity and the open innovation paradigm frameworks to 
explain the transformation process at the firm level. This discussion emphasises the 
dynamics of organisational capabilities in their responses to dynamic environments. 
2.2 Industrial Maturity and the Maturity-Trap 
Industrial maturity has been studied by a number of economic and business 
historians (see for example Vatter, 1975, Abernathy and Utterback, 1978, Abernathy, 
et al., 1983, Owen, 1999). It occurs as a consequence of dynamic relations between 
market share, competition and technological advancement. According to Abernathy 
and Utterback (1978) at the early stage of industrial evolution (fluid phase), 
production flexibility is critical to deal with a number of factors such as uncertainties 
in market demand and technology, instability of supply and possible frequent major 
changes in products. Uncertainties force firms to invest in rather small scale plants or 
development projects to reduce the risk of undefined markets and products. 
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Competition is determined by functional product performance rather than costs. 
Therefore, innovation attempts emphasise on product development rather than 
process improvement (Figure 2-1). The moment market demand is well understood 
and product features and attributes are defined, a dominant design emerges 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990). At this stage, firms begin to shift their innovation 
activities from product development to capacity and market expansion through the 
adoption of modem and capital intensive production systems -or process innovation- 
and the implementation of complex organisational structure (transitional path). Thus, 
innovation becomes incremental in nature. The diffusion of knowledge and know- 
how facilitates the growing number of competitors (imitators). Growing competition 
and/or slowing market growth forces firms to improve efficiency in order to improve 
productivity and reduce costs through economies of scale. At this stage the industry 
is heading towards the mature stage. In short, the process from the development 





Figure 2-1. The dynamics of innovation- the shift from product innovation to process 
innovation during the transition towards maturity 
Source: Utterback (1994) p. xvii 
In a mature industry, the relationship between demand and technologies to 
fulfil such demand has been established and widely understood. Competition is very 
intense as the barriers to entry are sufficiently low to permit new entrants. All 
players perceive competition in the same manner and follow the same strategy to 
compete with one another. The nature of competition shifts from being driven by 
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technological or product performance to by product appearance, market share and 
efficiency to improve productivity (Styles and Goddard, 2004) that affect costs. 
Such a pattern of industrial innovation can be exemplified by the 
development of nylon. In its early development stage, the production was performed 
within a small scale plant in which a series of trial and error of product development 
for a number of different markets were undertaken. The first market for nylon was 
the toothbrush. From this market DuPont, the owner of the technology, learned to 
improve the process technology and searched for other potential markets. The firm 
found the technology had the potential to substitute silk fibres in the women's 
hosiery market. It started to develop the processing technology to produce nylon 
filaments which suited the requirements for knitted stockings. Following intensive 
market research and product development to define market needs and the most 
efficient production processes the firm built larger production plants to increase 
production capacity and improve efficiency. This allowed the firm to increase its 
market share. Following the expiry of the related patent which permitted other firms 
to produce similar products for the same market, competition intensified. As market 
demand was well understood and the technology and the relevant know-how were 
widely accessible, the basis of competition shifted to costs. At this point, the market 
was moving towards the mature stage. 
Low cost products can be achieved through the utilisation of large volume 
production processes. This requires a set of equipment operating in a standardized, 
automated system. The equipment undertakes a series of tasks and reduces the need 
for highly skilled labour and can be purchased off-the-shelf. Under such 
circumstances new competitors from low-cost countries with abundant low-skilled 
labour can enter the same market. Barriers to entry which at the earlier stage rest on 
technological competence shift to, among other things, the magnitude of initial 
capital, market share controlled by the existing players and, in some cases, proximity 
to markets. The developed countries start to receive pressures to reduce costs to 
adapt to the new competition brought in by new low-cost competitors. Consequently, 
producers in developed countries are forced to relocate production facilities to 
countries that offer cost advantages. 
The development of textile machinery follows such a pattern. In the early 
development of textile spinning and weaving machinery, spinning jenny, mules and 
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flying shuttle looms were considered to be high technology as they replaced aspects 
of manual work. They were flexible, being able to spin and weave different 
standards of quality of cotton fibres. Skilled labour was required to operate the 
machines. Attempts to standardize textile production began when an American, John 
Thorp, invented ring spinning in 1828. He invented equipment that can replace 
skilled labour so that the equipment could be operated by less-skilled labour. 
Innovations in textile machinery that followed placed greater emphasis on 
automation, high speed and throughput, and moved towards mass production. The 
economic boom following the Second World War which encouraged consumerism 
in the US facilitated the fast growth of global demand. This facilitated the diffusion 
of the mass production systems to Europe and, eventually, to other parts of the globe. 
The widespread diffusion of the machinery allowed low-cost countries with 
abundant low-skilled labour to enter textile and clothing markets. It encouraged 
Japan, India, and, later on, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Pakistan, China and North 
African countries to build up textile production capabilities. Fierce competition from 
the new competitors forced a wave of relocation of clothing and textile production 
from the Western countries to Asia and North Africa which started in the 1970s. 
Such a development has encouraged the globalisation of textile and clothing 
production in which the developed countries can source products from other parts of 
the globe. This situation has put greater pressures on the European textile and 
clothing firms to a point where they were forced to become service firms which only 
design and market the products. 
Industrial maturity is not only a consequence of the relationship between 
changes in technology, market share and competition. According to Hayes and 
Abernathy (1980), it is also a consequence of managerial failure -both vision and 
leadership. They argue that the management principles that favour short-term cost 
reduction rather than long-term development of technological competitiveness can 
gradually erode the propensity and the capacity of firms to innovate. This approach 
prioritised short-term incremental improvements at the expense of more risky R&D 
projects that may need several years to generate profits but may provide a new long- 
term competitive advantage. The behaviour is a result of a heavy reliance on control 
over short-term financial measurements (return on investment, ROI) which drive the 
management to become more and more adverse to risk. This is argued to be the 
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cause which led to the decline of the competitiveness of the American manufacturing 
sector in the 1970s. 
Hayes and Abernathy's argument concurs with a number of studies 
concerning the decline of the Lancashire cotton industry. Lazonick (1983), Lazonick 
and Mass (1990) and Owen, (1999) suggest that the decline was indeed a result of 
myopic business strategy and organisational inertia. Lazonick argues that 
entrepreneurial failure, that is, managers' inability to alter business constraints or to 
break barriers to change to create new profit opportunities amid fierce new 
competition from low-cost countries, was a major factor that led to the decline. 
Managers could not appreciate the need to change and diversify into different 
markets where their key capabilities were competitive. Instead, they remained in the 
business which had lost its competitive advantage and continued to implement the 
same strategy which was no longer suitable to a new environment. Management was 
not able to escape from or alter the situation (the emergence of cost competition and 
low-cost competitors) as it perceived as given. Consequently, the firms were locked- 
in to the existing structure, technology and market. Meanwhile, Owen suggests that 
misdirected strategy -using an outdated strategy to be applied in a new business 
environment - orchestrated the demise of the industry. Their arguments indicate that 
the industry's rigidity is a result of structural problems, in which it favours a familiar 
strategy, market and technology although the competitive environment has changed. 
Sull (2000) names such behaviour 'active inertia' while Levitt and March 
(1988) refer it to the 'performance-trap'. It is an unintentional tendency among 
management to reinforce the status quo by its actions in response to competition, 
particularly in mature markets. Leonard-Barton (1992) suggests that such inertia 
could be a consequence of deeply-rooted `core capabilities". These capabilities, 
built on past successes and have become the firm's core competence, can cause 
organisational inflexibility in a changing environment. In addition, Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1988) suggest that such inertia may be caused by lock-in to a specific 
set of fixed assets or by unwillingness to close down existing product lines. 
' Knowledge sets that distinguish and provide a competitive advantage and comprise of four 
dimensions: 1) technical systems, 2) managerial systems, 3) knowledge and skills, and 4) value and 
norms, all of which are associated with the various types of embodied and embedded knowledge, and 
with the processes of knowledge creation and control (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
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When an industry matures, the infrastructure and business networks become 
large and complex so that fundamental changes become extremely costly and risky. 
At the firm level, as firms grow and mature their organisational functions, routines 
and production processes expand and the relationship among those factors become 
more complex. As these interrelationships have been accumulated and are deeply- 
embedded in the firms over a long period of time the scale of change required to 
shift the business has increased. Under such circumstances, firms tend to favours 
their established technologies, markets, production systems and structure in their 
pursuit for improvement rather than radically restructuring the established system. 
Abernathy et al. (1983) name such a phenomenon the `maturity-trap' -an inability or 
unwillingness among managers or business owners to fundamentally change 
business practices. Although Abernathy et al. (1983) refer to a lack of 
entrepreneurial leadership and organisational capabilities as factors that affect the 
maturity-trap, the study did not examine these aspects further. For our purposes 
here, a new interpretation of the maturity-trap is required, wherein an organisation 
not only favours established products and production processes in its search for 
improvement, but also has great difficulties to break away from the established 
culture, routines, skills, knowledge, and internal and external relationships. 
The maturity-trap is argued to be the major factor which caused the loss of 
the British textile industry's competitiveness in the 1930s and the failure to restore it 
in the 1970s. The industry has been under immense pressures since the First World 
War because of the emergence of the Japanese textile industry which offered similar 
quality products at much lower prices. Rather than seeking new sources of income 
through the creation of new products for new markets, the industry opted for cost 
reduction strategy (prior to 1970s) and mergers and acquisitions for market 
consolidation (Owen, 1999). The industry in general neglected radical change 
despite the fact that its traditional competitive advantage had eroded. 
More alarmingly, the maturity-trap does not only affect firms operating in the 
traditional textile market but also those in the technical textile market. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, Courtaulds' failed diversification attempts in synthetic fibres 
and carbon fibre show that indeed the firm made significant efforts to adopt and 
commercialise new technologies. Its failure rested on its decision to use the same 
strategy and organisational structure which were used to be successful in the 
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development and commercialisation of viscose and acetate fibres. Furthermore, its 
short-termism caused the firm to make poor business decisions to gain short-term 
profits in the emerging carbon fibre market. The firm pursued large volume, lower 
value-added markets (the market it understood better through its main rayon 
business) and neglected high value added products for niche markets. This led to the 
demise of the once largest carbon fibre producer in Europe. 
2.3 Path-Dependency 
The path-dependent and lock-in phenomena in studies concerning economic 
change has widely been discussed following the publication of the economics of 
QWERTY (David, 1986) and the effects of positive feedback and increasing returns 
in competing technologies on the lock-in phenomenon (Arthur, 1989). Through a 
narrative economic history of QWERTY, David asserts that history matters in 
economic evolution such that `historical accidents' or temporally remote events may 
have significant influences upon the eventual outcome. With this approach, David 
postulates that it is feasible to interpret which changes are the most influential to the 
development of a particular path. The relationships could form `cause and effect' 
interactions in a dynamic system, or `soft determinism' - historical events make 
pathways in certain directions more probable than in others (Rosenberg, 1994). 
Among the studies on path-dependency (see, for example Arthur, 1989, Rosenberg, 
1994, David, 1994), those that discuss path-dependence in technological change 
(Rosenberg, 1994) and organizational evolution (David, 1994) are particularly 
relevant to this study. Rosenberg (1994) argues that the key factors that influence the 
direction of technical change at one point are the stock of technological knowledge 
(or the spectrum of technological options) and economic forces. The former is 
determined by the presently available scientific knowledge is built on the previously 
available scientific knowledge and technologies. The economic forces influence the 
decision to undertake a search process in a direction that is foreseen to have 
significant potential demand in the future. 
One implication of the path-dependent concept is the country-specific market 
(specialisation) identified in the EU textile industry. The Italian textile industry built 
its textile competence on its unique structure, close relationships between textile 
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manufacturers, fashion designers and textile machinery makers, and its pool of 
fashion designers. These assets have facilitated the formation of the high quality 
fashion industry as its core market. This choice may have led to the unintentional 
exclusion of the diffusion of synthetic materials - the non-desirable materials in the 
market - into the textile industry. Although this appears not to have a direct 
implication to its strategic choice, the exclusion of synthetic materials from the 
Italian textile industry's strategic long-term development has caused the slow 
development of the technical textile market. This condition may put the industry in a 
serious danger in the future as its core market has been in decline. 
The slow diffusion of synthetic materials in to the textile industry appears to 
be influenced by the slow development of organic chemistry in the country. Italy 
was behind in research in the field compared to Germany, Britain and France, the 
other three major textile nations in Europe. During the development of the organic 
chemical industry in Europe, Italy imported special plastics for its consumption. As a 
result of this, the linkage between the textile manufacturers and the chemical fibre 
producers has never been strong. The evolution of the industry has therefore 
revolved around the areas where its `stock of knowledge' was more competitive, that 
is, in design, quality and production flexibility. The development of the German 
textile industry, on the other hand, has been driven by its large stock of knowledge in 
chemical engineering and machine-tools manufacturing. As a result, the country 
leads the development in technical textiles. 
Economic forces play a strategic role in driving the application of new 
technologies. For instance, competition in the aircraft industry, global warming and 
rising oil prices has encouraged demand for aircraft with greater fuel efficiency. 
Light-weight carbon composites found an application in the industry to replace metal 
sheets in certain sections of the aircraft's body. Likewise, the trend in non-invasive 
medical treatment opens up immense potential applications in biosensing and drug 
delivery. 
The illustration demonstrates that the path-dependent nature of technological 
development, the stock of technological knowledge and economic forces encourage 
developments in particular directions. According to Rosenberg (1994), the greater 
the stock of technological knowledge possessed by a firm, the lower the cost of 
acquisition of some particular new technologies. In other words, the stock of 
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technological knowledge renders acquisition of certain alternative technologies 
easier or cheaper. 
How do firms diversify their knowledge in the areas which are distant from 
their productive activities? The case studies of Ten Cate and Freudenberg address 
this issue. At Freudenberg, its knowledge and large networks in the automotive 
industry encouraged the firm to start research in fuel cell technology, although it did 
not have the competence in the field. The firm found that its competence in the 
development and manufacturing of nonwovens could be developed to produce gas 
diffusion layers, an important component of fuel cells. In addition, its core 
competence in seal technology could be leveraged to produce seals for fuel cells. 
The latter is particularly critical to strengthen Freudenberg's position in the value 
chain because the technology plays a significant role in the efficiency of the 
assembly of fuel cells in the future. Freudenberg did not pursue other important fuel 
cell component technologies such as membranes and catalysts as the firm's stock of 
knowledge was not sufficient to add the necessary value to the market. 
Consequently, the cost to generate capability in the field would be higher. 
The illustration demonstrates the cumulative nature of the development of 
technological knowledge at the firm level as argued by Rosenberg (1994). From the 
case studies, the path-dependent nature of knowledge development does not 
necessarily result in the phenomenon of lock-in. Diversification of competencies also 
involves some degree of path-dependent change. The firm generates new 
competencies through the combination of its established competencies and new 
technological knowledge it acquires from external sources that include its customers, 
partners and suppliers, as well as from collaborative research. The case studies also 
reveal that the decision to adopt a particular technology from a number of 
alternatives is not only dependent upon the stock of knowledge and economic forces. 
Other factors also considerably influence the firms' decision such as the cost of 
adoption, the perceived economic benefits, individual and organisational cognition, 
the availability of complementary technologies and the competitors' activities. The 
finding confirms and, moreover, extends Rosenberg's argument about factors that 
influence the path-dependent nature of technological change. 
Furthermore, the case studies also suggest that the selection process to find 
potential markets for a new technology is also path-dependent. The firm's existing 
49 
Chapter 2 -The Textile Industry: A Question of Survival 
market is often selected as the initial target for a new product because of familiarity 
with market demand, customer behaviour and established marketing networks. In 
many cases the initial market is not necessarily the eventual market from which a 
great deal of profit is generated. Nevertheless, the initial market provides the 
opportunity to learn a number of aspects related to the technology and production 
processes, from which new applications may be found. The development of nylon as 
discussed earlier is an instance. In another instance, Freudenberg initially developed 
nonwovens to substitute leather materials which disappeared prior to the Second 
World War. The leather market, however, reappeared after the war. The firm started 
to develop nonwovens for interlinings and technical applications from which it has 
generated the largest profit. Rosenberg (1994) indicates that such process of market 
development demonstrates market uncertainties entailed in the commercialisation of 
new technologies. 
In relation to path-dependence of organisational change, David (1994) argues 
that organisations and institutions are the `carriers of history', in that the past events 
continuously influence the shape of the present, and that history matters to the 
formation of human organisations and institutions. David (1994) indicates that the 
phenomenon is evident in the process of change of organisational procedures that 
include learning, coordination, and information filtration and interpretation. 
Complementary procedures are gradually added into the existing system to satisfy 
some economic or social purposes that are important in particular period of time. 
The new procedures are adapted to the existing ones so that organisations evolve 
their precedent-base rule structures incrementally. Historical precedents are crucial 
in shaping the entire organisational functions and structures, simply because each of 
the additional components must be adapted to interlock with the pre-existing 
components. As a consequence of the interlocked functions, structures or procedures, 
changing or eliminating one established component is costly and risky because it 
may affect other components. Incremental change is thus preferable to minimize the 
risk of organisational turbulence and adjustment costs. One implication of this 
process is that the historical context out of which organisations are formed can 
become enduring constraints. Organisations are less adaptive to a rapidly changing 
environment which may lead to the phenomenon of lock-in. In this context, the lock- 
in phenomenon is caused by the failure of organisational and structural systems 
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which renders an organisation inflexible. This study proposes a reinterpretation of 
lock-in to the existing structure, technology, market and routine. It is argued that 
lock-in attributes to the maturity-trap as a consequence of firms' inability to break 
down the barriers to change in a mature market. 
David (1994) recognises the paradox faced by organisations. On one hand, 
organisations are rigid and less adaptive as a consequence of deeply-rooted complex 
procedures or routines. On the other hand, it is critical to overcome barriers to 
change in order to avoid being acquired or even ingested by competitors. This 
requires breaking away from the established routines, knowledge and skills to 
achieve path-breaking change. However, he does not discuss further the process to 
break the barriers to change or inertia. 
The path-dependent concept is criticised by Garud and Karnoe (2001) who 
are concerned about the limitation of the approach to deal with deliberate efforts to 
create new paths or 'path creation' and escape lock-in. The concept tells us little on 
how new paths come into being, despite the fact that many industries such as 
automotive and telecommunications have shifted their technologies and development 
paths which have enabled them to compete in a changing competitive landscape. In 
the automotive industry, for instance, the development of hybrid, electric or fuel cell 
cars has sparked new optimism among the European car makers as the new 
paradigms may help them to escape from the Chinese and Indian car makers' plans 
to flood the market with cheap cars. Likewise, the transformation of the European 
textile industry from initially producing traditional cotton textiles to developing solar 
cell fabrics, fuel cell component technology and functional fabrics certainly requires 
explanation, not only from the a technical change standpoint but also from the 
organisational change point of view. 
At the firm level, the path-dependent concept has a major flaw in that it can 
not explain firms' capabilities to reinvent themselves and become successful in 
driving new businesses forward in domains that are entirely new from their original 
competencies. A longitudinal study of the development of fibre glass technology by 
Coming is a useful example (Cattani, 2006). Cattani found that the development of 
fibre glass technology was as a result of the redeployment of Coming's traditional 
know-how in specialty glass, particularly the flame hydrolysis process to 
manufacture fused silica using the vapour deposition method. The production 
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process and method was redeployed to produce glass that could satisfy the 
requirements of long-distance telecommunications networks. The new technology 
successfully replaced the dominance of copper wire in the long distant 
telecommunications sectors, a sector that unrelated tp Coming's traditional market. 
The redeployment of existing knowledge into a new domain is referred to as 
technology speciation (Levinthal, 1998). This demonstrates the manner in which an 
established firm develops a breakthrough technology derived from the modification 
of its established knowledge. The breakthrough impact of the redeployment of 
technology is a consequence of distinct selection criteria and the degree of resources 
abundance in the new application domains. In the case of the application of glass 
fibres for the telecommunications industry, as the performance requirements in the 
new application was very different to those of the original application (specialty 
glass), Coming adopted new technologies and combined them with its glass 
processing capabilities. The study thereby supports the path-dependent framework in 
technological change, on one hand, as well as path-breaking change, on the other. 
While knowledge accumulation and adoption is path-dependent, the application of 
existing knowledge into a new domain breaks the firm's development path away 
from its traditional path. 
This case study of Coming suggests that path-dependent change may lead to 
two opposite consequences. The first is the phenomenon of lock-in, and the second is 
the phenomenon of path-creation. The path creation refers to the circumstances 
whereby firms are locked-in to an inefficient structure and are trying to break out 
from such a structure through the modification of their existing competencies. 
Studies that address the process of path-breaking change at the firm level by which 
firms break away from the existing paths and create new competencies are crucial. 
This is one of the major concerns being investigated in this study. 
Teece (2007) briefly addresses the issue of path-creation. He proposes the 
concept of `break-out structure' by which an entirely different set of structures and 
procedures are established to facilitate radical change in technology, product, market 
and routines. It may involve transfers of non-tradable assets to and from other 
organisations through, among other things, mergers, acquisitions, divestments and 
licensing, particularly where market failure exists. A number of (quantitative) 
empirical studies favour acquisitions as the means to access new resources in an 
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attempt to break out from path-dependent change (Karim and Mitchell, 2000, 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Access to new resources and combine them with 
existing capabilities can facilitate the development of new and unique competencies 
by which firms develop new competitive advantage, create new value proposition, 
overcome barriers to entry, and reduce organisational inertia. The need for 
acquisitions arises from the imperfect tradability of routine and resources. When 
substantial change is needed within a relatively short period, acquisitions are more 
favourable as they provide new opportunities for path-breaking changes (Karim and 
Mitchell, 2000). Path-breaking change results in fundamental business and 
organisational reconfiguration and may allow the acquirers to possess resources that 
are new to the firms and to the industry, although, some degree of path-dependence 
remains (Colpan and Hikino, 2005). 
There are a number of studies that examine the factors which encourage 
corporate decisions in developing (internally) or buying (externally) of new 
competencies (see for example Narula, 2001, Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). 
Compared to the external acquisitions, the internal development is believed to be 
more constructive to reinforce existing resources or to perform incremental changes 
(path-dependent changes). Narula (2001), however, argues that the underlying 
factors that determine the routes to source new knowledge (internal R&D, R&D 
alliances or outsourcing) are closely related to the development stage of the 
associated technologies, that is, pre-paradigmatic (before the emergence of a 
dominant design or ferment phase) and post-paradigmatic (after the emergence of a 
dominant design or mature phase), and the distribution of technological 
competencies of a firm. He purports that in the pre and post-paradigmatic stage, if 
the technology has no fundamental effects to the firm and multiple sources are 
available, regardless of the speed of technological development, outsourcing is the 
common practice. In this case, firms may decide to acquire some shares of the R&D 
partners as outsourcing may have an effect on the firm's confidentiality. In contrast, 
if the technology being developed is fundamental to the firm's major 
competitiveness, in-house R&D in combination with alliances with competitors (to 
create new standards) and suppliers (to establish a dominant design) is the most 
appropriate route. If the pace of technological development is taken into 
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consideration, in addition to costs and the level of uncertainty, alliances are more 
favourable. 
Here we agree with the arguments of Narula (2001), Karim and Mitchell 
(2000) and Teece (2007), that internal R&D should be combined with acquisitions of 
external competencies and research collaborations. The combination of these routes 
allows firms to continuously generate new technologies and products, and create 
new competencies. With regards to the maturity-trap, the new concept should be 
adopted by mature firms in order to bypass or break out of the maturity-trap. As 
suggested by Leonard-Barton (1982), core capabilities evolve, thus, corporate 
survival is dependent upon successfully managing that evolution. 
The findings of this study make a considerable contribution to the issue 
above by providing new insights to the path-dependent concept pioneered David 
(1986) and Arthur (1989). He suggests that path dependence is related to the 
proposition that history matters, increasing returns and lock-in. His argument, to a 
great deal, supports the argument of the maturity-trap, wherein those factors 
reinforce short-termism, rigid production processes and inflexible organisational 
routines and structures. This study, however, reveals that when competing 
technologies exist, there are firms that want to break away from the existing 
paradigm driven by the desire to be different from competitors or to capitalise from 
emerging markets. Interestingly, the process of creation of new paths involves some 
degree of path-dependent change. As an illustration, in-depth knowledge in textile 
technology and processes may not sufficient to transform a traditional textile 
manufacturer to become a spacecraft manufacturer. However, the knowledge, when 
it is combined with knowledge in advanced materials and composite technology, 
may enable a textile producer to manufacture woven carbon composites for 
spacecraft component technologies. 
2.4 Industrial De-Maturity 
The conventional wisdom assumes that the decline of mature industries in 
developed economies is irreversible; therefore, the developed countries have to let 
their mature industries to fall into decline and use the resources for more competitive 
activities. Abernathy, et al. (1983) argue, however, that mature industries can be 
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revived through innovations that can change the basis of competition from costs to 
technological competence. The argument, called industrial de-maturity, contends that 
manufacturing industry can arrest maturity and even, for some circumstances, 
reverse the process of maturity. The concept was developed to analyse the problem 
faced by the US automobile industry in the face the emergence of new low-cost 
competitors, that is, the Japanese automobile makers, in the 1970s. The new 
competitors satisfied the emerging demand which leaned towards smaller, cheaper 
and fuel-efficient cars with greater variety. Mass production systems employed by 
the US car makers which was characterised by large production volume, long 
production run and standardized products could not satisfy the new demand as it 
required production system flexibility and tighter quality control in each stage of the 
production process. They found themselves trapped in a large and complex supply 
chain developed to produce large, fuel inefficient cars with very little model variety. 
Abernathy et al. (1983) suggest that the decline of the US automobile 
industry should have been responded to in a positive manner by encouraging more 
radical innovation(s) to restore its competitive advantage. This form of industrial 
renewal required fundamental changes in the innovation paradigm and organisational 
practices. In this regards, the industry should learn from its own history, particularly 
during its early development which has brought the industry competitive at the first 
place. The US car industry was built on Henry Ford's innovative efforts in product 
design, production and inventory systems. During the period, innovation, often 
radical, was performed continuously. However, as pressures in the market to reduce 
costs mounted, radical innovation became more incremental, the production system 
was standardized to improve efficiency and product variety was very low to avoid 
any interruption during production. To restore its competitiveness, the US car 
makers needed to change its outdated paradigm. Only by doing this could the 
industry initiate the process of de-maturity. 
It shows that de-maturity can be driven by the collapse of stable relationships 
between customer preferences and the design concept of the technologies that fulfil 
the needs2. If the new demand is sufficiently dissimilar from the one it supersedes, 
2 Stable relationships occur in a mature industry. Such relationships are increasingly vulnerable to 
changes in technology, market preferences, and relative prices. Indeed, it carries intrinsic threats of 
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"producers may need to seek out new technology, to revise design concepts, to 
reintroduce innovation as an important element in competition, and to undertake 
new rounds of iterative learning. They may also be confronted by new technologies 
that make possible entirely new technical approaches to product attributes or 
previously unattainable levels of product performance" (Abernathy, et al., 1983, p. 
27-28). Such a condition may encourage firms to move away from the prevalent 
innovation paradigm in a mature industry, that is, incremental innovation and initiate 
radical change. 
There are three types of change in industrial development that may create the 
condition for de-maturity, that is, new technical options, changes in customer 
demands and government policy (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). Government policy 
has been the driver of the development of radical technologies or the creation of new 
demand. The most recent instance is the policy on climate change which has been 
the driver for R&D in low-carbon energy. This policy has induced new demands in 
clean energy for different applications. The change could provide new opportunities 
for long-term growth. Therefore, firms should take the necessary actions to tap into 
the new trends through offensive innovations that "destroy the value of present 
competences, may alter the relative positions of competitors, attract new entrants 
and redraw an industry's competitive boundaries" (Abernathy, at al,. 1983, p. 28). 
In other words, de-maturity can be initiated in the occurrence of "innovation that 
changes an industry's basis of competition3 at the same time that it disrupts 
established production competence, marketing and distribution systems, capital 
equipment, organisational structures and the skills of both managers and workers" 
(p. 109). 
It suggests that de-maturity corresponds to the departure from innovation 
characteristics, organisational structures, routines and firms' core competencies that 
are prevalent in the mature stage to achieve a new stage of growth. As the major 
driver of de-maturity is the collapse of stable relationships between customer needs 
and the relevant technology the transition towards de-maturity can be explained 
upheaval if there is a sudden or radical shift of those aspects brought in by new competitors, 
technologies, demand, regulations (Abernathy, et al., 1983). 
3 The dimension of product and process among which firms seek to differentiate themselves from 
their competitors. 
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through the transition of innovation phases which are a function of its impact on 
productive systems and market linkages. The process of de-maturity is a transition 
process from incremental phase to radical phase or to architectural phase (Figure 
2-2). The transition goes beyond the adoption of new technologies as a means for 
survival. Rather, it involves complex dynamic interactions between technology and 
market preferences, and entails learning processes to facilitate the creation of new 
competencies. Therefore, de-maturity involves not only a shift in technological 
innovation but also in markets and products, production systems, competencies and 
organisational structure and routines (Table 2-1). This process can provide new 
opportunities for firms to regain their technological competitive advantage. 
Niche creation -the creation of market opportunities through extensive use of 
existing technology- may be the more favourable means for firms in a mature 
industry to create new sources of profit. This innovation is less risky and does not 
need a great deal of change in terms of technology, production systems and 
organisational structure and routines. De-maturity, however, has greater effects on 
firms' long-term growth because it allows them to achieve a competitive advantage 
through technological competencies, which is the characteristics of the growth path 
of an industry. 





Refining existing system, major 




1-# Regular Phase 
Maturity --- 
Low 
Architectural Phase -fluid 
phase prior to the emergence of De-maturity dominant design 
i 
i Impact on 





Figure 2-2. Evolution of Technology Transilience 
Source: Adapted from Abernathy et al. (1983) 
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Creation Phase Mature Phase 
Technological 
innovation 
Radical or architectural innovation Incremental Innovation 
Products Low volume, un-standardized 
products 
High volume, standardized 
products 
Technological phases Technological fluid Technological standardized 
Production systems Open-ended and unstructured system Rigid and elaborately structured 
Organisational control informal and entrepreneurial Formal, emphasis on control, 
goals and rules 
Transition towards maturity 
Transition towards de-maturity 
Table 2-1. The characteristics of the creation and mature phase, and the direction of change 
(Source: adapted from Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) 
As to the changed competitive environment experienced by the US 
automobile industry, the European textile industry's competitiveness has been 
severely hit by the arrival of low-cost competitors since the 1930s. A number of 
innovative textile firms in Europe responded to this new competition by creating and 
adopting new technologies that advanced their current competencies in textile 
production but, at the same time, destroyed their present competencies in traditional 
textiles to build new competencies in technical textiles. As a result, new markets, 
new marketing, distribution and production systems, new knowledge and new 
organisational structures and cultures were created and adopted. Germany and the 
Netherlands are two countries that had been successful in shifting their textile 
capabilities from traditional textile manufacturing to technical textile development 
earlier than other European countries. Up to now, Germany remains the largest 
technical textile producer in Europe. Thus, the experience of the European textile 
firms is very relevant to the concept of de-maturity. 
At the firm level, innovative textile firms which developed new competencies 
in high-value-added textiles for technical applications experienced similar rigorous 
change in various aspects of the business. The firms experience a comprehensive 
transformation from traditional to technology-driven firms through a long process of 
transition. This became a trend in the mid 1990s as the new innovation paradigm in 
textiles that involved scientific advances and R&D started to attract the wider 
attention of the European textile community. Innovation shifted from merely 
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adopting new textile processing technologies to improve efficiency and reduce costs 
to creating new high-performance textiles derived from advanced materials and 
improved processing technologies. Due to the high level of performance demanded 
by the technical textile market, textile firms initiated in-house R&D and often 
collaborative research with other firms. Such a shift in innovative activities or 
innovation paradigm, according to Abernathy at al. (1983) was an indication of de- 
maturity. 
Such a shift was a response at the firm level to the failed protectionist regime 
led by the EU. Although the development rate of technical textiles has continuously 
increased since the 1990s following the diffusion of the technology within and 
across industries, the EU did not initiate a concerted effort to transform the industry 
until 2004 with the introduction of The European Technology Platform as mentioned 
in Chapter 1. Attempts to turn the EU textile industry around indicates that the topic 
of industrial de-maturity is still of contemporary importance. Despite the changing 
innovation paradigm, the industrial taxonomy maintains the classification of the 
textile industry within the low-tech or traditional industry (OECD, 1986) or supplier- 
led industry (Pavitt, 1984). Indeed, innovation studies in the textile industry remain 
focused on the traditional section of the industry and overlook the technical textile 
sector which has been the main driver of technological change and growth in the past 
two decades. 
The innovation literature has not only overlooked innovation in the textile 
industry. In fact, it has overemphasised studies on R&D intensive sectors and 
undermined the importance of the low-and medium-technology industries (LMT) for 
the economy in general (Robertson, et al., 2009, von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2006, 
Sandven, et al., 2005). It is rather surprising as the LMT industries dominate the 
economies of the developed and developing economies in terms of output, capital 
investment or employment. In Europe, the sector represented 90 per cent of 
manufacturing output in 2006. The textile industry itself contributed to four percent 
of the EU manufacturing output. It suggests that the LMT sectors are far more 
dynamic and innovative than it has been widely believed. They constantly upgrade 
and adopt new and emerging high technologies to revolutionise their markets and 
renew their competencies. The sectors have experienced a transformation 
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characterised by the use of more advanced technologies, greater variety of product 
offerings, market diversification and restructuring. 
The discussion about the transformation process -the nature, the 
characteristics and the drivers- of a mature industry has been very limited (Freddi, 
2009). The transformation of the German textile industry discussed in Chapter 4 
shows that industrial transformation can only be achieved if the majority of firms 
have the capability to continuously adopt and commercialise new technologies to 
adapt to changing technology and demand. It suggests that industrial transformation 
requires the diffusion of technology not only in the textile industry but also in the 
user industries (such as military, medical and sports). Robertson et al. (2009) 
however indicate that the knowledge about the process of technological diffusion is 
not yet well understood. This must be addressed in innovation studies as robust 
knowledge in this subject will help the development of more effective technology 
and innovation policy to improve diffusion. 
Robertson et al. (2009) further argue that central to the uncertainty about the 
diffusion of technology is information flow. They suggest that the limited flow of 
information from technology providers to technology users or vice versa impedes 
diffusion. In this respect, the government can play a role to facilitate easy and cheap 
access to information. Freemand and Soete (1997) however suggest that a great deal 
of scientific and technological knowledge is accessible. If it is true, what factors that 
determine the different performance of firms? In other words, in the context of this 
study, what factors that determine some textile firms to fall into the maturity-trap 
whereas others successfully bypass the trap and initiate de-maturity? Here, it has 
been found that, for the latter group, access to information has to be complemented 
with sufficient innovative and entrepreneurial capabilities of firms. These 
capabilities enable firms to obtain information about markets in which their 
competencies can be competitive and the type of information they require and its 
sources. Furthermore, firms should have the capability to use the information to 
develop competitive products and sell them in their target markets. This includes 
collaborative R&D programmes with suppliers and potential customers. As demand 
for new products and the efficacy of new technologies are often uncertain at the 
early stage (Rosenberg, 1996) learning process is required. This process often entails 
a high level of investment and a considerable time frame. As resources are limited, 
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firms have to carefully examine and manage uncertainties. Above all, firms should 
possess the necessary culture to encourage continuous innovation and the ability to 
manage change. These two factors are particularly important as innovation on its 
own is not sufficient. It has to be complemented with management that can develop 
strategy to gain optimum benefits from innovation activities. All these factors 
together will help firms to bypass the danger of the maturity-trap and initiate de- 
maturity. 
This finding accentuates the importance of the study on the process and 
management of innovation and diffusion of new technologies at the firm level for 
policy making. A rigorous understanding on the process of innovation and diffusion 
and on the pre-requisite capabilities which ensure growth is a critical factor for the 
government to develop and implement effective technology and innovation policies. 
The capabilities can not be built overnight. They have to be developed and tested 
over the course of the history of a firm. Government therefore should address the 
development of these capabilities in their technology and innovation policies. 
De-maturity and Other Radical Technology Conceptual 
Frameworks 
Abernathy et al. (1983) argue that the process of de-maturity involves radical 
innovation which disrupts the established production competence, changes the basis 
of competition and has an impact on the established practices. Two studies that 
discusses technological disruption are the disruptive technological framework 
(Christensen, 1997) and technological discontinuities (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). These studies examine innovations that have an impact on the disruption of 
the existing technologies. Both approaches explain the manner in which established 
technologies are displaced by breakthrough technologies introduced by new entrants. 
The new technology destroys the existing competencies of established firms and 
causes environmental uncertainty. The impact of such a disruptive technology could 
reach to a point where the existing technologies become obsolete and corporate and 
industrial leadership is reshuffled. Under such circumstances, competitors or users 
have to change to adapt the changing competitive environment. Those who can not 
change may find difficulties to compete and are forced to leave the business or are 
acquired by other firms. 
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The disruptive technology framework, while examining competence 
destruction, is inadequate to explain the concept of industrial de-maturity for the 
following reasons. The framework focuses on technologies that have disruptive 
impacts on the existing technologies (production competence) while the de-maturity 
concept looks also at changes in organisational and industrial structure and practices. 
De-maturity involves the transition of innovative characteristics from the mature 
phase to the revolutionary or architectural phase, over the course of industrial and 
organisational evolution. The disruptive technology, on the other hand, does not 
consider disruption in the context of organisational or industrial evolution. Rather, it 
places an emphasis on new entrants as the `attacker' or the source of innovation that 
destabilises the existing systems. In this respect, de-maturity does not consider the 
origin of the attacker as a key factor that instigates de-maturity. Instead, it examines 
the process of industrial or organisational renewal as a deliberate attempt to change 
the industry's basis of competition from cost reduction to technological competence. 
The disruptive technology framework suggests revolutionary and abrupt 
change. Levinthal (1998) and Adner and Levinthal (2002), on the other hand, studied 
disruptive innovations from the evolutionary process point of view. They argue that 
the emergence of new revolutionary technologies is not necessarily a result of 
breakthrough technologies. Rather, they are developed gradually derived from the 
existing knowledge base and being applied in new application domains -or 
technological speciation (Levinthal, 1998) as discussed in section 2.3. In the context 
of this study, the speciation argument enriches the study of de-maturity at the firm 
level in relation to the creation of new competencies through the combination 
existing and emerging knowledge to satisfy the requirements of different (maybe 
emerging) demand. From the level of the firm perspective, rather than destroying 
their established knowledge, firms modify and extend their accumulated knowledge 
from which they generate new sources of profit. 
The case studies reveal that the process to build new competencies is indeed 
gradual and takes a number of years. As with Coming, the traditional textile firms 
had to build up R&D capabilities as the pre-requisites to build up new competencies. 
The capabilities were built through a combination of different routes that include 
hiring new qualified technical/scientific persons, acquisitions of new firms and 
collaboration with suppliers and customers. Continuous development of these 
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capabilities has enabled the firms to diversify and broaden its technological 
capabilities and competencies. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) referred to this capacity 
as absorptive capacity4. It is found that technological speciation is only one 
alternative means to build new competencies that could instigate radical 
transformation at the firm level. Mergers and acquisitions, as well as the adoption of 
new radical technologies to radically change the established markets or to create new 
markets are two other means that could facilitate the de-maturity process. 
The case studies confirm Utterback's (1994) suggestion that established firms 
must persistently renew and diversify their core businesses rather than simply 
improve and expand the established ones. Both competence improvement and 
diversification need to occur simultaneously. Under such circumstances, innovative 
firms should implement two different innovation strategies simultaneously: 1) 
defensive innovation strategy to defend their existing market and/or technology 
trajectories through the adoption of incremental and or imitative innovations, and ii) 
offensive innovation strategy aiming for future technical and market leadership by 
outpacing the competitors in the introduction of new products (Freeman and Soete, 
1997). The critical factor to sustain a competitive advantage over time, according to 
Freeman and Soete (1997), rests on firms' abilities to adapt to changing business 
environment through learning processes and shifting innovation strategy. For 
instance, the Japanese textile industry shifted its innovation strategy from imitative 
prior to the First World War to defensive after the Second World War and to 
offensive in the 1990s and beyond (Colpan and Hikino, 2005). The transition of the 
innovation strategy has helped the industry to remain competitive in the traditional 
market in the early periods of industrial development and to move in to the high- 
technology textile sector at a later stage. 
Freeman and Soete's concept of innovation strategy confirms the de-maturity 
thesis from the strategy standpoint. Strategy shifts from traditional, imitative, or 
defensive to offensive should lead to de-maturity if the shift facilitates greater 
variety of product offerings, increased competitive visibility of the technology that 
makes up the products and significant shift in the nature of innovative activity. These 
Absorptive capacity is the ability of a firm to appreciate the value of new, external information, 
assimilate it with its existing knowledge, and apply it into commercial ends. This capacity is critical 
to the firm's innovative capabilities. The capability develops path-dependently in that it is a function 
of the firm's prior related knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
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have to be achieved through the destruction and replacement of the existing 
production competencies and its linkages with market preferences. There must be a 
major increase in the diversity of technology to meet the shift in consumer 
preferences. If only a few technical alternatives emerge, the change could be 
incremental in nature (Abernathy, et al., 1983). 
The implication of this concept is that firms have to constantly have access to 
the necessary information which helps them to make strategic decisions about what 
and how to change or to develop new competencies. The creation of and a shift to 
new competencies entails a certain level of risk. The gaps between the existing and 
new capabilities, assets, know-how and strategy need to be filled and the process of 
change needs to be managed properly (Figure 2-3). Firms, constrained by their 
resources, capabilities and bounded rationality on one hand, and technology and 
market uncertainties, on the other, find it very challenging to make decisions. The 
balance between opportunities and risks should be maintained. Excessive aversion to 
risk may cause firms to fall into the maturity-trap whereas the opposite may lead to 
bankruptcy. In addition, firms need to decide the appropriate timing for change 
which adds to the complexity of the decision making process. This requires a 
number of factors to be considered that include the firm's perception about the 
readiness of the market; the maturity of the products/technologies, competitors' 
responses and the availability of complementary technologies. As de-maturity entails 
a shift from process innovation to product innovation (Figure 2-4), with regards to 
the shift of innovation strategy, the cost of transition from one strategy to another is 
also an important determining factor. 
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Figure 2-4. The dynamics of innovation - the shift from process to product innovation 
during the transition towards de-maturity 
Source: Adapted from Utterback (1994) p. xvii 
It is shown in Chapter 4 that technological change in the EU textile industry 
has leveraged the industry's knowledge-base to include advanced materials, plastic 
electronics, telecommunications technology and nanotechnology. The application of 
these technologies in textiles has the potential to create a myriad of applications of 
textile products, ranging from water-repellent textiles, solar cell fabrics and armour 
composite to GPRS embedded ski outfits and biosensing jackets. Meanwhile, the 
traditional fibre and textile technology, that is, spinning, weaving, printing and 
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finishing, have also evolved to facilitate the production of new high-value added 
textile products. For example, melt-spinning technology can now produce fibres at 
the micro-metre scale and electrospinning can produce fibres at the nano-metre 
scale. Fibres at this dimension can be used to develop a wide range of technical 
textiles such as body armour and scaffolds for tissue engineering. The development 
of weaving technology has been directed towards i) flexible equipment to enable the 
production of different forms of weaving; and ii) new construction of woven fabrics 
such as 3D weaving. In the meantime, nonwoven textile technology has eliminated 
the need for weaving process to produce a wide range of textile products for various 
applications that include filtration, floorcoverings and apparel at very low costs. 
Research to eliminate the weaving process to produce clothing is also underway. 
One fascinating development is the capability to print functional nanomaterials on 
fabrics. This technology makes possible the creation of numerous functional fabrics 
for various purposes that include clothing (water and stain-proof fabrics), medical 
purposes (drug delivery), power generation (solar-cell fabrics) and security tags. 
The development of these technologies may replace the traditional textile 
technology for the technical textile market in the future. It is therefore plausible to 
argue that the EU textile industry is on the verge of a new process of de-maturity. 
Whether or not the technology will diffuse into the traditional sector it remains to be 
seen. Nevertheless, a number of new developments in clothing textile markets show 
the possibilities of these technologies of being adopted by the traditional sector. 
In brief, the study of de-maturity of an industry is about investigating the 
transition from the regular phase to revolutionary or architectural phase. Abernathy 
and Clark (1985) suggest that it is at the point of transition that originating firms 
which can not compete in the new environment are forced to make an exit. They are 
replaced by new firms better able to manage in the new mode of competition. 
Therefore, it is especially important to investigate further the nature of transitions 
and the determinants of survival within the dynamic context of the firm, technology, 
market and competition. This is indeed one of the objectives of this study. For the 
European textile industry, in particular, the success of the new Textile Technology 
Platform to transform the industry into a technology-driven industry is dependent 
upon managing the transition. This includes the capability of the majority of the EU 
textile firms to adopt, develop and commercialise the new technologies. Their 
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success is also dependent on the capability of those firms to read the trends and find 
new applications that satisfy potential customers' latent needs. 
2.5 The Open Innovation Paradigm 
Central to this study is examining the transition of the European textile 
industry, from a traditional to a high-technology industry. One fundamental 
difference between the two industrial paradigms, according to the taxonomy by 
Pavitt (1984), lies upon the patterns of innovative activities. As discussed earlier, 
Abernathy et al. (1983) suggest that a shift in innovative activities is one of a few 
signs of industrial de-maturity. However, Abernathy et al. (1983) do not explain 
further the strategy and process to enable de-maturity. 
The Open Innovation (01) paradigm by Chesbrough (2006) is highly 
appropriate to analyse issues related to the changing innovation paradigm. The 
framework encompasses the technological and non-technological aspects of an 
organisation that facilitate change. The framework focuses on the changing 
innovation paradigm in the high technology sector. The framework is appropriate for 
this study as the European textile industry is in the process of paradigm change from 
being a supplier-led (Pavitt, 1984) to the open innovation paradigm. Therefore, 
examining a shift in the innovation paradigm in textile firms can provide an 
explanation of the transition of firms in a mature industry in which the framework 
lacks. 
Chesbrough (2006) shows that a number of high-technology firms such as 
IBM, Intel and Lucent Technologies have moved to 01, a new paradigm he argued to 
have become the new imperative that should be adopted by technology and non- 
technology based firms. The 01 is: 
"a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external as 
well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as 
the firms look to advance their technology. It combines internal and 
external ideas into architectures and systems whose requirements 
are defined by a business model. The business model utilizes both 
external and internal ideas to create value while defining internal 
mechanism to claim some portion of that value. The Open Innovation 
assumes that internal ideas can also be taken to market through 
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external channels outside the current business of the firm, to 
generate additional value " (Chesbrough, 2006 p. xxiv). 
He explains the old R&D paradigm, -Closed Innovations- that brought 
success to a number of prominent high-technology firms such as Xerox and IBM in 
the 20th century is no longer suitable for the competitive environment in the 21st 
century. This is because of the abundant knowledge landscape and ever rising R&D 
costs which have made control over technological knowledge by a few large firms 
difficult to achieve. Valuable ideas can come from any number of sources and it is 
impossible for any single firm to manage. He suggests that increasing technological 
competition due to the increased mobility of highly experienced and skilled people, 
easier and cheaper access to knowledge discovered elsewhere, and growing 
recognition to the role of venture capital to nurture specialised new firms or start-ups 
have eroded the effectiveness of closed innovation. Under such circumstances, firms 
are encouraged to reduce time to market for products and services -hence shorter 
technology life time-, and to develop multi-technology products, as the means to 
provide competitive solutions. Firms need to work together with other firms - 
suppliers, customers and competitors- or to license externally-generated 
technologies. The underlying argument is that relying entirely on a firm's own ideas 
and resources or competencies no longer adequate to provide a significant 
competitive advantage. These conditions have forced a number of high-technology 
firms to make a fundamental shift away from the old paradigm. The shift involves 
changing their mind-set from ideas-abound internal industrial research and vertical 
integration to an entirely new innovation paradigm which includes the acquisition of 
external developments, collaboration of R&D and marketing, and structural 
decentralisation. 
Likewise, firms also need to radically revise their approach in terms of 
commercialisation of innovation. Firms can longer restrict their commercialisation 
practice to a single path to market. Chesbrough (2006) indicates that failure in 
commercialisation among high-technology firms is, in greater deal, affected by 
market uncertainty than by technical uncertainty. Xerox's failure was mainly due to 
S Closed Innovation is a paradigm that solely relies on internal competencies and capabilities in the 
process of innovation from idea generation to commercialisation. This paradigm encouraged firms to 
establish a central research laboratory in the early 20`h century (Chesbrough, 2006). 
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its falure to commercialise a number of its valuable research results rather than to 
master the technology. The firm was unable to break away from its traditional 
approach to commercialising technologies. It lacked a systemic process for exploring 
and evaluating alternative business models. For instance, 3COM and Adobe were 
spun-off from Xerox's PARC Lab as Xerox could not realise the potential economic 
value of the technologies. Xerox's problem was it applied the same business model it 
used for its traditional business, the copier and printer businesses, to emerging 
technologies. This led Xerox to lose its investment in these new technologies. The 
two technologies were successfully commercialised after the respective inventors 
devised new business models. 
The application of 01 is dependent upon each firm's priorities and its 
perception of the competitive landscape in their relevant industries. Chesbrough 
(2006) has uncovered three approaches to manage innovation generated from the 
principles of 01. The first concerns the internal research commitment to developing a 
different business model for leveraging its technology. IBM shifted its innovation 
approach from internally-dependent sources of innovation (or academic research) to 
include customers as the primary source of innovation. The firm expanded its 
customer base and used different business models to deliver values for different 
customers within its value chain. IBM adopted the internet, an externally-invented 
technology, to leverage its business and to provide a range of different solutions for 
different customers. The second approach connects internal and external research 
with corporate venture capital to grow a business model. Intel does little fundamental 
research on its own. Instead, it seeks potential new developments performed by other 
organisations and uses its corporate venture capital, Intel Capital, to acquire the new 
technologies. The external technologies are complemented by Intel's internally- 
developed technologies in order to provide competitive solutions for their customers 
and to offer a range of technologies for different markets. The third approach is 
related to the formation of new firms to commercialise and continue the 
development of new technologies initially developed internally. This approach has to 
be complemented with the invention of new business models to commercialise the 
new technologies. This is an alternative to that used by Intel. In addition to licensing 
its technologies Lucent Technologies established New Venture Groups (NVG) 
which functions as an internal business development unit, as well as a source of the 
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fruits of its internal research. Lucent Technologies argued that this approach 
permitted the creation of new commercialisation paths and facilitated faster time to 
market. The new business development activities in Lucent were balanced with 
innovations that support the firm's existing business. 
Chesbrough (2006), however, suggests that each approach entailed inherent 
risks. When the technology bubble burst in 2000-2001, Lucent's NGV was sold to a 
group of external investors led by Coller Capital. Although the unit had created more 
than $200 M in value (or about ¬133 M) by 2001, the firm could not convert the 
value of the corporate's new technology venture portfolio into shareholders value, 
due to a lack of appropriate metrics to measure the value on the market. Lucent 
obtained $100 M in cash for its share in NGV but it lost the infrastructure that 
connected the laboratories and business units. Meanwhile, Intel's strength in 
extensive uses of external knowledge potentially limits its success in the future. The 
trend in the semiconductor industry appears to lean towards the domain of quantum 
computing, a domain that might bring about a revolutionary breakthrough in 
semiconducting technology. Intel has to acquire knowledge in this domain if the firm 
is to prevent other competitors from catching up. However, to enable the integration 
of knowledge in quantum computing into its own systems, a huge amount of internal 
research is required to transfer the knowledge into the production stage. This is the 
kind of research Intel has not historically performed. 
Our studies suggest that firms that adopt 01 in the process of de-maturity 
acquire external knowledge and know-how to help them to break away from their 
established knowledge and development paths. Freudenberg, in particular, has 
adopted a combination of Intel's and Lucent's approaches. However, unlike Lucent 
or Intel's individual approaches that place an emphasis on external (Intel) or internal 
(Lucent) developments, Freudenberg (as well as Ten Cate) combine their internal 
R&D with collaborative R&D and alliances in order to keep abreast of scientific and 
technological advances. They also use other means, including acquisitions, licensing 
(in and out) and joint ventures. The decision to externally acquire or to internally 
develop a new technology depends upon the routines that enable the firms to foresee 
the future, upon the competences they posses and upon the availability and the cost 
of the complementary knowledge they need. To avoid becoming a conglomerate, 
they select opportunities that have strategic relevance to their core technologies and 
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businesses. Similar to Intel, Freudenberg and Ten Cate do not perform fundamental 
research. Rather, they acquire new knowledge through research collaborations with 
universities and public research institutions. With regards to technology 
commercialisation, in addition to licensing, they conduct internal and external 
venturing either through a dedicated organisation (Freudenberg New Technologies, 
under which a corporate venture capital and a new business development unit are 
managed) or through relevant business units (Ten Cate). 
Chesbrough suggests that firms need an `architecture' to help them to 
integrate internal and external technologies. Our case studies suggest that the 
architecture should include dynamic capabilities (Teece, et al., 1997), a framework 
that is discussed in the next section. Dynamic capabilities enable firms to create, 
deploy and protect intangible assets that support superior long-run business 
performance. The development of dynamic capabilities requires certain skills, 
knowledge, facilities, organisational structures, rules and culture. Moreover, 
flexibility to change or modify those elements to suit the new business environment 
is vital to enable organisational transformation. For example, when IBM embraced 
the 01 it expanded the role of researchers from being solely knowledge generators 
into being knowledge brokers. Meanwhile, Lucent established a communications 
infrastructure between its researchers and business development people in NVG 
which facilitated the diffusion of knowledge between the two parties. 
Teece (2007) suggests that enterprises with strong dynamic capabilities are 
intensely entrepreneurial, because they not only have to adapt to the business 
environment but are more proactive through innovation and collaboration. An 
entrepreneurial-based capability allows a firm to develop `sensing, seizing and 
reconfiguring' capacities that are difficult to develop and deploy, or, in other words, 
unique and difficult to imitate assets. This capability is driven by entrepreneurial 
management who have the capacity to recognise opportunities and seize them 
through the strategic deployment of resources. Our case studies (and the example of 
IBM), also demonstrate the need for leaders with a new vision, a broad perspective 
towards the needs of a firm, and an entrepreneurial capability to turn the firm around 
and put it in a new direction (example of Xerox and IBM in Chesbrough, 2006). 
71 
Chapter 2 -The Textile Industry: A Question of Survival 
2.6 The Dynamic Capabilities Framework 
It has been discussed earlier that the European textile industry is undergoing 
a transition phase, moving away from being a traditional industry to a technology- 
driven industry. The transformation process is gradual, as a consequence of the path- 
dependent nature of technological change and organisational evolution. However, 
the consequence of such activities to organisational capabilities has not been 
discussed. 
Indeed, Abernathy, et al. (1983) and Abernathy and Clark (1985) indicate 
that the implications of de-maturity on organisational and managerial capabilities, 
particularly during the transition is crucial. In fact, Grandstrand et al. (1997) and 
Chesbrough (2006) argue that it is organisational capability, rather than 
technological superiority, that enables a firm to swiftly respond to a changing 
business environment. Grandstrand et al. suggest that failure to exploit radically new 
technologies is a consequence of failure in product development, production, 
marketing and organisational adaptation than in technological competencies. 
Meanwhile, Chesbrough indicates that in the face of new competitors or changing 
market demand, a number of large firms found themselves in severe difficulties, not 
because of lacking technological competencies but because of inflexible 
organisational or managerial capabilities. In this respect, the case studies here reveal 
that organisational and entrepreneurial capabilities are indeed two of the key 
determinants of corporate survival. 
The appropriate framework to analyse this issue is the dynamic capabilities 
framework (Teece and Pisano, 1994, Teece et al., 1997, Teece, 2007). Dynamic 
capability is defined as the firm's organisational ability to build, integrate and 
reconfigure internal and external assets to address a rapidly changing environment. 
The framework is built upon the theoretical foundations of Schumpeter (1934), 
Penrose (1959), Williamson (1975,1985), Barney (1986), Nelson and Winter 
(1982), and Teece (1988) to analyse the sources and methods of wealth creation 
captured by private firms operating in an environment of rapid technological change. 
The literature attempts to unearth the foundation of long-run enterprise success with 
an emphasis on the key role of strategic management in adapting, integrating and re- 
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configuring internal and external organisational skills, resources and functional 
competencies. 
Teece (2007) suggests that the foundation of enterprise success today 
depends very little on cost-reduction. It is necessary but insufficient to sustain a 
firm's competitive advantage in the long-run. Rather, firms should depend on 
(among other things) new discoveries, organisational flexibility and efficient and 
effective technology transfer processes to adapt to a rapidly changing business 
environment, including the invention of new business models. It also involves 
shaping new rules of the game in the global marketplace. The challenge would be to 
find strong-willed executives who have the capabilities to make sensible judgments 
about the future, develop competitive business models and strategies and 
strategically pull the necessary resources to achieve the desired outcome. Firms have 
to establish a proper corporate innovative culture that facilitates creativity and 
innovativeness. Furthermore, they have to create the necessary organisational 
structure and routines that permits coordination and integration, and yet allows 
diverse projects to run concurrently to support the short, medium and long-term 
objectives. 
Dynamic capabilities are the foundation stone for continuous change and the 
underlying factors of a long-term competitive advantage (Teece and Pisano, 1994). 
They are organisational capabilities required to manage a firm's internal processes 
or routines, create or acquire unique and difficult-to-replicate/imitate assets, and 
examine the path the firm has travelled and envision the potential future alternative 
paths (Teece, et al., 1997). In other words, dynamic capability is an organisation's 
ability to orchestrate internal technological, organisational and managerial processes, 
all of which are shaped by the firms' specific (non-purchasable) assets positions and 
moulded by its evolutionary and co-evolutionary paths (Teece, et al., 1997). A firm's 
asset positions determine its competitive advantage at any point in time, its 
evolutionary path constrains the types of industrial activities in which a firm can be 
competitive while its organisational processes gradually transform the capabilities 
of the firm. In this regards, the framework demonstrates its linkage with the path- 
dependent aspect of technological change (Rosenberg, 1994) and organisational 
evolution (David, 1994). 
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The dynamic capabilities framework complements the argument of de- 
maturity in that it provides the conceptual framework to analyse the necessary 
organisational processes and capabilities to facilitate internal creative destruction to 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. The dynamic capabilities framework 
and the maturity/de-maturity thesis share the same argument that competitiveness 
does not exclusively depend on technical novelty. Equally important are the 
organisational and management aspects of a business, particularly when changes in 
the competitive landscape occur either as a result of new technology, a shift in 
market preferences or new competition. 
A number of elements that are attributable to distinctive dynamic capabilities 
have been identified; they are difficult-to-imitate collection of i) performance 
routines operating inside the firms, such as new product and process development 
routines, viable business model design and implementation routines; fl) skills and 
knowledge assets; and iii) complementary assets, which include reputation, brands 
and business networks. A large number of organisational routines such as learning 
processes, coordination of internal and external processes and incentive systems, are 
firm-specific and contextual-dependent (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The coherence of 
routines, which consists of a number of routines being connected to and 
complemented with each other, are built over a period of time, often over the entire 
course of the firm's history. Thus, these routines are unique and the replication of 
those routines from one economic setting to another is simply impossible. 
In addition to being unique, these routines are often deeply engrained and 
solidified within an organisation. The firm's core capabilities, however, may turn 
into core rigidities in the case of a changing business environment (Leonard-Barton, 
1992) as routines that work well in one context or period may not be applicable in 
different contexts or periods, even within the same organisation. Therefore, having 
unique, superior core capabilities is not necessarily adequate if the firm does not 
possess the capabilities to change them to fit with the new environment. In other 
words, the firm is trapped in its `static capabilities'. 
An organisation has to have a certain capacity to learn that enables it to 
recognise, learn, adopt, and create new activities and routines so that current 
competencies can be improved or disposed of and new ones can be created. It is 
called strategic fit or evolutionary fit (Teece, 2007). Such a learning capacity 
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improves the organisation's absorptive capacity, a critical element of dynamic 
capabilities (Zahra and George, 2002). Dynamic capabilities facilitate optimization 
of absorptive capacity through commitments to resource deployment, appropriate 
organisational structure, and necessary routines. Dynamic capabilities that foster 
change and transformation are crucial in the creation of adaptive organisations. 
Changing routines, however, involves complex processes and coordination, and is 
costly. Therefore, routine-based dynamic capabilities have to be complemented by 
entrepreneurial leadership and management that are able to select new opportunities 
and seize them, and to swiftly build, integrate, combine, protect, and reconfigure 
tangible and intangible assets at justifiable costs. Thus, in addition to routine-based 
dynamic capabilities, capabilities that are built on entrepreneurial actions are equally 
important (Teece, 2007). 
Discussion on dynamic capabilities in the innovation literature has developed 
further with issues around the use of the concept in firm's innovation strategy, 
processes and management. A particular emphasis has been to identify relevant 
variables and their interrelationships (see for example Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, 
Helfat, et al., 2007). Eisenhardt and Martin (2002) examined the influence of market 
dynamics, from moderate to high-velocity change, to the effective patterns of 
dynamic capabilities. They argue that in a moderately dynamic (mature) market, the 
effective dynamic capabilities emphasise incremental improvement and variety 
creation through the exploitation of the cumulative existing knowledge and 
processes (routines). In contrast, in the high-velocity market, dynamic capabilities 
rely on rapid creation of situation-specific new knowledge, as competitive advantage 
was often short-term. Hence, the creation of a series of temporary advantages faster 
than the competitors was the key, while the strategic logic was opportunities and 
selection of direction. Helfat et al. (2007) argue that capabilities follow a lifecycle or 
evolutionary path. The capabilities could be transformed/altered to a different 
trajectory in any stage of its evolutionary path as a response to selection events - 
threats or opportunities, internal or external to the organisations. Capability 
transformation may occur in the form of retirement (death), retrenchment, 
replication, renewal, redeployment and recombination. Retrenchment and replication 
were attributable to maintaining the capabilities, whereas renewal, redeployment and 
recombination led to the transformation or the creation of new capabilities. 
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The studies discussed above illustrate the different aspects of dynamic 
capabilities. Their arguments, nevertheless, converge on the fundamental elements of 
dynamic capabilities proposed by Teece et al. (1997) and Teece (2007): i) capability 
is based on organisational process ('routine'); ii) learning process is a fundamental 
factor in building dynamic capabilities; iii) dynamic capabilities are path-dependent, 
iv) different routines are required to maintain and refocus capabilities in moderately- 
changing environment and to create them in fast-changing environment. 
In addition, Augier and Teece (2006) and Teece (2007) add a fundamental 
argument that, in addition to routine-based capabilities, entrepreneurial abilities are 
crucial to enable a firm to shape the environment. This argument corresponds with 
that of Lazonick and Prencipe (2005) as entrepreneurial ability is commonly 
associated with personal talent. This study suggests that management's 
entrepreneurial and leadership abilities are indeed central to the orchestration of 
capacity development to develop dynamic capabilities and sustainable 
competitiveness. In particular, the case studies suggest that such abilities enable 
firms to sense when to change, to understand what to learn, where to learn and how 
to implement, and to comprehend where and how to change. Different `forms' of 
entrepreneurial and leadership abilities are required under different conditions. These 
findings confirm the concept of 'evolutionary fitness' proposed by Helfat et al. 
(2007). 
One striking difference among the studies was made by Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) in which the non-imitability, non-replicability and non-substitutability 
aspects of dynamic capabilities are challenged. They argue that dynamic capabilities 
exhibit common features across firms which are frequently referred to as `best 
practices'. The commonalities emerge because organisations are often able to 
perceive effective patterns in dealing with different organisational, interpersonal, and 
mechanical challenges that must be addressed by a given capability; hence, the 
emergence of, for instance, new product development routine, strategic decision 
making routine; and knowledge creation routine. The commonalities of key 
attributes of particular dynamic capabilities rendered equifinality. 
This argument is challenged by Augier and Teece (2006) and Teece (2007) 
who argue that implementing widely adopted best practices could not by themselves 
enable firms to gain long-term competitiveness because of the dynamics of market, 
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technology, and competition. Furthermore, equifinality is rarely, if not impossible, to 
obtain as different paths taken by different firms, even to achieve the same objective, 
may lead to different end points. The differences in history, human capital, social 
capital and cognition of team members may determine the eventualities (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003). 
The case studies here confirm the arguments made by Helfat and Peteraf, and 
Teece. The capability of individual firms to direct change, create competitive 
strategy for change and manage the transitions, technologically and organisationally, 
will determine the outcome. It is found that the perception of the management about 
the future market significantly affects the paths taken by individual firms. In 
addition, their decisions were based on the stock of knowledge, the cost of acquiring 
new knowledge, competitors' strategies and the availability of complementary 
knowledge or technology. These are (among) the underlying factors of firm 
heterogeneity. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This literature review covers a wide range of literature to understand the 
transition of the European textile industry, from a mature to a technology-driven 
industry form the standpoint of the level of the firm. To conclude, the de-maturity 
framework shows that reversed industrial evolution, from mature to ferment (or 
creation) phase, is possible. Such a fundamental transformation will take 
considerable time as the industry is predominantly populated by a large number of 
firms with limited capabilities. Through these frameworks, it is now possible to 
explain a number of necessary issues that will contribute to such a transformation. 
The maturity-trap appears to impede the process of innovation that allows the 
transformation because of different aspects of inertia, including organisation and 
cognition. The path-dependent nature of technological change and organisational 
development is also attributable to the slow and gradual process of transformation 
and the possibility of falling into the maturity-trap. Having said that, it is argued 
path-dependence does not automatically lead to lock-in. Firms which have 
successfully initiated the process of de-maturity instigated path-breaking change to 
move away from their traditional paths. In this regard, the dynamic capabilities 
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framework provides us with an analytical framework to address the issue. 
Evolutionary fit, which corresponds with the continuous creation of new 
competencies to adapt to or to shape the competitive landscape, will facilitate a 
sustainable competitive advantage. This is indeed the strategic implication of de- 
maturity. 
The next chapter discusses the phenomenon of the maturity-trap through the 
experience of the Lancashire cotton industry and Courtaulds. The Lancashire cotton 
industry and Courtaulds were once iconic in their fields, dominating the global 
market during their heyday. The industry and the firm however fell into the maturity- 
trap as they were unable (or unwilling) to change in the face of a changing 
competitive environment. The discussion explains the argument of the maturity-trap 
from the perspective of the industry and firm level. This provides important insights 
about our understanding on the maturity-trap and the relevance of the concept to the 
current situation of the EU textile industry. 
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3 
The Decline of the Lancashire 
Cotton Industry: An Early Case 
of the `Maturity-Trap'? 
3.1 Introduction 
In the 19th century, the Lancashire cotton industry dominated the global 
textile trade. During its peak in the 1880s, 80 per cent of the cotton export market 
was supplied by the British industry which employed 600 000 workers in spinning, 
doubling and weaving, in addition to 100 000 in finishing (Owen, 1999, Lazonick, 
1983). Its size led the industry to become the largest employer in the country. The 
industry's contribution to British economy was highly significant, representing 
approximately 50 per cent of the country's export (in terms of value) between 1835- 
1840. 
Since the interwar years, the industry has gradually lost ground to 
competitors from low-cost countries which offered significantly lower priced 
products. Its share of the global export market fell to 30 per cent in 1937, after which 
the figure continued to decline. A number of attempts at restructuring through 
capacity reduction (from 1939) and modernisation (from 1948) failed to restore the 
competitiveness of the industry. Instead, the industry's competitive position 
continued to weaken not only in relation to low-cost competitors but also to other 
high wage economies in Europe, particularly Germany and Italy, from the 1970s 
onwards (Rose, 1991, Toyne, et al., 1984). Given its domination in the global textile 
trade and its contribution to the British economy for over a century, the relative 
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decline of the British cotton industry represents one of major examples of economic 
decline in the history of industrial capitalism (Lazonick, 1983). 
Why did a powerful, advanced industrial nation fall victim in the face of 
growing competition from lower-cost countries? The debate over the alleged causes 
of the decline has been a most hotly contested issue. It is argued here that the causes 
identified by Singleton and Lazonick lean towards the phenomenon of the maturity- 
trap". The firms continued to function based on economic individualism' and a once 
highly competitive craft-based production system which grew during the 19th 
century although the practice was no longer fit for purpose in the new competitive 
environment of the 20th century. The British textile industry found it difficult to 
respond to the modem corporate system of the Japanese and American industries, the 
leaders in the early 20th century, characterised by centralised control, integrated 
business systems and mass production. Ironically, the factors which impeded change 
were the traditions on which Britain's hegemony was built. 
What is quite alarming is the maturity-trap appears to persist. In the 1970s 
the British textile industry once again failed to adapt to a changing business 
environment pioneered by the Italian textile industry. In more recent years, the 
European textile industry appeared to experience yet another shakeout affected by 
the emergence of China as the new dominant power in the global textile market. 
Furthermore, market saturation of once high-value added products developed in the 
1960s-1980s and the recent shift of demand towards more affordable products have 
added to the complexity of problems faced by the EU textile industry. Although it is 
clearly apparent that external conditions change continuously, the EU textile industry 
remains dependent on the traditional textile market, that is, clothing and household 
products, which have been under increased pressure from low-cost countries. 
The emergence of China should not be underestimated. Although the 
domination of the country is concentrated on the low-end market up to now it is not 
impossible that it can improve its textile capabilities and produce higher-value added 
textile products to catch-up with the quality of European firms. In fact, a number of 
Chinese firms have received orders from leading luxury brands and high technology 
1 This is a doctrine which provides priority for individuals in their decisions in economic activities, 
before government or community, for them. This doctrine often impedes collective actions as the 
government cannot impose regulations without receiving agreements from individuals. 
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textile producers in Europe and USA. However, the practice is protected under a 
non-disclosure agreement as any publicity would damage the reputation of the 
brands (Economist, 2009). In another instance, the acquisition of IBM's computer 
business by Lenovo (China) and Jaguar by Tata Motors (India) shows how industries 
in developing countries can rapidly move up the value chain and build up a 
reputation in high quality products whilst maintaining lower costs. 
This chapter examines the phenomenon of the maturity-trap through the 
analysis of the relevant factors, the process which leads to the trap and its effects. 
The experience of the Lancashire cotton industry is used as the initial starting point 
on how the industry fell into the maturity-trap. The Lancashire textile industry has 
strong parallels with the European textile industry as it appears that the maturity-trap 
has an extremely longevity. The lessons from past experience need be examined 
carefully to help the EU textile industry to escape from the maturity-trap in the 
future. The European textile industry cannot afford to overlook the threats posed by 
recent developments and fall into the maturity-trap. The conclusion will be used to 
support the analysis of the case studies in Chapters 5-7. 
3.2 The Lancashire Cotton Industry 
The Lancashire cotton industry experienced tremendous growth between 19th 
century and the first decade of the 20th century. During the period, a large number of 
new firms entered the industry and capacity increased considerably. In 1930 there 
were more than 2000 cotton yarn and cloth producers in Britain and the capacity 
reached 8000 million yards of cloth (Lazonick, 1983). The country represented 40 
per cent of world's capacity and controlled 60 per cent of the world cotton goods 
markets (Tippett, 1969). Its market spanned Europe, Asia and South and North 
America (excluding USA). The market for fine yarns and cloths in Europe however 
had declined considerably since 1879 because of tariff walls and the ability of 
individual countries to fulfil their own markets. Britain thus shifted its major market 
to coarser products from 1870. The country dominated the import of cotton products 
in India and China between 1889-1913. India was, by a considerable extent, its 
largest overseas market and constituted 46 per cent of its exports, followed by China, 
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Japan, and Central and South America. The industry's share of the domestic market 
was only 12 per cent of production. 
The growth of the industry had a concomitant effect on its structure. The 
considerable size of overseas markets encouraged new players to enter the market. 
As the investment required in a specialised function (spinning, weaving or finishing) 
was considerably less than in a combined function (spinning and weaving or 
spinning, weaving and finishing), the new entrants, the majority of which were 
small and medium-sized firms, increased the population of specialised firms, These 
firms had become increasingly dominant in the industry from the 1850s. In the 
period of absolute growth, specialisation permitted capacity expansion to supply the 
growing demand as the barriers to entry were relatively low. As a result of this, the 
structure of the industry changed from being vertically integrated to horizontally 
specialised. 
Specialisation also encouraged geographical concentration within a few 
industrial districts. The spinning industry became increasingly localised in the south 
of Lancashire such as Oldham for coarser-yarns and Bolton for finer yarns. The 
weaving industry was concentrated in the northwest region of Lancashire such as 
Burnley for coarser cloths and Nelson and Colne for finer cloths. Both industries 
were linked by the Liverpool and Manchester Exchange at which the yam and cloth 
trade took place (Lazonick, 1983). 
Specialisation and geographical concentration were the distinct features of 
the Lancashire cotton industry on which its superiority was built. The structure was 
highly efficient and productive. Skills were accumulated within each industrial 
district thus helping the transfer of knowledge from one generation to the next. Other 
complementary clusters such as machine builders, skilled mechanics and other 
service providers also emerged to specially serve the needs of the local industry. Mill 
owners did not need to look for services outside their districts, contributing to the 
efficiency of the system. The proximity of the machine suppliers and other service 
providers allowed the spinners, weavers or finishers to learn from each other. The 
close relationship helped not only the efficiency of the manufacturers but also the 
development of new machines. 
Specialisation within industrial districts allowed the cost of logistics and 
transportation (such as for purchasing and shipping cotton) to be divided among 
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firms within the Lancashire area. As a result of this, employers who set up factories 
within Lancashire districts possessed distinct competitive advantages over those who 
did not, owing to the accessibility of the necessary infrastructure and skilled people. 
These factors attracted a great deal of new entrants, new investment and new buyers, 
and reinforced the specialisation and geographical concentration (Owen, 1999, Mass 
and Lazonick, 1990). 
Britain's dominance of the global textile trade began to decline in the early 
1920s in the face of new competition from low-cost countries. Production and 
exports fell significantly as former overseas markets developed themselves by which 
they met their own demand and, furthermore, competed with Britain in foreign 
markets. India, Hong Kong and Pakistan emerged as the major textile suppliers both 
for their own markets as well as for the British market. The latter was facilitated by 
the agreement between Britain and Commonwealth countries that allowed products 
to be imported duty free under the Imperial Preference scheme2. It was Japan, 
however, which posed a more serious threat to Britain's domination. Within 30 years 
of its industrialisation programme, Japan transformed itself from a textile importing 
country to become a major global exporter, seizing the market which belonged to 
Britain, the world's oldest and largest textile producing country. In India, Britain's 
share in the imported cloth market declined from 97 per cent to 50 per cent between 
1914-1932, whereas the Japanese firms enjoyed an increase from 0.1 per cent to 45 
per cent. In a similar fashion, Britain's share of China's cotton import market was 13 
per cent in 1930, down from 53 per cent in 1913, whereas Japan's share leapt to 72 
per cent from only 20 per cent during the same period. The government attempted to 
halt the decline with the imposition of tariffs and quotas on Japanese imports in 
colonial markets after 1934 (Owen, 1999, Dupree, 1996). 
The competitiveness of the Lancashire cotton industry continued to decline in 
overseas markets as the individual countries introduced tariffs on imports after the 
First World War. The domestic market also deteriorated and was significantly hit by 
a wave of imports from Japan and the Commonwealth countries. Despite the 
considerable decline, Lancashire mill owners believed that it was only a temporary 
2 The agreement to reciprocally-level tariffs or free trade between different Dominions and colonies within the 
British Commonwealth of Nations was introduced in 1932. After the Second World War the policy was gradually 
changed, as a result of American pressures, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), and Britain's 
integration to the EU in 1973 (Owen, 1999). 
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change and any major change was unnecessary (Tippett, 1969). Exports continued to 
target low-end markets with improvements concentrated on cost reduction through 
wage cuts, utilisation of lower quality yarns and longer working hours. The most 
common response adopted by the majority of the firms was the use of inferior cotton 
as a cost-cutting measure known infamously as `bad spinning' and 'bad weaving'. 
This practice damaged the industry's credibility and created more problems for the 
industry such as a difficulty to attract quality workers. An option to re-tool the 
industry with more modem equipment, that is, with ring frames or automatic looms, 
was largely eschewed by the industry. 
According Saxonhouse and Wright (1984), the propensity to use low quality 
yarns as the main strategy to reduce costs caused the firms stuck to the old 
technology, mule spindles. The more modem technology, ring frames, caused low 
quality yarns to break because of its high-speed production process. As a 
consequence, while the rapidly growing textile industries in Asia, USA and South 
America invested in the latest technologies Lancashire was locked-in to the old 
technology (Dupree, 1996, Mass and Lazonick, 1990). 
Competitive decline, however, was not the only problem faced by the 
industry. As market share continued to shrink, the industry suffered from over 
capacity which was reported to reach 40 per cent. Firms had to reduce prices even 
further which forced the inefficient firms out of business. The condition called for 
government intervention to reduce capacity through the Cotton Spinning Act (1936) 
which forced firms to withdraw and destroy spindles (Fowler, 2004). 
The decline was halted briefly following a brief boom after World War II 
because of global shortages of supplies of textiles and the industrial reconstruction of 
Japan up to 1951. The government introduced the Cotton Spinning (Re-equipment 
and Subsidy) Act (1948)3 to reduce the productivity gap with the USA and to secure 
a voluntary restriction on imports from India, Hong Kong and Pakistan in 1958 
(Owen, 1999). Under these favourable circumstances mill owners were not 
convinced of the need to re-tool and modernise their production technology. Its 
failure to act put the industry back at square one by plunging it into a very poor 
3 Under the scheme, the Government agreed to contribute 25 per cent of the cost of new machinery to 
firms who grouped themselves into 'manoeuvrable units' and who accepted the introduction of shift 
work and new methods of labour deployment (Owen, 1999). 
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market and financial situation (Fowler, 2004). The industry's position was further 
weakened following the creation of the General Agreement in Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) in 1947 which forced the restriction on Japanese imports to be removed. In 
1950 its share of the cotton cloth export market fell to 15.6 per cent. By 1958 Britain 
had gone from controlling 80 per cent of the world cotton product market in the 19`h 
century to become a net importer for the first time since the Industrial Revolution 














1937 1950 1955 1960 1965 1968 
 Total world 
cotton cloth 
exports 
  UK share 
"Total world 
man-made 
fibre & mixture 
cloth exports 
0 UK share 
Figure 3-1. The share of UK cloth exports in world trade (cotton and allied textiles) in 1937- 
1968 
Source: Cotton Board Quarterly Statistical Review; R. Robson, the Cotton Industry in 
Britain (1957, p. 359) in Singleton (1986, p. 96). 
3.3 Causes of Decline 
A combination of different factors which allegedly led to the inexorable 
decline of the Lancashire cotton industry has been discussed, all of which indicate 
the irreversibility of the decline. Central to the debate is the industry's technological 
backwardness which is assumed to be the main cause of the decline. A group of 
scholars argues that the obstinacy of the Lancashire firms to use older (mule) 
technologies was a rational decision, given ineffective government protection 
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(Singleton, 1986, Singleton, 1990), the low incentives (cost savings) for the adoption 
of newer (ring) technologies (Higgins, 1993, Saxonhouse and Wright, 1984, 
Sandberg, 1969,1984) and the low suitability of the new technology to produce finer 
yams (supra-40 counts) which represented around 40 per cent of the production up to 
1913 (Leunig, 2001)4. The second group rejects this view and places the blame on 
the entrepreneurial failure and industrial organisation as the major contributors 
(Filatotchev and Toms, 2003, Owen, 1999, Lorenz, 1994, Rose, 1991, Lazonick, 
1983) 5. 
Singleton (1986) argues that the lack of support from the government to 
protect home markets raised a general feeling of mistrust among the Lancashire 
firms towards the government. Indeed, the industry's stakeholders shared a common 
view that in the presence of competition from low-cost countries, protection of the 
domestic market was the only real safeguard if the industry was to survive. However, 
the government appeared to be apprehensive about granting protection particularly 
for imports from Commonwealth countries (Fowler, 2004, Owen, 1999). Although a 
voluntary agreement with Hong Kong, India and Pakistan to limit their exports to 
Britain was settled in 1959, the British firms were not satisfied with the threshold of 
the quota as it was considered to be rather high. This raised issues of uncertainty and 
pessimism, and a lack of confidence over the future of the industry. Singleton 
therefore argues that it was a rational decision made by the mill owners to resist new 
investment in new technologies with a higher capacity when the future of the 
industry appeared to be uncertain. Other scholars also assumed that the obstinacy of 
the Lancashire firms to use the older technologies was a rational decision as the cost 
advantage from adoption was insignificant (Higgins, 1993, Saxonhouse and Wright, 
1984, Sandberg, 1969). 
Singleton further contends that under these circumstances, the government's 
programme for modernisation and rationalisation set out in the Cotton Industry Act 
4 The market structure of yams was admitted by Sandberg (1984) as a rough estimation. Different 
papers show different percentages for each type of yam (see for example Sandberg, 1964, Lazonick, 
1981, ad Saxonhouse and Wright, 1984). Owen, (1999) argues that the diversity of the market of the 
Lancashire cotton industry made mules more favourable mainly due to their flexibility to spin 
different counts of yarn. 
s Singleton (1990) mentions that a pool of entrepreneurs might have enabled a new cotton industry to 
arise. However, he did not advance it as a factor that caused the decline of the Lancashire cotton 
industry. 
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(1959)6 was largely ignored by the firms. Only 37 per cent of British looms were 
either fully or semi automatic in 1964, compared with 100 per cent in the United 
State, 69 per cent in France, 86 per cent in Italy and 86 per cent in Hong Kong. In 
1954, Britain possessed 84 percent of all mule spindles in the world market but only 
less than 10 percent of the ring frame market. The US cotton industry, on the other 
hand, had completely scrapped their mule spindles. 
Singleton goes on to say that given the growth of low-cost textile industries, 
notably Japan and India, the contraction of the Lancashire cotton industry should be 
expected as part of the industrial life-cycle. As those countries had a significant 
advantage of lower costs, cost had become the decisive factor of the competitive 
advantage in the textile industry. Singleton was less convinced that had the 
Lancashire firms adopted new technologies, they could have achieved large 
reduction in costs to maintain their competitiveness against the Japanese. He makes a 
bold argument that the demise of the industry should have been allowed even sooner 
because defending an uncompetitive industry led to economic inefficiency. The 
industry absorbed a significant amount of labour which would have been better off 
working in high-growth industries. 
On the other hand, Lazonick (1981,1983) strongly disagrees with 
Singleton's argument. He accepts the reasoning that market contraction was 
inevitable given the increased capability of the market countries to fulfil their own 
demand and that uncertainty hindered investment. Nevertheless, the fact that 
Britain's slow adoption of more modem technology was apparent not only during 
economically difficult periods - the inter-war years and after 1950s - upon which 
Singleton's argument was built, but also in prosperous times - the two decades prior 
to World War I and the short-lived boom period after World War II - indicated that 
pessimism was not the only factor that affected the low propensity to modernisation. 
Rather, it rested on more fundamental factors, that is, technological interrelatedness 
and its relevance to the structure of the industry. 
Ironically, the industry's vertically disintegrated structure and geographical 
concentration which prior to 1914 had significantly contributed to its long-term 
'The Cotton Industry Act (1959) introduced under a Conservative government provided subsidies for 
capacity reduction and modernisation (Owen, 1999). 
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competitive advantage was argued to be a serious constraint for the adoption of more 
advanced technologies (ring frames? and automatic weaving machines). According 
to Lazonick, the full advantage of high-speed, high-throughput machinery can only 
fully utilised within an integrated production system environment in which the flow 
of materials from spinning to weaving can be run uninterrupted. Otherwise, a 
number of additional costs such as transports would be incurred8. Furthermore, 
weaving mule-spun yarns in an automatic weaving machine caused yarn breakages 
as the yarns were relatively weak. This caused frequent production interruptions and 
incurred additional costs. Therefore, the adoption of automatic looms could only be 
justifiable with a guaranteed supply of low-breakage yarns that could only be 
produced with ring frames. As a consequence of this, the adoption of rings or 
automatic looms independently, as it happened in Lancashire, provides neither 
sufficient cost-savings nor high-throughput. 
This argument was supported by Leunig (2001) who found that the rate of 
adoption of ring frames by integrated and co-located spinners and weavers was four 
times higher than that of specialised spinners without weavers close-by between 
1880-1913. Given the technical complementarities between ring frames and 
automatic looms, this fording supports the argument of technical interrelatedness 
argued by Lazonick as one of the necessary conditions to gain the full advantage of 
the adoption of more advanced machineries. 
Furthermore, Mass and Lazonick (1990) argue that the adoption of high- 
throughput machinery should be complemented with the formation of integrated 
mass marketing and distribution functions within an integrated organisation. These 
functions would help firms to attain and maintain concentrated market power and 
provide an incentive for the adoption of mass production systems. In brief, only in an 
integrated structure of production and marketing functions the incentive to adopt 
advanced machinery could be materialised. Given the industry's vertically 
specialised and geographical concentrated structure, the incentive to adopt the more 
modern technologies was poor. 
Ring frames spin and wind yarns in one action; therefore it can operate continuously. Mules, on the 
other hand, operate intermittently -spin and wind is performed sequentially (Leunig, 2001). 
Therefore, ring frames operate at higher speed and produce higher output per unit time. 
8 Sandberg (1964) explains that ring-spun yams were wound on to wooden bobbins which cost much 
more and were heavier than paper cops on which mule-spun yams were wound. Mules could even 
spin yams without cops. For export markets, this would add transport costs. 
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In the context of a contracting market, fragmented structure instigated 
extreme competition among firms competing in the same market. As the adoption of 
advanced machinery was abandoned, firms adopted a cost-cutting strategy through 
the utilisation of low quality yarns and wage reduction to compete with the new 
competitors. This forced the spinners to compete against each other for 
comparatively small orders from several weavers which led to shorter production 
runs and overcapacity. The problem with excess capacity exacerbated the slow 
adoption of new technologies as the new machines would have increased the 
industry's capacity. Under such circumstances, it was economically justifiable to 
purchase low quality cotton to reduce costs and alter working practices (higher 
workloads and a double day shift system) to improve productivity. The spinners and 
weavers believed that their experienced workers would be able to offset the 
limitation of mules from the more advanced equipment. 
Mass and Lazonick (1990) further argue that blaming low wages in the new 
textile producing countries as the culprit for the decline of the Lancashire cotton 
industry does not stand up to scrutiny. Wages per head in India were 10-15 per cent 
less than in Japan but it was Japan rather than India which emerged as the world's 
dominant textile exporter. India even needed protection to keep Japanese products 
out of their domestic market. Although lower costs definitely helped the country to 
compete with Britain, Japan's sources of competitiveness rested on its innovative 
capability to rapidly improve its textile production capability and productivity 
through, among other things, training, 24 hour production and, more importantly, 
rapid development of its own version of high-throughput machinery (ring frames and 
automatic looms combined). Japanese firms -pioneered by Toyoda and Mitsui- did 
not only import machinery from Britain, but more importantly, replicated and 
subsequently developed their own versions of spinning and weaving equipment. 
Their machines were lighter and cheaper than those of the British firms' and by the 
mid 1920s the performance of the Japanese machinery exceeded that of the British 
machinery. The superiority of the Japanese machines reached to the extent that Platts 
and Brother, the largest textile machinery maker in Britain from which Japanese 
firms initially imported their equipment from the 1860s, bought the right to 
manufacture Toyoda's machines in 1925 (Singleton, 1997). In addition, in contrast 
to the attitude of the Lancashire firms who accepted the limitation of ring frames to 
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spin low quality yams as it was and, hence, their reluctance to adopt the new 
technology, Japanese firms found a way to spin low quality yams in ring frames. 
They developed a procedure to mix lower and higher quality cotton to allow the 
production of low breakage yarns at lower costs (Mass and Lazonick, 1990). This 
shows the innovative capability of the Japanese firms to turn limitations to their 
advantage. As a result of these innovations, Japanese firms' production costs per 
spindle which prior to World War I were the world's second highest after 
Switzerland, 40 per cent greater than India and 93 per cent greater than Britain were 
significantly reduced to compete favourably with these countries (Mass and 
Lazonick, 1990). 
Japan's rapid adoption of high-throughput machinery was supported by its 
capabilities to change the structure of the industry from a cottage to a vertically 
integrated. Such a structure was built to support the government's aims to adopt 
mass production systems as part of a competitive strategy to gain market share in the 
international textile market dominated by Britain. The process of transformation was 
distinctly characterised by state-led concerted efforts involving all stakeholders - 
state, banks and firms - to build up a large and efficient integrated structure 
(Rothwell and Zegved, 1985). This resulted in a rapid restructuring process and a 
highly-concentrated, integrated and efficient industrial structure, as opposed to a 
vertically disintegrated structure in Britain. The integrated structure in Japan 
permitted control over the transaction between the different stages of the production 
process, allowing coordinated decision making. The structure also permitted planned 
coordination across the supply chain to allow continuous flow of production, 
optimisation of machine's capacity and high productivity (Lazonick, 1983). This 
system could not work in the fragmented structure found in Lancashire because 
firms had little control over the types and amount of cotton supplies and orders9 and 
over the flow of the production process1°. Japan's labour productivity rapidly 
9 This is related to the routines adopted by firms in Lancashire. Spinning managers bought cotton in 
Liverpool weekly without knowing in advance the quality of the available cotton; therefore they did 
not have control over the quality of cotton available in the market at any point in time. Orders were 
also placed weekly by marketing firms. This encouraged mills to work for short-term orders 
(Lazonick, 1983). 
10 In the vertically specialised and geographical concentrated structure, different production stages 
were linked by middle men. Ibid. 
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improved and eventually surpassed that of Britain. It took less than 50 years for 
Japan shift from being an importing country to the world's major textile exporter. 
Japan's success in the industrial transformation is in striking contrast to 
Britain. Despite losing its competitive advantage in the cost-driven market, the 
industry continued to compete in the same market. The downside of this decision 
was the British cotton industry was trapped with its cost-cutting strategy and the 
production of low quality textile products. The majority of the firms eschewed any 
attempt to search for new markets where competition was not driven by costs, 
Why did the British cotton industry find it difficult to change technologically 
and organisationally whereas Japan was able to successfully transform the structure 
of its industry and to adopt the system of mass production? It is probably true that 
the Japanese textile industry was far smaller than the British industry so that the 
necessary collective action to radically change the industry was more manageable. 
However, Lancashire's long experience, superior skills, more advanced textile 
machinery industry and well established support systems (services) theoretically 
should provide the industry with the necessary resources and assets -tangible and 
non-tangible- to respond sufficiently to maintain its leadership. Surprisingly, the 
supposedly advantages turned out to be the disadvantages when it became obvious 
that they were no longer appropriate for the new environment. This is because the 
traditions" became a constraint to change, the production skills to work with 
traditional equipment became entrenched, and the large infrastructure and well 
established routines became rigid. In addition, the vertically specialised and 
geographical concentrated structure limited communication between managers at the 
different stages of production. This hindered managers from learning from each 
other and from expanding their knowledge which eventually limited the possibility 
of vertical integration. Specialisation tended to be reinforced under these 
circumstances, impeding structural integration (Singleton, 1990, Mass and Lazonick, 
1990). All these factors rendered the industry locked-into its existing structure, 
technology and market. This is in fact the nature of the maturity-trap (Abernathy, et 
" Individual firms in the industry were used to belong to a family. In an extreme competitive 
environment, firm integration was refused by the majority of mills owners as it could entail sharing of 
power with other family members who involved in the merger. Consequently, collective actions 
required to radically change the industry was impeded as the mill owners were reluctant to give up 
their control in integrated mills. Ibid 
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al., 1983), or described as active inertia (Sull, 2000) or core rigidities (Leonard- 
Barton, 1992). 
Lazonick believes that the underlying factor that caused the decline of the 
Lancashire cotton industry was entrepreneurial failure, that is, the inability of the 
Lancashire managers to change the constraints which blocked innovation. Managers, 
constrained by their inability to alter the technical and structural limitation opted to 
stay in their traditional and yet uncompetitive markets. As competition in the market 
had to lower costs, the firms pursued a cost reduction strategy through more 
intensive use of their existing capital and resources. This is the fundamental 
difference in views between Lazonick and other scholars in the interpretation of the 
persistence of Lancashire mills to use mule spindles and power looms and the slow 
adoption of more advanced equipment compared to foreign textile industries. As 
discussed earlier, the majority of Lancashire mill owners overlooked the adoption of 
more modem technologies because they were capital intensive, incurred additional 
costs and, even worse, needed an integrated structure. In other words, the adoption of 
high throughput production process required radical change in both structure and 
practice, a condition which could not be provided by the Lancashire managers. The 
fact that the adoption of advanced machinery lead to dramatically lower unit costs 
was ignored by the Lancashire firms as a way to adapt to the changed competitive 
environment. 
Entrepreneurial failure is also related to the inability to change deeply 
entrenched values that are no longer suitable in a different competitive environment. 
The tradition of maintaining absolute power over their family-owned firms has also 
been attributed to the resistance to integrate. The mill owners feared that integration 
would cost them their power and influence. Tippet (1967) explains that even in 
combined (spinning and weaving) firms he seldom found a self-contained firm 
within which the technical and managerial aspects were integrated. Instead, each 
function was run as a department or division with an individual degree of autonomy. 
The argument forwarded by the mill owners was that the combined firms were not 
economic because a spinning mill could not economically spin as wide ranges of 
yams as required by a weaving mill to be profitable. Consequently, yams produced 
by spinning mills in combined firms were sold to external firms while the weaving 
94 
Chapter 3- The Decline of the Lancashire Cotton Industry: An Early Case of the Maturity-Trap? 
mills purchased yams from other spinners. In other words, the synergy between the 
different production stages could not be achieved. 
This individualistic culture which had characterised the industry since its 
heyday and the inability to change it hindered collective action necessary to radically 
change the industry. This situation was in striking contrast to the collective efforts 
made by the Japanese textile industry, which led it to dominate the international 
market by the early 1930s. It is important to note that it was the Japanese 
government policy which played a pivotal role in the transformation. The British 
government, on the other hand, was prepared to let the market determine the future 
of the industry. In hindsight, the government appeared to let the individualistic 
culture in any major way to persist and did not intervene to change it. 
At this point, it is important to include another observation to the debate that 
supports the argument of entrepreneurial failure to the decline of the Lancashire 
cotton industry. In Lancashire and its surrounding areas, there were a number of 
firms such as Perseverance Mills (Lancashire) and Birley Brothers (Manchester) 
who managed to diversify into higher value-added products including rainwear, 
outdoor sports, military and extreme weather cloth and thrived in their new 
businesses (Rose and Parsons, 2005). Those firms survived the turbulence of the 
1930s and 1970s and expanded their businesses. Unfortunately, the majority of the 
Lancashire firms did not have the entrepreneurial capabilities to search for new 
sources of profit through, for instance, the creation of new products and access to 
new markets. The finding highlights the severity of the maturity-trap among the 
Lancashire firms in that despite more creative and innovative attempts were 
underway in their neighbourhood they were completely overlooked or ignored by the 
majority of the firms. They could not appreciate the emerging opportunities well in 
advance and take advantage of them. They opted for the old same market, 
technology and strategy and requested more protection from the government which 
in the end did nothing for their cause. 
These findings cast significant doubt over the validity of Singleton's 
argument that pessimism among the Lancashire owners and managers was the result 
of a judicious assessment of the slim possibilities of finding alternative routes to save 
the cotton industry. Indeed, there were alternatives to further contraction of the 
industry if mill owners and managers were aware about the emergence of new 
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markets and had the innovative capability to seize the new opportunities. As 
Singleton correctly noted that (despite being rather contrary with his argument) there 
was always scope for `true entrepreneurs' to take advantage and exploit new 
markets. However, he continues, success was the `exception' rather than the 'rule' in 
the Lancashire cotton industry (Singleton, 1990). This suggests that Singleton 
somehow agrees that entrepreneurial failure was one of main factors which brought 
the industry to its knees. He does not discuss in great detail why success was an 
exception, however. If he had, he might have agreed with Lazonick that the 
`exception' was due to the capability to break down the barriers to change and to 
look for new sources of profits. 
The behaviour of the Lancashire managers and mill owners appears to be 
partly affected by their short-term business practices. According to Lazonick, a large 
number of firms operating in an extremely competitive environment could not see 
the importance of change for long-term competitive advantage as they were 
completely occupied by the need to grab relatively small orders for short-term 
revenues (Lazonick, 1983). This practice was not only used during difficult periods. 
In fact, it grew during the growth period when orders arrived continuously on a daily 
basis for short term deliveries. The practice of short-term orders and deliveries 
became routines as abundant high skilled labour, flexible equipment to work on 
small orders (mules and powered looms), specialised structure and geographical 
concentration enabled firms to meet such demand. Under these circumstances, mill 
owners did not have the incentive to develop plans for long-term growth. This 
practice became ingrained over a long period of time which caused inertia. 
To put things in perspective, the mass production system introduced into the 
global textile industry by the US and Japan required an entirely different practice. 
The equipment and production system was geared for long production runs. The 
system could provide significant profits when large orders were placed. This 
required procurement and production plans to guarantee the availability of raw 
materials and on-time delivery. Therefore, to change from one production paradigm 
to another required a concerted effort from all the stakeholders. This proved 
impossible to implement in the Lancashire cotton industry because of the number of 
different factors discussed earlier. 
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The experience of the Lancashire cotton industry vividly illustrates the 
complementarities between markets, technologies, skills, structures and practices 
(routines). As a consequence, a change in one aspect would require changes in other 
aspects accordingly to gain the optimum benefit. As argued by David (1994), in an 
organisation (firm, industry, or country) such interlocking elements which constitute 
the organisation slow down the process of change. Moreover, it increases the risk of 
lock-in to the existing structure as firms tend to opt for the status quo. Therefore, 
large firms operating in mature industries where all elements and their linkages have 
been firmly established are vulnerable to falling into the maturity-trap. Failure to 
change - or entrepreneurial failure - fits very well in the argument of the maturity- 
trap. The example also shows the cost borne by the British economy for failing to 
change the fortunes of the industry and the role played by the government in this 
matter. 
In brief, although pessimism may have influenced firms' decision making as 
Singleton argues, Lazonick has identified more fundamental factors which are the 
real culprits of the decline. Lazonick's argument is highly historical in that industrial 
inertia was caused by a well-established structure and routines, and deeply ingrained 
values and practices which were built up over a century and had brought success to 
the industry. For our purposes here we concur with Lazonick on the grounds that his 
argument gravitates towards the phenomenon of the maturity-trap although he does 
not refer to the phenomenon per se. 
3.4 Structural Change and `Mismatched' Strategy 
From the late 1920s, the government played a central role in the attempts to 
restructure and rationalise the Lancashire cotton industry. The government 
encouraged amalgamation or horizontal integration and the removal of inefficient 
looms aimed to reduce capacity and ease price competition among the Lancashire 
firms. The attempts however failed to improve the industry's competitiveness prior 
to the 1960s. If Lazonick's diagnosis to the problem is accurate that the industry 
needed to integrate vertically to compete with Japanese products, the policy was not 
sufficient as amalgamation failed to encourage vertical integration. 
97 
Chapter 3- The Decline of the Lancashire Cotton Industry: An Early Case of the Maturity-Trap? 
The direction of restructuring and rationalisation attempts changed 
dramatically after 1964. The government, deeply concerned with the sustained 
decline of the industry, was inspired by the reorganisation model of the US which 
suggested that a vertically integrated structure was a necessary condition to adapt to 
the new environment. It was believed that strong groups of integrated, multi-fibre, 
multi-operation textile manufacturers would make the industry less vulnerable to the 
fluctuations in demand and help to realise economies of scale (Owen, 1999). The 
government approached fibre producers to initiate and drive industrial restructuring. 
Large chemical fibre producers, especially Courtaulds and ICI, were the leading 
firms which drove structural changes in the industry through a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions. For the fibre producers, particularly Courtaulds, the acquisition of 
Lancashire firms helped secure the market for its fibres as cotton spinners and 
weavers were its major customers. The initiative resulted in structural change 
towards vertical integration and a higher concentration ratio. The concentration ratio 
reached 50 per cent in the spinning sector in 1968, an increase by 18 per cent from 
the ratio in 1958, while the ratio of the weaving sector increased from 12 per cent to 
31 percent. The invasion of man-made and synthetic fibre producers in the textile 
industry increased the utilisation of man-made and synthetic fibres whereas the 
proportion of cotton yams and products steadily declined (Lazonick, 1983). 
Courtaulds, however, found that restructuring and rationalisation on its own 
was insufficient to improve the industry's competitiveness. The firm appealed to the 
government for protection from imports from developing countries on the grounds 
that it was justified while the industry was being re-organised. The appeal was 
accepted and the government took the lead to promote an agreement among 
exporters and importers to limit the growth of imports from developing countries to 
5 per cent a year. This agreement led to the introduction of Multi Fibre Agreement 
(MFA) in 1973. The policy instrument, however, did not deal with the greatest 
anxiety of the industry, that is, Britain's duty-free imports from the Commonwealth 
countries. Despite concerns about offending the Commonwealth countries, the 
government eventually imposed tariffs on Commonwealth imports in 1972 (Owen, 
1999). 
The restructuring towards vertical integration shows that the industry has 
resolved problems with the fragmented structure as argued by Lazonick (1983) as 
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the fundamental cause of the decline. If his argument is correct, the Lancashire 
cotton industry should have regained its competitiveness and competed successfully 
in the traditional textile market and should have halted or reversed the decline. The 
reality of the situation was something very different from the early expectations. 
Vertical integration had little impact, if any, on the long-term improvement of the 
industry's profitability. In 1980 cotton production hit a historic low of 399 million 
yards and 327 million yards for cotton and synthetic fibres respectively. Compared 
to its peak, cotton production in 1980 only accounted for five per cent of that in 
1912. Likewise, employment in 1980 only represented 12 per cent of that in 1910. 
This fact raises a doubt over the accuracy of Lazonick's argument. Although 
his diagnosis of the problems appears to be quite convincing, the prescription needs 
further examination in accordance to the circumstances under which it is applied. 
Between the 1910s-1960s, during which the mass production system revolutionised 
the global textile industry, a vertically integrated structure as he suggested was 
probably the competitive solution. The new system proved to be vastly superior 
compared to the British traditional craft-based system for the production of low- 
value, high-volume products. From the 1970s onwards market trends changed 
towards more fashionable products characterised by frequent changes in design and 
style. The new trend required flexible manufacturing systems to enable 
manufacturers to respond rapidly to seasonal fashion demand. Italy was the pioneer 
of this new concept which could only be achieved with a less concentrated structure 
where small and medium sized enterprises were clustered in a number of industrial 
districts within which they worked together in networks. Italy's distinctive industrial 
features fitted well into the new trend whereas a more concentrated structure as 
found in Britain did not as large firms tend to be inflexible. 
The new fashion concept introduced by the Italian fashion designers is called 
pret a porter (ready to wear). The concept revolutionised the fashion system used to 
be dominated by the Parisian haute couture (made to order). As discussed in Chapter 
1, the adoption of high-throughput machinery from the US transformed the Italian 
designers' couture capability to ready to wear. The emergence of the new fashion 
concept was encouraged by the new demand for lower-cost solutions of high quality 
fashion products. The demand was driven by mass consumption in the US which 
emerged during the economic boom after the Second World War. The solution can 
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be achieved by combining Italy's traditional craft-based system with the mass 
production system imported from the US. The latter was part of the Marshall Aid 
Programme from the US government for the restoration of Italian industries after 
World War II. The new concept rapidly gained in popularity as it facilitated the 
production of stylish clothing at more affordable prices. 
This new fashion system did not only revolutionise the fashion industry but 
also shifted the power within the textile and clothing supply chain away from the 
manufacturers to designers. Benetton was the icon of this new era. As its distinctive 
industrial features fitted well into this new trend, Italy possessed a relative 
competitive advantage compared to other countries. For the next three decades, 
Italian designers dictated the market with their seasonal ranges (summer, autumn, 
winter and spring). A large number of new design houses such as Dolce and 
Gabbana, Armani, Cerutti and Versace to name a few emerged in Italy for which 
Milan emerged as the Capital of Fashion. 
The British textile industry which had neglected the European market for 
decades was not in a position to respond quickly. The industry overlooked the 
development of their neighbours and reverted to the outdated strategy of its 
counterpart across the Atlantic (USA) which appeared to be unsuitable for the 
prevailing conditions in the European market. In fact, the British textile industry did 
not adopt the American strategy as it was. Britain integrated the entire production 
process from fibre to garment production whereas the US remained separate fibre 
production from textile manufacturing. Consequently the British structure was 
arguably more rigid and inflexible to changes in the business and economic 
environment. 
Yet again, history was about the repeat itself as the industry once again failed 
to recognise potential changes in demand and technology in advance and to identify 
appropriate ways to respond. This 'mismatch' between market trends, structure and 
technology caused by misreading potential changes had a devastating impact on the 
industry. Having lost ground from the low-cost countries in mass-produced markets 
since the 1930s, the British textile industry now found itself insufficiently equipped 
with the technology, structure and capability necessary to compete in the fashion 
market. The extent of the damage was very severe. Courtaulds and other large textile 
firms including Viyella and Coats Patons found themselves in a very difficult 
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situation. Courtaulds, because of its heavy dependence on the Lancashire cotton 
industry and on its cellulosic fibres, had to significantly downsize from 1980 and to 
relocate a large portion of production abroad. The firm was demerged into two 
different firms -textiles and fibres-chemicals- before the textile business was 
acquired by Sara Lee in 2000 who subsequently sold to it to a Hong Kong group, 
PDE Enterprise, in 2005. Its chemical business was acquired by one of its former 
competitors, AkzoNobel, in 1998. 
A small number of Lancashire firms actually managed to escape from being 
acquired by large firms and survived when Courtaulds was struggling to reorganise. 
Rose and Parsons (2005) identified that firms which survived in Lancashire were 
smaller in size and pursued specialised, high value-added products where 
competition was less determined by costs. They diversified into high-performance 
and technical textiles, notably rainwear, outdoor sports, military and extreme 
weather cloth. Demand in these markets emerged in the years leading up to the First 
World War, and grew progressively after the 1960s. As discussed earlier, a number 
of traditional Lancashire firms such as Perseverance Mills (founded in 1901) and 
Baxendan Chemicals, and Manchester-based cotton manufacturers Birley Brothers 
and R. W Barton foresaw these new opportunities and decided to create new products 
rather than following the majority of their competitors. Since World War I they have 
successfully diversified their products to include fabrics for the military (balloon 
fabrics, parachutes), extreme weather, and outdoors (such as sleeping bags). 
They made the transition within a relatively short period of time. To illustrate 
the point, during World War I, Perseverance Mills supplied barrage balloons to 
guard against anticipated German air raids, although up to 1914 it still exported grey 
cloth to India. The transition was made possible because it applied accumulated 
knowledge generated from its experience in the production of grey cotton cloth to 
make goods demanded in new markets with different specifications. The firm 
combined its traditional knowledge, for which they were the best in the world, with 
new materials (nylon) to fulfil demand in emerging markets. From the outset, the 
firm licensed or purchased fibres to make breathable waterproof fabrics from DuPont 
and W. L. Gore (GoreTex(&). They wove or knitted the synthetic yarns into 
performance fabrics with close cooperation with their clients. Over time, 
Perseverance Mills learned and improved its learning and absorptive capacity to 
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make its own specialised fabrics, Pertex®, the market leader in water resistant, 
lightweight and highly breathable fabrics. Interestingly, the experienced spinners and 
weavers which were claimed to be the obstacle in the adoption of more modem 
machinery due to their inappropriate skills to run the new machines (Saxonhouse and 
Wright, 1984) turned out to be a great contributor to the process of diversification. In 
fact, their experiences were the critical assets during the new product development 
process. This illustrates the entrepreneurial capabilities which facilitate firms to 
break down the barriers to change and to profit from them. These capabilities, 
however, were rarely found in the Lancashire firms (Lazonick, 1983). 
3.5 The Maturity-Trap at the Firm Level: Lessons from 
Courtaulds 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the debate about the decline of the British cotton 
industry which mostly focuses on the condition at the industry level lacks of the 
analysis of the inner workings of business enterprises which contributed to the 
decline. It is argued that a lack of such knowledge disregards the underlying factors 
necessary to analyse the process which leads firms to fall into the maturity-trap, the 
fundamental cause of decline. In addition, the firm level analysis permits the analysis 
of firm's dynamic capabilities to examine the source(s) of a sustainable competitive 
(dis)advantage (Teece, et al., 1997). 
The historical development of Courtaulds, the largest group of textile 
manufacturers in Britain between the 1920s-1960s, is the most appropriate case to 
illustrate the process of the maturity-trap at the firm level. The firm which used to 
dominate (in fact, monopolize) the market for viscose and acetate rayon in Europe as 
well as the largest producer in the US fell victim in the face of a changing business 
environment. Competitive threats posed by synthetic fibres, that is, polyamide and 
polyester developed by DuPont and ICI respectively, played a significant role in the 
decline of the rayon market. With the growth at around 8-10 per cent per annum, 
synthetic fibres took over the share of rayon in its main market, that is, garments and 
tyre reinforcements. It is argued that the firm's inability to adapt to the new 
competitive environment appears to be fundamental to its demise in the late 1990s. 
Courtaulds, an old and large organisation, fell victim to its old strategy which had 
102 
Chapter 3- The Decline of the Lancashire Cotton Industry: An Early Case of the Maturity-Trap? 
brought success to the firm but was no longer competitive in the face of the 
emergence of new competitors. Organisational inertia led to poor business decisions 
which eventually plunged the firm into crisis. A number of attempts to save the firm 
were made but the results were very disappointing. There is a strong indication that 
the failure of Courtaulds was fundamentally caused by the maturity-trap. The 
following section analyses the issues of maturity-trap at Courtaulds in greater detail. 
Courtaulds enjoyed exceptional growth between the 1920s-1940s following its 
decision to license the production process of viscose rayon for the British and US market 
in 1904 and 1911 respectively. The decision was initiated by the entrepreneurial 
management who foresaw that the future of the fin was no longer in the silk mourning 
crepe, its traditional business, as the market had stagnated in the 1890s. The firm 
realised that the decline of its traditional market was permanent and that it needed to 
change direction and capitalise on emerging technologies and markets. Viscose rayon 
which was invented in 1894 was an ideal replacement for silk and, moreover, provided 
an opportunity to enter different markets. The acquisition of viscose rayon led to a 
radical change in the firm's knowledge, technology, product and market. Courtaulds was 
the first firn to commercialise viscose rayon. 
When the firm faced a changing market for the second time Courtaulds' 
entrepreneurial attitude and strategy however appeared to be lacking. The arrival of 
synthetic fibres in the market saw the growth of its viscose rayon business decline 
considerably. The market experienced a long-term decline up to the acquisition of the 
firm by AkzoNobel in 1998. Prior to the Second World War, viscose products 
contributed to 80-90 per cent of the firm's profit. In less than two decades the figure 
dropped to 30 per cent. The situation was exacerbated by increased competition in 
viscose rayon as a consequence of the diffusion of relevant knowledge and lower entry 
barriers to the market. Under these circumstances, price competition intensified as 
capacity soared. 
Its distance from the development and commercialisation of polyamide and 
polyester excluded the firm from the opportunity to capitalise from the period of rapid 
growth which was monopolised by DuPont and ICI. In fact, ICI declined Courtaulds' 
request to license the technology. To make inroads into the synthetic fibre market, 
Courtaulds made attempts to develop its own version of acrylic fibres, Courtelle, and a 
few other fibres after 1955. Courtelle was Courtaulds' most successful synthetic fibre as 
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it could improve the performance of its garments through blending with other fibres. 
However, the introduction of Courtelle in 1958, several years after DuPont and Monsato 
established their acrylic markets was a poor product development strategy. The prowess 
of the two competitors in R&D in synthetic fibres and their strong financial resources 
impeded the growth of Courtelle. Arguably, Courtaulds was falling into the maturity- 
trap as it refused the option to make a radical departure into synthetic fibres as DuPont 
did12 despite clear indications that the future of cellulosic fibres was under serious threat. 
In contrast to its decision to enter the viscose market at a very early stage its decision to 
enter the synthetic fibre market was considered to be too late. 
Under these circumstances, Courtaulds was forced to concentrate on its main 
market despite the severity of the decline and the maturity of viscose technology. The 
firm ruled out the possibility that the decline was permanent and contended that rayon 
staple fibres offered the most hopeful prospects (Knight, 1974). The firm believed that 
the changing environment was temporary partly due to a change of fashion and the end 
of the post-war boom. Therefore, incremental innovation such as price reduction, quality 
improvement and aggressive marketing could overcome the problem. To some extent 
the strategy arrested the decline but it definitely did not halt it (Boisot, 2002). In terms of 
R&D, Courtaulds maintained a focus on the improvement of processing cellulosic fibres 
until the 1990s although its performance appeared to have stagnated after the invention 
of high tenacity rayon in the 1940s and high wet modulus rayon in the 1950s (Boisot, 
2002). 
In 1955 Courtaulds launched a new strategic movement to expand its rayon 
market and to look for other alternative areas for growth through acquisitions. The firm 
acquired British Celanese, the producer of acetate products, in 1957 to ensure its 
dominant position in the rayon market. It also entered paint, packaging (cardboard, 
plastics and can), steel tyre cord, and glass fibre and fabric markets between 1958-1960. 
The result of the expansion and diversification strategy was not as expected. The 
performance of the new divisions was poor despite significant investment. The firm was 
over-optimistic regarding the size of the market and misread competitors' responses to 
its strategy. Metal Box, a competitor in open-top can packaging market, launched a 
12 DuPont diversified its business from gun powder to rayon through a licensing agreement with the 
French Comptoir des Textiles Artificiels in 1920. As the market of rayon declined DuPont scaled 
down its rayon operation and eventually closed the operation in 1960. 
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costly battle which forced Courtaulds to sell the majority of its ownership in Reads, its 
can packaging firm in 1967. 
The Board's reluctance to shift to a decentralised structure despite its inability to 
properly manage such diverse businesses with a centralised structure contributed 
significantly to the failed attempts at diversification (Coleman, 1980, Knight, 1974). 
Centrally controlled management of highly diversified businesses generally involves 
complex bureaucracy. Management often fails to recognise problems early on, thereby 
delaying any attempt to fix them. In addition, Knight (1974) suggests that the firm's 
inability to overcome the complications during the process of integration of the acquired 
firms into Courtaulds' management systems, cultures and practices was fundamental to 
the failure. He believes that the knowledge of Courtaulds' managers could not instantly 
be applied to the new businesses at least in the beginning. The managers needed to learn 
the conditions and practices specific to the relevant industries and markets. In a similar 
fashion, the managers from the acquired firms needed to be introduced to a new 
management style and culture. It appears that Courtaulds' management could not 
recognise the complications which arose from acquisitions. 
The story of Courtaulds vividly illustrates how a large, ambitious firm can fall 
victim to the maturity-trap when confronted with a changing competitive environment. 
The adoption of viscose rayon had strategic implications for the fine's structure and 
practices which was ignored by the management when the market for rayon started to 
decline. By moving up the value chain to produce man-made fibres and the increasing 
importance of the fibre business to its turnover, Courtaulds gradually reduced its 
involvement in its traditional business, that is, the production of fabrics and garments for 
end users (Knight, 1974). As the firm considered itself a textile firm regardless of the 
fact that its main product was chemically-modified cellulosic fibres, Courtaulds did not 
build up a research capability in basic chemistry as DuPont did (Owen, 1999). Rather, it 
decided to strengthen its competence in the commercialisation process of new fibres 
discovered elsewhere which was exceptionally successful in the commercialisation of 
viscose (Boisot, 2002). 
The strategy worked well in the adoption of viscose where Courtaulds was the 
first firm which took the risk to commercialise the new fibre at an early stage. As the 
subsequent developments of fibres came from R&D in basic organic chemistry its 
decision not to invest in fibre chemistry put it behind any new developments. Moreover, 
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the presence of the new competitors -DuPont and ICI which came from the chemical 
industry- characterised by advanced research capability in chemistry, large size and a 
financially strong organisation -in contrast to the characteristics of textile firms- left 
Courtaulds with little opportunity to commercialise the new fibres. DuPont and ICI 
developed and commercialised new synthetic fibres themselves and gained a temporary 
monopoly during the growth period whereas Courtaulds was left behind. Its joint 
venture with ICI to commercialise nylon -British Nylon Spinners (BNS)- fell through 
which provoked Courtaulds to sell its share in BNS to ICI in 1964 in exchange of ICI's 
holdings in Courtauld's equity. Although it developed a different production process to 
produce nylon 6 (`felon'), the commercialisation had little effect on the firm's profits. 
This illustrates how striking to an old strategy in a different competitive environment 
can prove to be absolutely fatal. 
Courtaulds failed to respond effectively in the face of new competitors from 
outside the textile industry who brought in new products performance in to the existing 
markets derived from a different technological paradigm. Its insistence to remain in its 
traditional textile market was typified by greater emphasis on processes improvement 
and niche market diversification excluded the option to diversify organically away from 
its established businesses. Its competence was not sufficiently broad or diverse. This 
rendered the firm more vulnerable to changes in both markets and technology and was at 
risk of losing a large share of its revenues if there was any significant change in the 
former or latter. 
Courtaulds' experience was in striking contrast to that of DuPont. DuPont 
successfully transferred its chemical R&D capability (established in 1903 with the 
formation of Central Research) in gun powder and rayon fibres into synthetic polymers 
through the establishment of a fundamental research programme in 1927. As the rayon 
market had reached maturity, DuPont sold its rayon business in 1960 and concentrated 
its R&D efforts on the emerging synthetic polymers. This shows that DuPont's agility 
and flexibility towards change saved the firm. from disaster as the market for gun powder 
gradually disappeared following the conclusion of the Civil War. 
The decision to ignore R&D in fibre chemistry had further ramifications for the 
firm's plight. It became detached from the development of synthetic polymers and its 
decision to focus on the expansion and improvement of rayon fibres. The fact that rayon 
had lost its competitiveness to synthetic fibres and opportunities for technical 
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improvement were limited was ignored. As the majority of its staple rayon production 
was consumed by the textile industry, the decline of the Lancashire cotton industry 
posed a serious threat to its revenues. Therefore, forward integration into textile 
manufacturing was deemed to be the only sensible option to secure its future. As 
discussed earlier, other alternative paths such as diversification and entry into the 
synthetic fibre market failed to have any considerable effect on the firm's profitability. 
Moreover, this strategy was to show to the City of London that Courtaulds had found a 
new path to grow following the bid by ICI which was rejected in 1961. 
Courtaulds' management was convinced that an injection of capital, 
modernisation and modem management style would help the Lancashire textile firms to 
compete with low-cost imports in the European market. They believed that scale and 
standardisation for long production runs of standard fabrics were the key competitive 
factor in the global textile trade (Owen, 1999). The firm was encouraged by the British 
government to lead mergers and acquisitions of the Lancashire firms to form large 
groups of integrated textile manufacturing firms. As discussed earlier, this business 
strategy was inspired by the successful restructuring programme in the US textile 
industry. The management at Courtaulds assumed that the same strategy could be 
applied in Britain. They ignored the fact that the market structure and demand between 
Europe and the US were different and this would affect the effectiveness of the strategy. 
In contrast to the US market which was more homogenous the European market 
demanded more differentiated, stylish and fashionable fabrics. Therefore, a large 
integrated structure was less suited to the competitive environment in Europe. 
Management also made an ill-based assumption that the integration of the entire textile 
production process (from fibre to textile or garment manufacturing) would generate 
synergies and increase the competitive advantage of the British textile industry (Owen, 
1999). They also misjudged the capability of low-cost countries to put even greater on 
Western producers even after they had reduced prices. 
Indeed, the extraordinary wave of takeover activities which began in 1962 (see 
section 3.4) could not restore the competitive advantage of the British textile industry. 
The recession post oil shock in 1973 caused a significant decline in demand. The entry 
to the European Common Market (now the European Union) which coincided with the 
recession exacerbated the problems faced by the industry. Contrary to its initial intention 
to replace imports from low-cost countries, the firm found its standardized products 
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unsuitable for the heterogeneity of the European consumers. It failed to capitalise from 
the Common Market as it lacked experience in marketing and distribution of textiles on 
the Continent. 
The new management in 1975 abandoned the vertical integration strategy. The 
firm initiated rationalisation, reorganisation and redirection over the next two decades. 
The unprofitable (traditional) businesses were sold, the textile and chemical businesses 
were demerged into two different firms and greater focus was put on the fields where 
Courtaulds had a technical advantage over its competitors. Despite these attempts, the 
chemical business, comprising of fibres, packaging materials and paints, was acquired 
by the Dutch chemical group, AKZONobe1, its competitor in the improved rayon fibres, 
in 1998. Meanwhile, its textile operations started to outsource production to cheaper 
overseas locations. Its long-term business relationship with Marks & Spencer guaranteed 
a steady flow of orders in the domestic market, yet it failed to prevent the textile 
business from being acquired by Sara Lee in 2000. 
Interestingly, the maturity-trap did not only affect Courtaulds traditional textile 
market but also in the carbon fibre market. Courtaulds was one of a few firms which 
initiated the commercialisation of carbon fibre in Europe in the mid 1960s. In fact, 
Courtaulds was the largest carbon fibre producer in Europe up to the 1980s, accounting 
for 90 per cent of European carbon fibre production and it seized 13 per cent of the 
world market (Spinardi, 2002). The firm, however, failed to maintain its leadership 
despite full support from the British government and ceased its carbon fibre production 
in 1991. 
Courtaulds entered the carbon fibre market following the invention of the 
process to produce high strength, high modulus and highly orientated crystalline carbon 
fibres by the UK Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) in Farnborough in 1965. It found 
that polyacrilonitrile (PAN) fibres could be used as the precursor to carbon fibre 
production. The government, who was keen to avoid yet another British invention being 
exploited more successfully overseas and encouraged Courtaulds to be the supplier of 
the precursor for the RAE13. Courtaulds was an obvious candidate to be a supplier of 
PAN as it was the largest supplier of `British' acrylic fibres (Courtelle). PAN was a 
variant of Courtelle and was produced using a similar process to manufacture Courtelle. 
13 Please refer to Colombo U (1977) Strategies for Europe proposals for science and technology 
policies industrial innovation in Europe. Omega 5,511-527. 
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Within two years of its involvement in the production of PAN, Courtaulds became the 
producer of carbon fibre. 
Courtaulds' process had a cost advantage over other processing methods. 
Nevertheless, its aqueous spinning process was vulnerable to inorganic impurities in the 
water supply. This impurity had a great adverse impact on the strength of the resulting 
products. For instance, it caused carbon fibre turbine blades of Rolls-Royce (RB21 1) 
failed the bird strike impact tests in 1967-1969. This problem caused by the impurity of 
PAN was not identified by RAE until the 1970s (Spinardi, 2002). 
The impurity issue caused Courtaulds to lose out on the high end market 
(aerospace). Rolls Royce, for instance, shifted to Japanese suppliers which produced 
high purity carbon fibres. Yet its lower cost solution and large production capacity 
appealed to other markets (sporting and leisure goods) which started to pick up in the 
late 1970s. The support from the government to increase production capacity helped the 
firm to reduce the price even further (Knight, 1974). By the end of 1980s the sporting 
and leisure goods markets represented about two third of production while the rest was 
for the aerospace industry, particularly for British Aerospace (now BAe Systems). 
Courtaulds' competitive advantage, however, became a weakness when the 
market changed against it in the early 1990s. The decision to exploit low-cost PAN and 
pursue mass markets in sports applications (75 per cent of its production went to Taiwan 
and Korea by the end of the 1980s) made it more vulnerable to competition from low- 
cost countries, mainly Japan and Korea. Meanwhile, its large investment in the US in 
carbon fibres and the subsequent processes, that is, prepreg and composites, failed to 
generate healthy returns. Its assumption about the growth of demand in the US military 
market never been materialised following the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the 
firm suffered from huge overcapacity and loss of profits. Courtaulds lost faith in carbon 
fibres and sold its production units in the US and UK in 1991. Meanwhile, the late- 
comers such as Toray, Toho-Tenax and Mitsubishi Rayon, emerged as the world's 
largest (small tow) carbon producer which offered better products (purities) and more 
cost-effective production processes. Together they seized 72 per cent of the global 
market in 2007. Toray alone had the largest share (Roberts, 2007). 
How did a large firm which dominated the European market and controlled a 
significant global market share fall victim to competition from low-cost firms? The 
answer is the classic maturity-trap. The downturn in global demand certainly adversely 
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affected the firm's performance; however, the firm's reluctance to change, ill-judged 
business decisions and a short-term business strategy appears to have caused permanent 
damage to the firm (Spinardi, 2002). Courtaulds declined to shift from the aqueous- 
based spinning process although the impurity resulting from the process weakened the 
strength of the fibres. This made the fibres unsuitable for the high-performance market 
such as the aerospace industry. A request from Rolls-Royce to provide samples for its 
aeroengine pod doors in 1979 was declined by Courtaulds on the grounds that the 
requested fibres could not be produced by its established processing technology and the 
size of the order was too small. Courtaulds contended that any change which could 
cause disruption to its continuous production process was uneconomic. It was reluctant 
to establish small production facilities to deal with development projects that were 
different from its established products and technologies. This shows that its reluctance to 
change hampered the opportunity to receive orders from the aerospace industry which 
offered higher margins but demanded higher strength carbon fibres. 
Ironically, Rolls-Royce became an important market for the Japanese carbon 
fibre manufacturers. In fact, Toray became an important supplier for the main 
players in the aerospace industry, Boeing and Airbus (Spinardi, 2002) whereas 
Courtaulds missed out on this opportunity as it concentrated on low-cost products 
and the US military market. As with the Lancashire cotton industry, this strategy made 
it vulnerable to competition from low-cost competitors (Japanese and Taiwanese 
producers). 
Furthermore, its large investment appears to have forced management to pursue 
quick returns. As argued by Rosenberg (1996), new technologies entail uncertainties in 
market and technological performance. Therefore, it is highly risky to invest at large 
amount in one market and technology at the early stage of market and technology 
development. In the case that the assumptions on which the investment was based failed 
to materialise, and hence low return on investment (ROI), the firm lost its confidence. 
This led to Courtaulds' withdrawal from the carbon fibre business. Hayes and Abernathy 
(1980) argue that relying heavily on short-term financial measurements such as ROI 
reinforces short-termism which had serious detrimental effects on the US manufacturing 
in the 1970s. 
Interestingly, the Japanese firms had a very different approach. They maintained 
their investment in diversification, capacity expansion and cost reduction although the 
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global down turn caused severe overcapacity and loss of profits. This behaviour was 
driven by its expectation of long-term gains rather than short-term profits. Despite many 
years of marginal profitability Toray management still believed that the carbon fibre 
market would pick up and the most profitable market would be in the high performance 
market. Instead of following other big competitors to pursue the US military market 
Toray improved its capability from producing carbon fibres for low-technology 
applications to high-technology applications particularly for the European aerospace 
industry (Spinardi, 2002). 
The rise and decline of Courtaulds clearly exemplifies the consequences of 
falling victim to the maturity-trap. The firm's responses to the changing competitive 
environment were ineffective to ensure its survival due to outdated R&D and business 
strategy, poor management and an inappropriate organisational structure and practices. 
The application of the same strategy, management style, business structure and practices 
which used to bring about success to the firm (in its rayon business) and yet were no 
longer suitable in a new competitive environment led to its demise. Its deeply 
entrenched values and practices that have been built over a long period of time hindered 
more radical responses which might have saved its future. 
3.6 The Maturity-Trap: Lessons from the Past 
What can be learned from the decline of the British textile industry and 
Courtaulds? A number of factors that triggered the loss of the competitive advantage 
of the Lancashire cotton industry in the face of rising competition from Japan, the 
US and India have been identified. Uncertainty which caused pessimism over the 
future, low-level of investment leading to technological backwardness, ineffective 
government policies, fragmented industrial structure, a lack of collective actions and 
inability to accurately recognise trends have been cited. Above all, the underlying 
cause of the decline was the industry's distinct structure, values and practices that 
had been very successful over a long period of time and had reinforced each other to 
become deeply entrenched. When the environment changed rapidly, managers who 
could not change the traditional structure, values and practices, confined their 
responses to the areas they knew very well and became locked-in to the existing 
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structure, practices, technology and market. This is the very nature of the maturity- 
trap. 
The determination of the Lancashire firms to continue to pursue the cost- 
cutting strategy to compete in the market it used to dominate despite the loss of its 
competitiveness clearly illustrates the maturity-trap. Instead of searching for new 
markets the industry brought its reputation into disrepute by the use of low-quality 
yams, the reduction of wages and the extension of working hour to reduce costs. The 
strategy neither helped the industry to regain its competitive advantages nor did its 
reputation any good. The poor reputation caused the industry to lose its 
attractiveness to highly-skilled workers which by implication damaged the industry's 
competitiveness even more. In this case, the maturity-trap caused a spiral downward 
effect which eventually led to its terminal decline. 
The cost-cutting strategy became a common practice among the firms since 
the growth period in the last two decades of the 19th century. As discussed earlier, 
the number of firms competing in Lancashire created an extremely competitive 
environment as the firms located in the same district produced the same products, 
used the same technology and raw materials, followed the same strategy and 
perceived competition based on the same assumptions. The pressure to imitate each 
other was high, leaving price as the main differentiating factor. Therefore, it is 
hardly surprising that the managers opted for cost reduction in search of short-term 
profits at the expense of more radical alternatives for long-term growth. The 
attachment of the firms to this strategy was severe to the extent that they failed to 
recognise the serious deficiencies of the strategy to retain their competitive 
advantage when new more nimble competitors emerged. This underpins the 
argument that poor leadership, myopic views of the owners and entrepreneurial 
failure are the underlying factors of the maturity-trap at the firm-level. These factors 
are also highlighted in the decline of Courtaulds. 
The study of the British textile industry and Courtaulds vividly illustrates a 
large industry and an iconic firm falling into the maturity-trap. It is important to note 
that the firms were not necessarily unresponsive to changing environments. On the 
contrary, they put considerable efforts in to respond to the changes. However, the 
attempts were insufficient to maintain their leadership, were misdirected as they 
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misread emerging trends, were too late or were based on ambitious assumptions to 
gain quick returns. 
With regards to the debate about the cause of the decline of the Lancashire 
cotton industry, this study offers a different perspective. Had the Lancashire cotton 
industry managed to change its structure and adopted modem technologies in time or 
changed its direction to more fashionable products, would the industry have thrived? 
It is far from clear whether the industry would have been able to compete in the 
coarser textile market dominated by Japan, India, and the US or in the fashion textile 
market controlled by their European competitors notably Italy, France and Germany. 
In either case, the industry needed to build up new capabilities and create a new 
industrial structure because the prerequisites for the two extremely different markets 
were not readily available to the British textile industry. For instance, it is the basic 
requirement in the fashion market to have a pool of fashion designers who work 
closely together with textile manufacturers to develop new designs on a frequent 
basis. Close relationships between textile manufacturers and machinery 
manufacturers are also necessary in the development of flexible equipment to enable 
them to adapt to frequent changes in trends. In Italy, such relationships have been 
evolving since the late 1940s and handed a unique competitive advantage over 
Britain. In Britain, on the other hand, little collaborative efforts have been made 
between the British textile machinery makers with the textile manufacturers. The 
former, although leading the global market up to the 1930s, exported the largest 
portion of its production as the domestic industry rather slow to adopt more modem 
equipment. 
In the coarser textile market, had the industry changed its structure and 
production system early enough to compete with the mass production system, the 
Lancashire cotton industry might have been able to prolong its dominance for 
several more years as its productivity could have increased significantly. Under such 
circumstances, Japanese firms might have required a longer time to catch-up with the 
level of productivity of the Lancashire firms. However, given the maturity of the 
textile technology which permitted competitors to purchase off-the-shelf 
technologies and the diffusion of know-how in textile production, Japan would 
eventually catch up with Britain's level of productivity but with much lower 
production costs. Such a catch-up process has occurred repeatedly in the global 
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textile competition. This is precisely what the Korean textile industry did to the 
Japanese textile industry and, more recently, the Chinese textile industry to the 
Korean textile industry. This suggests that the competitiveness of the industry in its 
traditional mass-produced cotton fabrics could not have been retained in the long run 
even had the industry had changed its structure and technologies earlier. 
This argument suggests that industrialised countries have to rejuvenate their 
mature industries as they cannot compete effectively when competition is based on 
cost. The strategy and process for de-maturity has to be examined carefully. As 
discussed earlier misreading trends and an inappropriate strategy were among the 
major factors which led to the collapse of the Lancashire cotton industry and 
Courtaulds. Examples can be drawn from other sectors. For instance, Firestone, once 
the major contender in the tyre market, could not recognise the long-term effect of 
the introduction of radial tires by Michelin in the 1960s on its competitiveness. The 
firm did not respond in a timely fashion manner which led to its long-term decline 
(Sull, 2000). It indicates that the emergence of new competitors that initiate new 
trends or encourage changes in market demand cannot be overlooked. Firms in 
developed countries have to continuously move-up the value chain to offer added 
value to their customers at a pace where they can avoid being caught-up by the 
lower-cost competitors or imitators. Therefore, it is crucial for firms to create the 
foundations for continuous change. This can only be achieved if they are receptive to 
change; implement a flexible strategy to accommodate different business 
environments; adopt flexible production systems and organisational structure. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates how a mature industry and a large firm can fall into 
the maturity-trap. The historical context of the Lancashire cotton industry and 
Courtaulds shows that the maturity-trap is a consequence of organisational value and 
practices that have been accumulated for a long-period of time and have helped the 
industry and the firm to gain a competitive advantage. As the value and practices 
become deeply ingrained within the organisation, ironically, they become the 
barriers to change. Government policy was ineffective in its capacity to 
fundamentally change the industry as it only addressed one aspect (capacity 
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reduction). Initiatives led by both government and the private sector were unable to 
strategically redirect the industry. Although the industry finally changed its structure, 
the response came too late. It found itself in the wrong position as the market 
changed and went in a different direction. The maturity-trap is a `product' of 
structural, institutional and managerial (or entrepreneurial) failure. 
Despite the common suggestion that the decline of the Lancashire cotton 
industry was irreversible, studies of the industry at the firm level found that a 
number of firms survived the crisis which hit the industry in the 1930s and in the 
1960s. What distinguished the surviving firms from the majority of the Lancashire 
firms was their dynamic capabilities. These enabled them to escape the maturity- 
trap. Instead of being caught up in the cost-cutting strategy and the wave of mergers 
and acquisitions, they focused on the creation of new competencies and restructuring 
to tap into newly emerging markets. They became producers of specialist products 
where demand was determined by performance than low-costs. 
In hindsight, it could be construed that the process of transition to be a 
specialist in the performance fabric market parallels the process towards 
specialisation in the low-cost cotton market in the 19`h century. Likewise the process 
towards specialisation in the mid 19th century, the specialisation in the 1960s was 
driven by access to emerging markets, rapid adoption of the latest technology and 
reorganisation. It is indeed the contention of Abernathy's et al. (1983) that to 
understand the process of de-maturity, an industry should learn from the very 
process from which they gained their competitiveness in the first place. Thus, in a 
changed competitive environment after the First World War, the industry should 
have learned from its past and applied it to the new environment. Had they managed 
to transfer their capabilities to capitalise the emerging market as they did in the mid 
19th century, the future of the industry could have been different. 
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4 
Technological Change in the 
Textile Industry: 
The Role of New Materials 
4.1 Introduction 
The development of the textile industry has been profoundly influenced by 
changes in the technology associated with the industry. There are three distinct 
technological fields that have changed the industry over the past two centuries. The 
first is the advancement of textile engineering which has helped the industry to gain 
high productivity, quality and flexibility. Technological innovation in this field has 
improved the speed of production by over 2000 times between 1750-2000 (OECD, 
2004) which fostered the transformation of the industry from a cottage to a 
manufacturing industry. A number of different methods of spinning (dry-spinning, 
melt-spinning and electrospinning), weaving (jacquard weaving and 3D weaving), 
knitting (flat knitting and circular knitting) and finishing have significantly improved 
the quality of textile products and enabled the production of a wide range of textile 
products. Advanced textile machinery has reduced the use of water and solvents 
thereby decreasing the environmental impact of the production process. 
The second is material science and engineering. The advancement of 
synthetic polymers, for instance, has revolutionised the industry from solely 
processing natural fibres to include a diverse range of polymers and composite 
materials. Synthetic materials are not only used for fibres but also for reinforcement 
and finishing materials. This technology has facilitated the development of new 
products for various applications that can not be achieved through processing natural 
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fibres from apparel to aerospace and medical textiles. The emergence of a new 
textile subsector, the technical textiles', was fostered by advances in this domain. 
The third domain is the development of information technology (IT) which 
has improved the speed and flexibility of production and delivery, and helped to 
achieve cost savings. The technology has enhanced logistical systems of 
manufacturers and retailers significantly as it enables `real-time' communication 
between retailers and manufacturers to allow efficient real time order and delivery 
systems. The technology permits firms to maintain their inventory at the minimum 
level which has a significant impact on overall costs. It has fostered the development 
of `fast fashion', a new business model in the fashion industry pioneered by Zara 
which has allowed retailers to bring down the delivery time of new collections from 
three months to two weeks at affordable prices. The technology has also facilitated 
the off-shoring practice which allows European retailers to manufacture their 
products abroad. 
The first two technological fields have influenced the development of 
processing technology and fostered the fragmentation of market while the latest has 
radically changed the relationship among the stakeholders within the supply chain. 
Sewing is the only production stage where technological development is relatively 
stagnant. A number of attempts to automate the sewing process to reduce the 
utilisation of labour failed to materialise. For instance, research programmes 
conducted in Europe (1987-1991) under the Basic Research in Industrial 
Technologies for Europe (BRITE) and in Japan (1982-1990) under the Automated 
Sewing System were abandoned as the high level of investment hindered the 
commercialisation of the technology (Jones, 2006). While spinning, weaving and 
finishing have become highly capital intensive and use high technology, sewing 
remains labour intensive. This part of the production process has largely been 
transferred to low-cost countries. 
The development of textile engineering and materials is interdependent as the 
processing of different materials often requires different equipment and methods to 
produce products with certain properties (Antonelli, et al., 1990). As an illustration, 
1 Technical textile is defined as "textile materials and products intended for end-uses other than non-protective 
clothing, household furnishing and floorcoverings where the fabric or fibrous component is selected principally 
but not exclusively for its performance and properties as opposed to its aesthetic or decorative characteristics" 
(Textile Terms and Definition, The Textile Institute, Manchester, l0`s Ed). 
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the introduction of synthetic fibres facilitated the `diffusion' of open rotor spinning 
and shuttle-less looms between the 1950s-1970s as the superiority of the physical 
properties of synthetic fibres compared to the natural ones -such as increased 
elongation at break and toughness - allowed for the utilisation of high speed and 
high throughput machines. Economies of scale were relatively easy to achieve with 
this set up. In a similar fashion, the diffusion of synthetic fibres into textile products 
was fostered by the development of new processing equipment such as wet spinning, 
melt spinning and electrospinning which allowed textile firms to convert the fibres 
into products. 
The advancement of synthetic materials (and the associated processing 
technologies) is very important for the textile industry in the developed countries as 
it has encouraged the growth of the technical textile sector. In contrast to the mature 
traditional textile market, the technical textile market has enjoyed an annual growth 
rate of approximately 4 per cent since 1995 (Figure 4-1). One of the fundamental 
differences between the traditional clothing and technical textile markets is their 
performance characteristics. While the former mainly offers fashionable design, fit 
and comfort the latter emphasises mechanical performance (such as strength, 
elasticity and toughness) and functionality that include ballistic resistance, flame 
retardancy, conductivity and being water proof. The requirements for the traditional 
market can mainly be delivered with the use of natural fibres whose technological 
advancement has reached maturity. Consequently, those who continue to use only 
natural raw materials for their products are much more vulnerable to competitive 
threats from low-cost countries as they do not have any form of technological 
advantage per se. Some firms have targeted the high-end segment of the market to 
avoid competition based on costs and compete on design and quality. Italy is the 
leader in this market. On the contrary, performance requirements in technical textiles 
can mainly be achieved through the exploitation of the different properties of 
synthetic materials or with a combination of natural and synthetic materials. It is 
reported that the share of synthetic fibres in the technical textile sector was 79 per 
cent in 2006 and this will increase to 81 per cent by 2010. Synthetic polymer and 
materials technology has advanced rapidly in that the 21st century has been 
recognised as the era of the `advanced materials revolution' (Moskowitz, 2009). 
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Source: David Rigby Associates (www. davidrigbyassociates. co. uk) 
Textile firms who shift their activities from the traditional market to the 
technical and the high-performance textile market have at their disposal various 
technologies that can be exploited. They have the advantage to change the basis of 
competition from lower costs to technological capability and product performance. 
In other words, the adoption of polymer and advanced material technologies can help 
the industry to bypass the maturity-trap and initiate the process of de-maturity. This, 
however, is only possible if firms can exploit the materials properties for use in 
commercial products. 
The market for technical textiles is not confined to industrial applications. 
There are a number of traditional textile markets which have been revolutionised 
through the exploitation of synthetic materials. Firms which aspire to exploit their 
synthetic polymer capabilities to serve the traditional textile market have channelled 
their research efforts to mimic or exceed the properties of natural fibres through the 
manipulation of synthetic fibres. This offers added value to customers and permits 
competition with natural fibres. As an illustration, the demand for crease-resistant 
cotton fabrics has been around for nearly a century. Innovations to treat cotton fibres 
to produce non-wrinkle cotton fabrics have been continuously launched on the 
market since the 1920s. The UK-based Tootal Broadhurst Lee developed the earliest 
solution for the problem with formaldehyde-treated cotton. The use of this method 
raised a number of health and safety concerns, not to mention the poor performance 
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of the end products. A breakthrough technology arrived with the discovery of 
Dacron® by DuPont in 1952. The new synthetic fibres allowed a new route to 
produce easy-care product lines, that is, blended synthetic and cotton fibres. In more 
recent years, non-crease fabrics have been produced through different routes that 
include surface finish using a number of different polymer resins including Teflon®. 
This latest technology allows cotton fabrics to be crease resistant as well as stain 
repellent as a result of the resin's hydrophobic, oleophobic and low coefficient of 
friction properties. 
While technical and high performance textile producers continued to survive 
with the improvement of existing products and the creation of the new ones, 
traditional textile producers in Europe have been under constant pressure to reduce 
costs. The strategy of the Italian firms to avoid price competition through 
competition in design, quality and flexibility which was extremely successful 
between 1970-2000 appears to run its course. The luxury textile market has come 
under increasing pressures to reduce costs. Not only have China and India improved 
their abilities to produce high-quality textile products at lower costs, but, more 
importantly, customers' preferences have changed from high quality, higher priced 
products to fashionable products at more affordable prices. 
On the other hand, Germany, whose strategic choice was to compete on 
technological competence, has greater opportunities to grow in the long run than 
Italy. Driven by rapid developments in materials science and engineering the 
German textile industry has vastly diversified their market and technology and 
continue to do so. This has made them less vulnerable to changes in external 
conditions. Italy, although highly diversified, is overly focused on the traditional 
textile market. The history of the world's textile industry has shown that this sector 
is much more vulnerable to cost competition. 
The experience of the Italian and German textile industry shows that the 
early strategic choice on which the competitiveness of the industry was built has 
long-term consequences or is path-dependent (Arthur, 1989). As Germany's strategy 
appears to be more sustainable, the EU textile industry should channel its innovation 
towards the creation and the improvement of products that can only be achieved with 
the technological capabilities where Europe is competitive. However, for countries 
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whose textile industries remain concentrated on the traditional textile market, a shift 
to technical and high performance textiles is a major challenge. 
Certainly, the experience of the German textile industry could be a useful 
example to follow. However, today's business environment is very different from 
that when the German textile industry built up its competitive capabilities. Rapid 
changes in technology and market, tougher competition, expensive technological 
development and shorter product life cycle make it extremely difficult for textile 
firms to initiate a radical transition. The challenge is not only to break away from 
their established technological and organisational capabilities. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, deeply entrenched culture and practices, large infrastructure and 
established skills are difficult to change and have caused traditional firms to fall 
victim to the maturity-trap. 
The objective of this chapter is to show that the textile industry is highly 
dynamic. Firms are exposed to a range of technologies to be exploited and 
opportunities to create new markets. However, it is the firm's individual strategy and 
innovative capability that determines whether to adopt or to ignore the new 
technologies and the paths to commercialise them. This chapter will show that this is 
influenced by the unique characteristics of individual countries and government 
policy. 
4.2 The Origins of Synthetic Fibres and Recent 
Developments 
Synthetic fibres or filaments are derived from synthetic polymers which 
mostly undergo an extrusion process. Polymers are defined as "substances composed 
of molecules which have long sequence of one or more species of atoms or groups of 
atoms linked to each other by primary, usually covalent, bonds" (Young and Lovell, 
1991 , p. 3). Synthetic polymers are 
different from natural ones by the process of 
their creation. Natural polymers are available in nature (such as from wood and 
starch) whereas the synthetic ones are synthesised through the process of 
polymerization. Whereas the manipulation of the properties of the former is rather 
limited as they are provided by nature, the latter can be used to develop materials 
with customised properties. Synthetic polymers can be synthesised to form different 
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structures -through the attachment of potentially reactive substances/molecules- and 
to possess different molecular weights -through the multiplication of given subunits 
(the `monomers') to produce materials with various combinations of properties. This 
has made synthetic polymers attractive to industries as they can be exploited to 
develop a vast range of products for particular applications. For instance, the 
structure of aromatic polyamide (or widely known as Kevlar®) is formed by the 
multiplication of amide units which are bonded together by many inter-chain bonds. 
The structure permits high strength to weight ratio resulting in materials that are 
seven times stronger than steel (on a weight equal basis) and are very stable at high 
temperatures. The properties are suitable for diverse applications including body 
armour, cut-resistant jackets, protective gear for motorcyclists and building 
construction materials. Other properties can be delivered through the synthesis of 
different polymeric structures and molecular weights that include soft or rubbery, 
permeable or impermeable, conductive or isolating, transparent or opaque, long-term 
stable or biodegradable. 
This development has opened up an entirely new pathway for the 
development of materials which has revolutionised markets across industries. For 
instance, a number of metallic components in automobiles and aircraft have been 
replaced with synthetic materials which offer better performance, lighter weight and 
often at lower cost. In another instance, the technology has fostered the creation of 
new products of various shapes that include disposable cutleries and artificial grass. 
As the molecular structure and weight is central to the major advantage of this 
technology (to facilitate the development of products with tailored properties) a 
rigorous understanding in the control of the molecular structure and the associated 
properties has become the main goal of research in the field. New understanding 
permits firms to select the most appropriate properties for particular applications and 
develop suitable processing methods. 
The first scientist who promoted the fundamental understanding of polymers 
(or macromolecules) was Hermann Staudinger of ETH Zurich. In 1920 he 
discovered that the size of molecules was limitless as they could be replicated to 
form long chains. His concept, widely known as polymerization, was tested by 
Wallace H. Carothers at DuPont's laboratory. Carothers' work was a breakthrough 
which has radically changed the textile industry. Following seven years of 
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experimentation to synthesise polymers, he discovered polyamide fibres, otherwise 
known as Nylon 6.6 in 1935 (Hounshell and Smith, 1988). In contrast to rayon, its 
predecessor whose long chain polymer is available in nature, nylon was made 
through chemical reactions to synthesize a chain made up of many monomers 
(polymers) from fossil fuels. Two of the most common versions of polyamide fibre 
are fibre 6.6 discovered by DuPont and fibre 6 by IG Farben. The latter was a 
German chemical firm which made attempts to reproduce the properties of fibre 6.6 
without breaching DuPont's patent. 
The properties of the new fibres which have similarities with silk but are 
stronger and have better resistance to abrasion made the new fibre a perfect 
substitution for silk imports. The women's hosiery market was an attractive market 
as it consumed 80 per cent of the US silk market before World War II. However, it 
took the firm five years of development before the fashionable nylon stockings were 
finally launched on the US market in 1940. The delay in the commercialisation of 
the fibres was partly caused by the scaling up of production to commercial levels and 
problems with finishing (dyeing and printing). Indeed, the inferior dyeability of 
synthetic fibres compared to that of natural fibres has long been an issue and been 
subject to considerable R&D. Less than two years proceeding the launch, nylon had 
captured more than 30 per cent of the silk stocking market. During World War II, 
nylon production capacity was channelled into military uses such as tents, 
parachutes, airplane tire cords and glider tow ropes. This war-related consumption 
facilitated the creation of technical textiles for civil applications such as tents, 
extreme-weather and outdoor clothing. 
Meanwhile, a dormant patent of DuPont turned out to be one of the most 
important inventions in the history of fibres in the hands of J. R Whinfield, a British 
scientist, together with his colleagues at the British Calico Printer's Association 
(CPA). They discovered another type of synthetic polymer, polyester, in 1941. Due 
to its various properties; cost-effective, durable and pleat resistant with aesthetic 
appeal, polyester became highly attractive to the textile industry. More importantly, 
its ability to be spun together with natural staple-fibres such as cotton and wool 
allowed for the production of less expensive and more durable (moth resistant) 
cotton and wool fabrics. In addition to apparel markets, polyester successfully made 
inroads into technical applications such as beverage bottles, high-quality packaging, 
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videotapes and X-ray films. Today, polyester has the largest market share of the 
synthetic fibre market (77 percent). In the global fibre market, polyester has 40 per 
cent market share, surpassing that of cotton and other fibres since the mid-1990s. 
The subsequent development of the synthetic fibres was fostered by a greater 
understanding of the relationship between the molecular structure of polymers and 
their physical properties. This knowledge opened up new windows of opportunity to 
develop polymers with superior properties such as ultra light and high strength 
fibres. Unlike the development of the first generation of synthetic fibres which aimed 
at the imitation of natural fibres (nylon and polyester to copy silk or acrylic to 
imitate wool), the next generation of synthetic fibres has been driven by demand for 
high performance fibres in different fields such as aerospace and the military. One of 
these achievements is the discovery of aromatic polyamides (aramids) family by 
DuPont in the 1960s. Included in this family is Nomex® -a heat resistant and strong 
synthetic fibre- and Kevlar® - high-performance fibres that exhibit superior 
properties to that of steel being several times stronger with a comparable elongation, 
lower density and high stability at high temperatures. Kevlar has a higher breaking 
tenacity than industrial nylon and polyester. Meanwhile, a Dutch firm, DSM, 
discovered ultra-high molecular-weight polyethylene fibres called Dyneema®. This 
fibre exhibits the highest tensile strength (15 times stronger than quality steel and 40 
per cent stronger than aramid fibres, both on weight for weight basis) of any 
thermoplastics currently produced. These high performance fibres have facilitated 
the creation of numerous new applications through the exploitation of these fibres' 
properties. Automotive fabrics, spacecraft and aircraft fabrics, soft and hard armour, 
and reinforcements for tyres and mechanical rubber goods are just a few examples. 
In the clothing market, the fibres have made possible the creation of high 
performance, lightweight and comfortable protective clothing that include 
spacesuits, vehicle and body armour and anti-ballistic clothing. In contrast to the first 
generation of synthetic fibres which entered the textile market through consumer 
products, the market for high performance fibres has been limited to niche, high 
value-added and specialty products because of high production costs and their 
superior properties. 
By the early1980s the majority of different synthetic fibres had been 
discovered and an immense range of products had been developed. The timeline of 
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the initial commercialisation of synthetic fibre is shown in Figure 4-2. The majority 
of them are classified within the second generation of materials (Figure 4-3). As the 
processing technology of synthetic fibres and fabrics was capital intensive, firms 
made attempts to expand the application of the fibres into a diverse range of products 
-a generic technology- so that economies of scale could be achieved. Two possible 
routes were the development of new building blocks of polymer structure and the 
combination of two or more different materials to generate new or improved 
materials properties. While the progress of the former appears to have been slow, the 
latter advanced rapidly. The materials produced through this avenue are called 
composite, that is, materials made up of (at least) two individual materials. One 
component imparts its special physical properties to the other component and the 
matrix. The synergies of such combinations produce materials with properties that 
cannot be achieved from the individual constituents. Since its introduction in 1941 
this avenue has opened up new development trajectories in materials science and 
engineering. Research can choose the optimum combination from a wide variety of 
natural and synthetic materials for specific applications. This route has fostered the 
development of emerging synthetic materials technology such as tailored smart, 
multi-functional and biodegradable materials. The new development may lead us to 
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Indeed, advanced composites are expected to play a fundamental role to fulfil 
demands in the 21St century (Hongu and Phillips, 1997). A vast range of composites 
have been developed from different combinations of fibres and matrices today to 
provide new solutions. The resulting properties range from greater impact resistance, 
biodegradable and fully recyclable to conductive and colour changing. Composites 
have also facilitated the development of fibres with multiple properties and 
functionalities. For instance, the reinforcement of cellulose -such as jute and flax- in 
biodegradable polymers has been developed to produce biodegradable plastics for 
the replacement of various plastic products. The application of biodegradable 
composites in textiles would foster significant reduction of textile waste. 
Biodegradable polymers such as polylactic acid (PLA) have been investigated so it 
can be used in a wide range of medical applications such as drug delivery and tissue 
scaffolds. Carbon fibre composites, despite invented and first used in the aerospace 
industry in the early 1960s, have recently found a new period of growth. As an 
illustration, twenty years ago, aircraft only contained no more than three per cent (in 
terms of weight) of carbon composites. The latest Airbus 380 contains 25 per cent 
while the Boeing 787 60 per cent (Scoltock, 2006). The value of carbon fibre 
production reached over ¬600 million in 2008, one fifth of which was dominated by 
the aircraft industry (Marsh, 2009). Demand in this market may increase by 500 
times in the coming decades driven by environmental issues to reduce fuel 
consumption (Lewis, 2007). Britain will provide over ¬20 million in technology 
development to encourage the adoption of carbon fibre composites by user industries 
(Marsh, 2009). 
Micro and Nano Sized Fibres 
A new innovative spinning technique -a combination of melt-blown and 
flash spinning - invented by Toray Industries (Japan) in the 1970s fostered the 
development of synthetic microfibers. Microfibres are defined as fibres of less than 1 
decitex (=0.9 denier)2 or at least 60 times finer than human hair (McIntyre, 2003). 
Microfibre is a radical innovation in fibre engineering as it facilitates the 
development of fibres whose properties are very similar to those of silk, that is, the 
2 One denier is defined as the weight of a filament of 9000 meters in length and was used to designate 
the coarseness of filaments of raw silk or nylon (Hongu and Phillips, 1997) p. 3 
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soft feel, drapability and have a luxurious appearance. The novel property of fabrics 
made with these synthetic microfibres is its inherent breathability -a property which 
could not be achieved through synthetic fibres with larger dimensions. This new 
development is a major breakthrough in fibre engineering towards mimicking the 
properties of natural fibres 
The properties of microfibres have made it a very popular alternative to 
cotton apparel for sports wear. In contrast to cotton fibres which absorb sweat and 
cause fabrics to become damp and have a sticky feel on users' skin microfibers 
transfer body moisture to the fabric surface through capillary action that helps with 
rapid evaporation because of the larger surface area. This wicking property keeps the 
users cool and dry. Microfibre yarns can also be tightly woven to form water 
repellent, windproof and yet breathable fabrics. These properties and functionalities 
made the fabrics suitable for outdoor apparel. Microfibres have gained in popularity 
for industrial and household cleaning applications because of their high water 
absorbency and ability to clean up dirt. The application of microfibre nonwoven 
fabrics in the medical textile market extends from medical apparel to wound 
dressings. The fibres have also been used intensively for nonwoven filters. These 
examples show that the ability to control the physical properties of fibres can be 
exploited to produce a variety of products for a wide range of applications. 
Further advancement in spinning technologies has fostered the development 
of nanofibres, fibres with diameters between 1-100 mn. Materials with nanometre 
features possess large surface areas per unit volume which has an impact on the 
dramatic increase of their surface energy (Siegel, 1999)3. This phenomenon has 
resulted in a significant increase of surface reactivity to their environment which 
might illustrate why materials at the nanometre scale have different chemical and 
physical properties compared to bulk materials (Cao, 2004). For instance, crystals at 
the nanometre scale have a low melting point -the difference can reach as large as 
1000°C - as the high energy of the surface reduces the materials' thermal stability. In 
another instance, silver nanoparticles have antimicrobial properties whereas its bulk 
materials do not have such properties. 
The ability to control materials at this scale can open up new opportunities 
for the modification of fundamental properties of materials and for the construction 
3 This phenomenon is measured as the ratio of surface area to volume. 
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of new structures to produce entirely new materials. At present, research is underway 
to improve the understanding of the phenomena of materials at the nano scale. For 
instance, as the high surface reactivity of nanomaterials tends to cause agglomeration 
when they are embedded in a composite structure effective routes to gain uniform 
distribution of nanomaterials in matrices are being investigated. The agglomeration 
of nanomaterials in matrices potentially reduces the resulting performance of the 
composite materials due to the reduction of the overall surface energy (Cao, 2004). 
In another instance, an ability to control the orientation of nanomaterials with respect 
to the mechanical load applied is required to improve the reinforcing effect so that 
significant advantages from load transfer phenomenon can be achieved (Schulte and 
Nolte, 2005). This shows that without a comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomena at the nano scale, the control over the physical and mechanical properties 
of the materials cannot be achieved. This will hinder the exploitation of 
nanotechnology in general. 
Nanofibres can be produced through a number of different methods that 
include melt-blowing, spun-bonding centrifuge spinning (jet) and electrospinning. 
The first two methods are relatively high throughput and economic but can only 
produce nanofibres at the order of -500nm. Electrospinning4, on the other hand, is 
able to form real nanometre-sized fibres (<100nm). Research is focused on 
investigating the properties of nanofibres from different materials, including nylon, 
carbon and carbon nanotubes. The filtration industry is expected to gain great 
advantages from electrospun nanofibres as they permit the filtration of very fine 
particles. Meanwhile, carbon nanofibre-reinforced composites are potential to be 
used for materials with high strength and stiffness properties. At extremely low 
addition of the filler (carbon nanofibres) the resulting materials exhibit significant 
improvement of strength and stiffness whilst maintaining the ductility and toughness 
(Schulte and Nolte, 2005). Such composites also have the potential to provide 
thermal and electrical conductivity (at a lower level). 
The use of nanofibres in commercial products depends on the ability of firms 
to find applications that will generate returns for further improvements and 
4 Electrospinning is a spinning method initially invented in the 1930s. It is an electrostatic process that 
has been widely used for drawing out fibres from numerous polymers. It forms nanofibres using 
20KV voltage differential along the polymer stream (solution or melt) (Laxminarayana and Jalili 
(2005). 
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developments. As argued by Rosenberg (1996) a new breakthrough technology 
comes to the market in a very primitive form and does not give any picture about the 
eventual applications. This uncertainty is a great challenge faced by firms in their 
investment strategy as they have to make assumptions about the future market of the 
technology on which their investment decisions are based. The poor investment 
strategy of Courtaulds in the carbon fibre market as discussed in Chapter 3 is a 
useful example. It is often that extended improvements are required to expand the 
practical application of a new technology. During this process complementary 
technologies that foster the practical application and wider diffusion of the 
technology may be found. The initial introduction of personal computers and the 
laser are useful examples (Rosenberg, 1996). The diffusion of the computer into 
wider economy was facilitated by the replacement of vacuum tubes by transistors 
which permitted the development of personal computers. 
Although nanofibres exhibit superior properties than other existing fibres at 
greater dimensions, it is rather too early to predict the future market of the 
technology. Nevertheless, a number of market studies suggest these have an 
encouraging future (see for example Cientifica, 2006). The report suggests that the 
highest growth of the application of nanotechnology in the textile market will be 
generated from non-traditional sectors such as the military, sports textiles, medical 
textiles and aircraft where performance rather than cost alone is the main driver. 
Nevertheless, the adverse effects of the materials on health and the environment need 
be investigated more thoroughly (Mnyusiwalla, 2003). More importantly, the cost- 
performance factor will also have to be taken into consideration to foster the 
diffusion of nanotechnology in the textile market. 
In brief, materials science and engineering is advancing rapidly. The close 
relationship between the technology and the textile industry which has built up since 
the development of the first synthetic fibres may significantly influence the future 
development of the high-performance textile market. This suggests that textile firms 
have at their disposal new technologies to be exploited. To capitalise from the 
development of materials science and engineering, firms have to be able to adopt the 
technologies and use them to develop competitive products. The following section 
examines the impact of the advancement of polymers on the textile industry. 
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4.3 Synthetic Polymers in the Textile Industry 
The development of synthetic polymers was led by large chemical firms with 
DuPont as the global leader in the field. In Europe, ICI, DSM and IG Farben (it was 
demerged into AGFA, BASF, Bayer and Hoechst, its original constituents, in 1952) 
were the leaders although other chemical firms, including AkzoNobel, and Rhone- 
Poulenc played a significant played in the development of synthetic fibres. 
Synthetic fibres are converted into textile products for various applications 
through a number of processing stages. Staple fibres are spun (filaments are twisted) 
into yams and chemically treated before being transferred into the weaving, knitting 
or nonwoven department to form fabrics. Finishing processes including dyeing, 
printing, permanent press treatment and coating are applied to fabrics before they are 
sent to the converters, distributors, clothing makers or end users. This last stage of 
the textile production process has recently attracted more attention as a means to add 
functionalities to fibres or fabrics. Finishing technologies that permit the deployment 
of ultra-thin layers of functional materials on fabrics or fibres, for instance, is 
claimed to facilitate the production of functional fabrics without damaging the 
properties of the fibres. Various promising approaches in this field are currently 
being investigated such as plasma liquid (and gas) deposition and digital printing. 
Plasma technology has been modified so it can function within an atmospheric- 
pressure environment. Plasmatex was the early European project (1997-2000) to 
develop plasma technology for flexible substrates operated in the atmospheric 
pressure. Further progress on this front has been made by a number of textile firms 
in Europe, including the German firm, Freudenberg, which is planning to 
commercialise products modified by the technology in the near future. Other firms 
adopt digital printing to deposit functional materials on fabrics. The Dutch firm, Ten 
Cate, for instance acquired a digital printing developer, Xennia, to join the race in 
the development of multifunctional fabrics. 
Radical Change in Textile Products 
Prior to the discovery of synthetic fibres, the non-clothing textile products 
such as tents, tarpaulins and sailcloth had used natural fibres for centuries (Horrocks 
and Anand, 2000). However, due to the limited properties of the natural fibres and 
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the lack of knowledge to manipulate them the range of applications of the fibres in 
technical applications was very narrow. Synthetic fibres, on the contrary, can be 
manipulated to meet tailored specifications which foster their broad applications. To 
exploit this technology for textile applications, textile firms have established new 
linkages with different sectors by which the diffusion of technical textile products 
into various sectors was encouraged. As a result of this, synthetic fibres and other 
synthetic materials have received growing recognition for their strategic role in the 
future of the European textile industry since the 1980s. 
" Driven by synthetic fibre " Driven by technological " Driven by the enhancement of 
revolutionary innovation speciation, -adapting technical functional polymers and 
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to impart functionalities. functionalities to include factors 
" Pioneered by new entrants, e. g. such as comforts, hygiene and 
Gore-Tex, Polartec, Outlast ease of care 
Technologies " Pioneered by new entrants, 
existing firms, e. g. Nano-Tex, 
Schoeller, Outlast and were 
backed by large corporation 
Traditional Technical Functional 
Textiles Textiles º Textiles 
" Driven by advancements in 
advanced materials, micro 
computer and electronics. 
" Facilitated by changing lifestyle 
towards persistent connectivity; 
information consciousness; and 
harsher combat condition 
" Greater emphasis on "intelligent 
interactive functions 
" Will be dependent on emerging 
knowledge such as polymer 
electronics, and 
micro/nanoelectronics, 
" Pioneered by new entrants, 
backed by large corporations, e. g. 








Figure 4-4. The evolution of product innovation in the textile industry 
Source: Author 
For analytical purposes, the evolutionary path of textile products can be 
divided into five stages, each of which has distinct characteristicss as illustrated in 
Figure 4-4. It can be seen that the evolution of product development parallels with 
(or is driven by) advancements in polymer science and technology and the changing 
nature of demand 
S Here, reference is made to non-traditional textiles (technical, functional, multifunctional and smart 
textiles) as high-technology textiles unless otherwise specified. 
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Following the development of technical textiles which was fostered by the 
discovery of a series of synthetic fibres including polyamide, polyester, 
polypropylene, polyethylene, Teflon®, Nomex®, Kevlar® and Dyneema®, a 
number of innovative firms such as Gore-Tex and Malden Mills developed 
processing technologies to exploit the properties of synthetic polymers for functional 
apparel. Gore-Tex® is one of pioneering products of functional fabrics through the 
process of lamination of polymeric thin films on fabrics. This firm developed a new 
processing method (extrusion under stress through a faster take-up rate than 
extrusion rate) to alter the physical structure of Teflon® in 1969. The process 
yielded strong, porous semi-crystalline films that have low surface friction, are 
chemically inert, breathable, hydrophobic, bio-compatible and durable. These 
properties fit the requirements of outdoor fabrics which demand stain repellent, 
waterproof but breathable fabrics. Gore-Tex® successfully replaced vinyl and rubber 
suits in protective clothing through the exploitation of its breathable property which 
improved comfort. Gore-Tex's superior properties, however, do have some serious 
shortcomings. Research has revealed some health concerns including some 
potentially poisonous from perfluorooctanic acid (PFOA), the key synthetic 
chemical to make Teflon® (Guo, et al., 2009). The greatest disadvantage with Gore- 
Tex is its high production costs and this has confined the application of the material 
to niche markets. 
Another pioneering firm in the early development of functional apparel is 
Malden Mills. The firm was on the brink of bankruptcy when their fake fur business 
lost its consumer appeal in the late 1970s. Its last attempt to save the firm was to 
develop a modified polyester product called Polar Fleece, a mountain-climbing and 
hiking material that mimicked sheepskin in 1981. The production cost of the fleece 
was less than half of that of sheepskin with greater thermal insulation. Through a 
partnership with Patagonia, a French sportswear producer, Polar Fleece was 
successfully commercialised. Its brand name, Polartec, has become the generic name 
for synthetic fleeces. 
A more recent development of functional and multifunctional textiles uses 
materials such as silver nanoparticles or titanium dioxide and substance-filled 
microcapsules to impart desirable features into fibres or fabrics. Silver nanoparticles 
can impart antibacterial properties while titanium dioxide exhibits self-cleaning 
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characteristics. Phase-change materials (PCMs) are another interesting class of 
compounds made of temperature-regulating structures made of paraffinic substances 
protected within microspheric shells (Figure 4-5). The mechanism of phase-shifts 
(solid-liquid) is promised to be able to protect the wearers from changing 
temperature which often causes discomfort, hypothermia and fever6. Outlast 
Technologies developed Thermocules®, the pioneer in this field, from the 
knowledge it had built up from its involvement with a NASA project in 1988 before 
improving the technology to make it commercially viable for the main stream 
clothing markets. Outlast has applied its technology to some other apparel markets 
such as sports apparel (ski and snowboard apparel, ski boot and glove liners), 
bedding products (mattress pads, comforters and pillows) and jumpers. 
(a) 
6 The phase-changing mechanism is triggered by changes in temperature because of climate 
conditions or the wearer's body temperature. The substances absorb the heat generated by the body of 
the wearers the temperature increases. During the process, the heat shifts the phase of the substance 
from solid to liquid. Conversely, the materials release the heat they previously absorb when the 
temperature decreases. The change shifts the substances back to solid. As a result, the wearers feel 
comforts despite the changing temperature. 
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(b) 
Figure 4-5. (a) Outlast microcapsules in viscose fibres; (b) Outlast microcapsules as coating 
materials on textiles 
Courtesy of Outlast Technologies, Inc. 
Research in advanced textiles has attracted multidisciplinary research 
programmes which include biochemistry and biotechnology to foster the creation of 
novel drug delivery systems. Controlled drug release can specifically target the 
intended areas rather than randomly as is the case today (Textiles, 2005). Research in 
novel drug delivery aims at control over the concentration of drugs in the targeted 
tissues so that it remains within the therapeutic range for a sustained period of time. 
Materials to perform drug delivery functions either through subcutaneous (under the 
skin) or intramuscular (into a muscle) are often based on naturally occurring 
polymeric compounds including polyatic acid and glycolic acid. Microspheres made 
of such polymers can be filled with different kind of drugs to cure a range of 
diseases or deficiencies such as cancer, hormone deficiencies and addiction. An 
early-stage product of this technology that has been granted FDA approval is Ortho 
Evra, a skin patch for birth control as illustrated in Figure 4-6. However, controlled 
drug release requires a long-term R&D programme (Textiles, 2005). It requires 
smart functions comprising of sensors to measure the level of drugs in target tissues 
and actuators to activate the release of drugs. The sensors and actuators are 
linked in 
a closed smart system. One potential route for improvement is through the use of 
nanocapsules as significantly greater number of capsules incorporated into fibres 
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may result in a great increase in the system's reactivity that may result in 
significantly improved performance. 
s 
ýý 
Figure 4-6. Ortho Evra skin patch for birth control 
Courtesy of Ortho Evra 
The 2000s has signified the most recent trend in textile product development 
with the advent of smart fabrics and intelligent textiles (SFIT). The novel concept is 
emanating from multidisciplinary research efforts involving electronics, computing 
and communication technology, medicine, polymers and textile technology. This 
new research field investigates the potential of textiles to possess `smart' functions, 
that is, they are responsive to changes in the environment including temperature, 
humidity, ultraviolet and blood pressure. To be `smart', textile products must possess 
a number of different functions whose variations depend on individual applications 
as illustrated in Figure 4-7. Research has focused on the development of materials 
that can sense and react to changes in their direct environments and which can be 
integrated into fabrics to impart various functionalities. These materials include 
conductive polymers7, light emitting polymers8 and shape-memory polymers9. These 
materials open up new possible applications such as flexible electronic components 
(mainly for disposable electronics) and sensors. Semiconducting polymers have the 
potential to be applied to fabrics to make solar cells. Shape memory polymers can be 
spun into fibres and blended with other fibres to form yarns. Fabrics made from 
shape-memory polymers deform in response to a change in environment such as 
temperature or moisture levels. 
Polymers that are able to conduct electronic current. 
8 Polymers that can convert electricity into lights. 
9 Polymers that can transform themselves from temporary deformed shape back to their predefined 
shapes by changing the external environment (e. g. temperature and moisture level). 
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A number of electronic and communication firms including Philips and 
Motorola, and system integrators such as Softswitch (recently acquired by Peratech, 
a North Yorkshire-based technology firm), Eleksen and Interactive Wear, have been 
working with textile firms, fashion designers and brands to develop wearable 
electronics. The development targeted a number of functionalities such as 
communication and remote control devices, physio-monitoring devices, and power 
generators integrated in fabrics without sacrificing the fashionable and aesthetic 
aspects of the textiles or clothing. They have been successful in integrating sensor 
technology into garments to allow the wearers to control their electronic gadgets 
such as iPODs and digital cameras from a set of keypads on the sleeves. Sports 
brands such as O'Neill, Burton and Adidas have adopted the new development into 
their product lines. 
Data transfer and 
communication link: 
textile ant. nnas 
Actuators 
ýr , hlatsdflbrts, c irl. ut s Thor. , iur a on 
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Figure 4-7. Application of smart textiles (e-textiles) in the short, medium, and long-term 
Courtesy of Markus Strecker, Interactive Wear, AG 
From left to right: ICD+ Jacket (2000); Motorola-Burton Snowboard (2006); Zegna iJacket 
(2007); Voltaic Backpack (2007) 
Figure 4-8. The development of electronic textiles 
Courtesy of Philips-Levi's, Audex, Zegna and Voltaic System 
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The future application of this emerging concept will involve a complex 
technological system. For instance, combat gear is envisioned to possess a 
communication system embedded into fibres or fabrics whereby injured soldiers can 
send messages to the nearest base. The communication system can also send signals 
to an integrated medication function, for example, antibiotics encapsulated in fibres, 
so that the injured troops can receive first aid treatment. To deliver such a smart 
function, a complex system comprises of sensors (to detect wounds) and actuators 
(to send signals to the necessary recipients) which are linked together with a certain 
mechanism of data transmission has to be embedded within the structure of the 
garment. For this particular application, multidisciplinary research in conductive 
polymers, microelectronics and computing, and biochemistry may play an important 
role. 
This section illustrates the dynamism of technological change, particularly 
polymer and advanced materials technology, in the textile industry. Indeed, the 
industry is far more dynamic than the `traditional' industry it has long been referred 
to. New concepts of textiles and clothing are continuously emerging encouraged by 
changing technology and demand. In fact, the textile industry is rapidly moving 
towards a knowledge-based industry. It can be seen from the concept for the next 
generation of textiles and clothing that can only be materialised through the 
implementation of a complex technological system derived from multiple scientific 
and technological fields. Arguably, this requires new approaches to R&D and 
technology strategy, business and marketing strategies, and organisational structure 
and routines. Traditional textile firms who wish to capitalise from the emerging 
technologies and markets will need to change their entire business strategies and 
paradigms. These issues will be highlighted in the case studies in Chapter 6 and 7. 
Market Fragmentation and Industry Structure 
The evolution of textile products over the past 60 years has been driven by 
continuous changes in the industry's technology and market demand. Technical 
textile markets are now highly fragmented with customers ranging from protective 
garments, sports and medical to armour, automotive and aerospace. The early 
demand for synthetic fibres to replace silk emerged as silk imports from Japan was 
interrupted because of Japan's invasion of Manchuria and subsequently the outbreak 
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of World War II. This condition has facilitated the diffusion of synthetic fibres in 
various markets that previously used silk as the raw materials. The war fostered the 
emergence of new demand for synthetic fibres in the US as the use of natural 
resources was tightly controlled by the government. The fibres were used for war 
related consumption such as tents and parachutes which fostered the further 
development of synthetic fibres for technical textile applications. 
In sports markets, demand for synthetic fibres was driven by the need to 
improve the performance of athletes of various sports. The success of microfibre 
polyester to displace the use of cotton fibres in sports jerseys because of its 
superiority to release moisture as discussed earlier is an example. In another 
example, the development of Spandex® by DuPont which offered lightweight, 
stretchy and water resistant properties replaced the use of the knitted jersey and 
cotton in swimming costumes. Spandex®'s lower surface friction has improved the 
speed of swimmers significantly. Meanwhile, the high cost of the maintenance of 
natural grass on different sports has ignited demand for synthetic turf. Although the 
first synthetic turf was used in the 1960s R&D is still underway to improve the 
performance of the turf for different sports as well as for domestic applications 
(including gardens and parks). 
The global war on terror launched in 2001 caused a sudden surge of 
investment in R&D in fabrics for armour applications. Different types of polymers 
and composites and their processing methods are being investigated to produce 
lighter and more flexible fabrics for ballistic protection. A combination of ceramics 
and composites is also being developed by Ten Cate. Meanwhile, new government 
policies concerning environmental, health and safety issues have also created new 
demand in high performance textiles that includes improved fume filters, airbags, 
seatbelts and flame-proof interior fabrics. 
The evolution of textile products has shown an increasing tendency for 
greater market fragmentation over time. Each application is tailored to meet the 
different needs through the manipulation of fibres or fabrics. As discussed earlier, 
such a development is underpinned by the advances in materials science and 
engineering that permits the development of tailored properties and functionalities, 
and by progress in fibre and textile engineering. It is apparent that the adoption of 
those technologies brings the textile industry closer to a knowledge-based industry. 
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A number of traditional textile firms have moved up the value chain to produce high 
value-added products derived from scientific research. Those firms have built up 
new capabilities in fibre processing, fabric forming and finishing as the prerequisites 
to compete in the technical and high performance fabric markets are very different 
from those required in the traditional market. However, an improved technical 
capability on its own is not sufficient to take advantage from the development of 
materials science and engineering. Firms will need to change every aspect of their 
business that includes R&D paradigm, product development and commercialisation, 
and their structure and routines. To illustrate this, textile firms will need to improve 
their technical capabilities to enable them to integrate new technologies into their 
existing systems and to use the technologies to develop competitive products. 
Nevertheless, as high-technology textiles requires a new set of knowledge and know- 
how such as advanced materials, microelectronics, biotechnology, biochemistry and 
which is very different from that in traditional textiles, traditional textile firms face 
great challenges to master the different technologies. 
An alternative approach to build up new capabilities in multi-disciplinary 
fields is through networking with organisations and individuals who have expertise 
in the relevant fields. This is a less risky strategy to have access to different 
knowledge domains. Networks of alliances to exchange and generate new 
knowledge as argued by Chesbrough (2006) is more appropriate for the competitive 
environment of the 21St century characterised by the exponential rise of R&D costs, 
significantly shorter technological life cycles, abundant and distributed knowledge, 
multi-technological products and rapid technology and market change. Under these 
circumstances, incentives for relying entirely on a firm's own research and 
competencies are low as innovative ideas and competitive solutions can come from 
multiple sources. In fact, control of knowledge by a few large firms (DuPont, ICI 
and IG Farben) found during the early development of synthetic fibres between 
1940s-1950s is no longer applicable today as knowledge has become increasingly 
distributed. Chesbrough argues that firms need to work together with other firms 
(suppliers, customers, competitors) or to acquire externally-generated technologies 
through either licensing or acquisitions to keep up with the new business 
environment. 
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This argument suggests that the diffusion of advanced materials will, if not 
already, affect the structure of the textile industry. New linkages with different 
sectors and different approaches to knowledge generation and commercialisation 
will certainly affect industrial organisation. This will lead to the reconfiguration of 
the supply chain and, eventually the reconfiguration of the textile industry as shown 
in Figure 4-9. Furthermore, if the emerging smart textile concept grows, the invasion 
of non-textile firms (such as electronics and pharmaceuticals) into the textile 
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Figure 4-9. Reconfiguration of the textile industry 
Source: Author 
The textile industry is dynamic, a world away from one where technology is 
stagnant along with demand as it has been assumed (von Tunzelmann and Acha, 
2006). The technology has constantly changed, the market has expanded 
substantially and increasingly fragmented and knowledge is now much more 
diversified. As discussed earlier, this condition has attracted the EU's attention to 
encourage change and turn the industry into a knowledge-based industry. This is the 
type of industry where Europe can maintain its competitive advantage over the long- 
144 
Chapter 4- Technological Change in the Textile Industry: The Role of New Materials 
term. The textile industry has the potential to be rejuvenated and escape from the 
maturity-trap. 
This however relies on the ability of textile firms to anticipate future trends 
and to continuously adopt new technological developments to adapt to and, 
moreover, actively influence changes in technology and demand to their advantage. 
In other words, the role of textile entrepreneurs is central to take the textile industry 
forward. In Europe, the excessive market fragmentation (see Chapter 1) may impede 
or delay the rejuvenation of the industry. Firms who have been able to shift their 
textile competencies from traditional to high-technology textiles grow. Nevertheless, 
a large number of them do not have sufficient capacity to change or cannot 
appreciate the urgency to change. These firms are stuck well and truly in the 
maturity-trap. For them, the future could be very difficult, in terms of either they are 
forced out of the industry altogether, they are taken over by larger firms, or they 
have to relocate to low-cost countries. At the end of the day, this has led to its 
decline over the past decade. 
4.4 Europe and the High-Technology Textile Market 
It is reported that global technical textile market in 2005 was over 670 
billion, with average annual growth of around 4-5 per cent since 1995. It is predicted 
to reach £88 billion in 2010 (Ciabatti, 2007). The largest applications are transport, 
industrial and sport while the fastest growth will be in medical and hygiene products 
and geotextiles. In recent years, high-technology textiles have become a vital 
component of the output of the European textile industry. The consumption of 
technical textiles in Europe reached £35.6 billion in 2004 which is approximately 
around 40 per cent of global consumption (see Figure 4-10). The figure is expected 
to grow by approximately 17 per cent in 2010. Europe is not only the largest 
consumer and producer of technical textiles but also the most fragmented with 16 
market segments. Its leading position in market and technology may provide the 
opportunity to set the global benchmark in a number of high-technology applications 
such as military and medical textiles. 
145 











  Transport   Protective uses O Construction 
O Wooden furniture   Medical, pharma & health ® Rubber 
  Leather & footwear O Paper & printing   Metal 
  Machine tools Q Agriculture   Mining 
  Electronics   Food & drink   Sports 
Figure 4-10. The consumption of technical textiles in Western Europe (2004) 










Figure 4-11. Breakdown of textile production into 3 sub-sectors by volume of fibre usage in 
2003 
Source: Euratex (2006) from CIRFS data 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, the EU textile industry is highly fragmented with 
respect to the rate of adoption of textile technology and the overall direction of the 
textile market. This section examines the different characteristics of the German and 
Italian textile industries, the two leading textile countries in the EU, and their 
individual development of textile capabilities and markets. This section shows that 
different strategies used to build the foundation of their competitive advantage early 
on has had an impact on the subsequent evolution (and competitiveness) of the 
respective industries. This is because of the unintentional exclusion of factors which 
appeared not to have a direct linkage to their respective strategic choice but, in the 
long run, turn out to be decisive for their competitive advantage. In other words, the 
different evolutionary paths of the two textile industries confirms the path-dependent 
sequence of economic change argued by Arthur (1989) in which eventual outcomes 
can be determined by historical events. 
4.4.1 Germany 
Between 2000-2005, Germany was the leading producer of technical textiles 
in Europe with 17 per cent market share, closely followed by France and the UK (16 
per cent), and Italy (14 per cent). In 2007, the German textile industry employed 102 
000 people and total revenue amounted to E20 billion, 40 per cent of which came 
from the technical textile sub-sector. According to the German Agency for Foreign 
Trade, the country's technical textile export in 2006 reached E2.7 billion, followed 
by the USA at around E2.3 billion. Despite the fact that Germany is a very high wage 
economy in Europe1° and the industry is relatively small in size compared to Italy, 
the productivity of the German textile industry was significantly higher level than 
Italy by around 30 per cent annually between 2002-2004 (Eurostat, 2005,2006, 
2007). The high productivity was achieved as the majority of the production (40 per 
cent) was for technical and high performance textiles which generate considerably 
higher added value than other textile segments. The structure is fostered by the 
relatively high R&D intensity (two per cent) and high level of investment per 
employee in comparison to other textile industries in Europe. Arguably, the industry 
has experienced a transformation from being a low value-added, low-technology 
'° The German textile sector was within the top five highest average personal costs in Europe 
(Eurostat, 2006) 
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industry into a high technology industry that produces high added value goods for its 
customers. 
The German textile industry is an interesting subject to study. Although the 
industry was devastated following two wars and painful industrial restructuring since 
the 1960s, it has successfully repositioned itself as the leader in the technical and 
high performance textile market since the 1970s. The industry has initiated the 
process of de-maturity itself through the creation of new competitive advantage 
underpinned by technological leadership rather than cost advantage. It is argued that 
the main factor that has enabled the industry to create a new competitive advantage 
was its ability to move away from low value-added cotton to high value-added 
textile products serving the high-end fashion and performance textile markets. 
Central to the transformation is the continuous adoption of the latest polymer and 
advanced material technologies into their textile products and the replacement of 
standardized production systems to high-technology equipment and flexible 
production systems. With the latter the industry can produce high quality products of 
different kinds with much greater flexibility than was previously possible. This 
strategy permitted the industry to adapt to changing demand and avoid commodity 
markets and the maturity-trap. 
A number of studies have suggested various factors that contributed to its 
success. These include: the government's free trade policy which forced inefficient 
firms out of business (Dolan, 1983); the Nazi government's R&D policy to support 
the development and adoption of synthetic materials to reduce their dependency over 
imported natural raw materials (Hoschle, 2004); the closed relationship between 
industries and universities which has been established since the second half of the 
19the century (Murmann, 2003); the industrial policy which promoted outward 
processing to reduce costs rather than mergers and acquisitions to reduce capacity 
(Toyne, et al., 1984); the technical innovativeness of the supplier industries (Owen, 
1999); and well-organised vocational systems which permitted sufficient skilled 
workers to be produced every year to rapidly adopt new technologies, to operate, 
maintain and repair machinery and to progress the transition towards flexible 
production systems (Nelson, 1987). Whilst those factors undoubtedly have 
contributed significantly to the sustained competitiveness of the industry, the 
question remains, however, on how the German textile industry has built up new 
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capabilities and managed continuous change amid rapid environmental change. 
Continuous change needs to be highlighted in approaching the issue in question as it 
is believed to be the determining factor that has fostered the de-maturity of the 
German textile industry. In fact, the de-maturity concept as discussed in Chapter 2 
emphasizes the ability of a firm to continuously change and innovate as the key 
success factor to adapt to the constantly changing business environment. 
The ability to continuously change and innovate suggests that the culture and 
infrastructure of the organisation is built to encourage continuous innovation and that 
the process is embedded in its routines. These have to be built over a significant 
period to ensure that the necessary culture, infrastructure and systems are deeply 
entrenched in the organisation. As a consequence of this, continuous innovation is 
not dependent on a few people (tacit knowledge) but, rather, a part of the behaviour 
of the industry and innovation systems. This is the factor the Lancashire cotton 
industry lacked. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Lancashire textile industry certainly 
mastered a high degree of innovativeness in the 19th century. However, the 
innovative capability appeared to erode following the First World War as 
organisational inertia hindered change. 
On the contrary, innovation and continuous change have been the foundation 
on which the German textile industry was built. It remains its high priority today. 
Openness to change for improvement has been the noticeable character of the 
industry since the 19th century. To illustrate this, the German textile industry was 
highly receptive to the adoption of synthetic dyes initially developed by IG Farben in 
Germany. As the synthetic dyes were not only cheaper replacements for imported 
natural dyes but, moreover, offered better performance -brightness, variety, 
durability- the rapid adoption of synthetic dyes improved the textile industry's 
competitive advantage. This had an impact on a remarkable increase in its 
competitiveness (Streb, et al., 2007). 
In a similar fashion, the industry's receptivity to synthetic dyes created close 
cooperation between the chemical and textile industries through which further 
improvement of dyes was achieved. This contributed significantly to the ability of 
the German synthetic dye industry to overtake Britain's leadership in the field, 
despite the fact that a British scientist, William Perkins, discovered the substance in 
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1856 (Murmann, 2003)". By the first decade of the 20th century, within 30 years 
after its first attempt to develop its own version of synthetic dyes, five German 
chemical firms (BASF, Bayer, Hoechst, Casella and AGFA) controlled 75 per cent 
of the global synthetic dye market. 
Openness to change of the industry encouraged IG Farben to develop nylon 6 
in its attempt to reproduce nylon 6.6 without breaching the patent of the latter which 
belonged to DuPont. The German firm creatively used ring-opening polymerization 
(as opposed to condensation polymerization used to produce nylon 6.6) to produce 
synthetic fibres with similar properties. Nylon 6 has an advantage over its competitor 
as the process is easier and cheaper. The German textile industry rapidly responded 
to this new development through the development of new products for military use 
such as tire cords, parachutes and tents prior to World War II and replaced the use of 
natural fibres in these applications. 
In the engineering field, Germany has taken over Britain's leadership as the 
world's largest textile machinery producer since the 1970s. In 1970 Germany 
dominated the textile machinery export market with 30 per cent market share 
whereas Britain only had 12 per cent down from 80 per cent during its heyday 
(Singleton, 1997). Hereafter, the German textile machinery industry has maintained 
its leadership in the field with around 25 per cent market share. According to 
Singleton, the tremendous achievement made by the German textile machinery 
industry rested on its creativity to search for new opportunities. The textile and 
textile machinery industries found it difficult to compete with the British textile and 
machinery markers which dominated the standardized textile machinery market for 
the production of mass volume products in the 19th century. Therefore, the German 
textile machinery industry opted to specialise in machinery with greater flexibility 
for niche markets and higher-quality textile products. Such a strategy gave a 
competitive advantage to the textile and machine-tools industries as the textile 
market changed from mass production to specialisation in the 1970s which required 
highly flexible equipment. 
" Murmann also argues that the absence of patent system in the country allowed a large number of firms to enter 
the market in the 1860s and 1870s by simply 
imitating the original invention. The situation led to greater 
competition through which a selection process took place. 
Those who survived in such fierce competitive 
environment were equipped with the capability to advance the technology and quality, as well as to reduce cost. 
Britain, on the other hand, underwent slow development 
due to entry barriers erected by the patent system. As a 
result, the competitive German firms successfully competed 
in the domestic and international markets. 
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This suggests that Germany's advances in chemicals and engineering, the 
close relationship between the chemical, engineering industries and the textile 
industry and the latter's openness to adopt new technologies provided the foundation 
for its long-term growth. Singleton (1997), however, is less convinced that the 
advancement of the domestic textile machinery and chemical fibre industries is 
essential for the success of the textile industry on the grounds that the international 
market for these inputs is highly developed. Under these circumstances, he argues, 
textile firms can purchase the inputs from different sources. His argument, however, 
appears to refer to the production of commoditised textile products where textile 
firms in Europe can source commodity fibres, such as nylon and polyester, and 
standardized equipment from China to make shirts. It is argued here, however, that 
in the case of the German textile industry, the advancement of the supplier industries 
and their close proximity were critical factors for continuous change. These factors 
facilitated interactions and learning and thus rapid and continuous dissemination of 
information from the suppliers to the textile firms and vice versa. Textile firms have 
the advantage to obtain information about the latest development(s) earlier than their 
competitors and to find the partners to develop prototypes. Under these 
circumstances, there is an opportunity to capitalise from the advantage of being a 
first mover. Moreover, as the decision to adopt emerging technologies required a 
thorough technical and economic know-how, close proximity to the suppliers helped 
textile firms to make informed decisions. 
Indeed, the case study of Freudenberg clearly suggests that close cooperation 
between textile firms, textile machinery manufacturers and chemical producers is 
vital to the process of diversification, new product development and the creation of 
new competencies. In fact, in many cases, successful product development is 
motivated by new inventions made by the supplier industries. The case study thus 
suggests that, contrary to Singleton's argument, the advancement of the supplier 
industries, close proximity and cooperation indeed has helped the firm to develop a 
culture of continuous change. 
The role of government also appears to be critical not only in the adoption of 
technology but also in the course of the development of the industry. The country's 
reliance on imports of raw materials for textiles was considered to be strategically 
disadvantageous during war time as trade blockades interrupted national supplies. 
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The Nazi government reinforced the self sufficiency policy to reduce dependency on 
imports (British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, 1946) through subsidies for 
textile manufacturers to invest in synthetic fibre manufacturers and to progressively 
adopt synthetic materials into their products. By 1939, most German textiles had 
some synthetic contents (Hoschle, 2004). The policy facilitated learning and 
appreciation over the advantages/disadvantages of synthetic materials. This helped 
rapid diffusion of the technology not only into several firms but into the entire textile 
industry. The new knowledge enabled textile firms to develop higher value-added 
textile products for technical textile markets initially facilitated by demand from the 
military, most notably the army. The new capability provided the industry with an 
alternative avenue for growth when their traditional market started to collapse in the 
1960s. This highlights the different approaches of the German and British 
governments. It appears that the former encouraged change whereas the latter tended 
to maintain the status quo. 
The development of non-woven technology illustrates how government 
policy, advances of supplier firms and close proximity with suppliers and markets 
have helped Freudenberg to adapt to changes in technology and demand. Those 
factors facilitated the development of new competencies by which it shifted away 
from its established development path. In Chapter 7 it is explained that government 
policy in the adoption of synthetic materials led to one of the greatest inventions in 
the textile innovation history, that is, nonwoven fabrics. In the early 1930s, 
Freudenberg, a German leather tannery, was forced by the government as well as by 
a changed business environment to search for the replacement of leather as imports 
of the raw materials disappeared. Together with IG Farben and the machinery 
makers the firm developed materials to substitute leather made of cotton fibres 
which were bonded together with synthetic rubber to form nonwoven layers. With 
the discovery of synthetic materials Freudenberg enhanced the quality of its 
nonwoven fabrics and extended the applications. 
The firm continuously adopted new materials -thermoplastics (such as 
polypropylene and polyester), elastomers, silicone, PTFE and fluorubber- and 
processing technologies that would help it to diversify and reinforce its competitive 
position. The firm's filter business, for instance, has developed from focusing on the 
automotive industry to focusing on a range of industries including aerospace, clean 
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room, office filtration, and medical applications. Freudenberg's nonwoven 
technology has been employed to produce a vast range of products ranging from 
diapers, wipers, filtration, tea bags, surgical drape, medical dressing and apparel, to 
geotextiles, roofing and floorcoverings, automobile carpet backing and wound 
dressings. Such a diversification strategy has become the competitive advantage of 
the firm as its diversified markets, to a great extent, have secured it from the 
volatility of demand which often occurs in these user industries. 
In addition to replacing the existing products, nonwoven also fostered the 
emergence of the revolutionary disposable market such as diapers, wipers, tea bags 
and a variety of hygienic and medical textiles. The production of nonwovens is 
characterised by high productivity and very low production costs as it does not 
involve a weaving or knitting process. The cost factor which is negligible permits the 
creation of disposable markets. Disposable products have become an important part 
of an individual's daily activities. As the nonwoven market is one of the fastest 
growing markets in the textile sector, Freudenberg expects to continue to grow in the 
future. Freudenberg is the oldest and largest nonwoven producer and remains so up 
to the present day. 
Despite its leadership in the technical and high performance textile market, 
the German textile industry is not necessarily immune to changing economic 
conditions. Demand for these textile products is largely dependant on the growth of 
the user industries (Singleton, 1997). For instance, the collapse of the US automotive 
industry in 2008 hit technical textile manufacturers who supplied textile products to 
the industry. Freudenberg, for instance, had to close one of its plants in North 
Carolina which supplied nonwoven fabrics to the US car makers. In contrast, 
growing demand in ballistic proof fabrics following the global war on terror 
launched in 2001 brought about rapid growth for firms who supply this market. Ten 
Cate, one of the leaders in ballistic protection fabrics experienced 17 per cent growth 
in 2008, the highest among the 20 largest textile firms in Europe. In addition, the 
sector is also not immune to product and market maturity and growing global 
competition (Horrocks and Anand, 2000). Therefore, the leadership of the German 
textile industry in this sector depends on its ability to perpetuate its innovative 
culture and systems from one generation to the next. This will foster continuous 
development of new products and the creation of new markets. 
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According to Textilwirtschaft Magazine which publishes information about 
the top 20 European textile firms (in terms of turnover) each year, the German textile 
industry was represented by six firms in 2007-2008. Germany and Italy are the only 
two countries that have been represented by more than four firms on the list since 
2005. A striking contrast of the characteristics between the German and Italian firms 
is on their product and market focus. The German firms are the manufacturers of 
highly diversified technical and high-performance textiles, the majority of which 
contain synthetic materials. The Italian firms, on the other hand, supply high quality 
wool, cashmere and silk fabrics for the luxury fashion market. Over the years, 
German firms developed different products for a wide range of markets with the 
adoption of synthetic materials and the relevant processing technologies. This has 
helped them to vastly diversify their products to serve various niche markets in 
different industries. For the Italian firms, on the contrary, product diversification has 
been based on the quality of yams (counts) and aesthetic designs, all of which are 
manufactured to serve the high-end fashion industry. The relatively more 
concentrated market (in comparison to the German textile industry) makes the Italian 
firms more vulnerable to changes in demand. This is discussed in greater detail in the 
following section. 
4.4.2 Italy 
Italy is the largest textile and clothing producer in Europe. In 2006, the sector 
constituted 25.5 per cent of the total turnover of the EU textile and clothing sector, 
and represented 37 percent of the total number the EU textile and clothing firms. The 
sector remains crucial to the country's economy, representing 10 per cent of the total 
turnover of the manufacturing sector, seven per cent of total manufacturing 
production and 11 per cent of manufacturing employment in 2006 (Sistema Moda 
Italia, 2006). Unlike Britain which used to be prominent for its standardized textile 
products or Germany for its technical textiles, Italy is well-known for its high-end 
fashion brands which emerged in the mid 20`h century. While other European 
countries such as Germany, the UK and the Netherlands have shifted their textile and 
clothing capabilities to technical and high performance textiles, Italy remains 
focused on traditional textiles for the clothing market (82 per cent in 2006) and trails 
behind in technical and high performance textiles. 
154 
Chapter 4- Technological Change in the Textile Industry: The Role of New Materials 
The Italian textile industry has been under immense pressure over the past 
decade. It has been in long-term decline where the rate of exports has declined 
whereas imports have increased considerably. In the past eight years, the loss of 
employment has reached more than 100 000 jobs - or around 20 per cent of the 
industry's current level of employment. In 2008 the loss of employment reached 
6000. This shows that even the high-end textile fashion market is not immune from 
the effects of cost-based competition because of the emergence of new low-cost 
competitors and changing demand for quality products at more affordable prices. 
Cost pressures have forced the industry to increase its outward-processing 
activities mainly to Eastern European countries. More controversially, it was 
revealed that a number of Italian luxury fashion brands manufacture their products in 
China (Economist, 2009). This practice has occurred for several years but been 
protected under a secrecy agreement. Disclosing such a practice would very likely to 
damage the reputation of `Made in Italy' which has been the industry's distinct 
characteristics and competitive factor. In terms of changing demand, in contrast to 
the 1980s where consumers willing to pay premium prices for fashion products, the 
consumers in the late 1990s onwards have become much more value driven and 
demanding more for less prices. High-end fashion brands including Stella 
McCartney and Armani responded to such a trend through the production of 
secondary lines at much more affordable prices to reach-out to larger markets. 
Recently, Jimmy Choo, a high-end fashion brand, designed shoes for H&M, a low- 
price high-street fashion brand. 
It appears, however, little effort has been made to respond to these trends. 
The majority of the industry's stakeholders remain adamant that the decline is 
temporary and ignore the possibility that the change could be permanent. They 
believe that as long as the speed of delivery and production flexibility can be 
improved the Italian textile industry will regain its competitive edge (Bruni, 2004). 
Therefore, the adoption of more modem technologies to improve speed and 
flexibility is more prevalent among the Italian firms than a more radical approach 
such as the creation of new markets. 
This attitude mirrors that of the Lancashire cotton industry in the early 
decades of the 20"' century during which the threat posed by the emergence of 
Japanese firms as low-cost cotton textile producers was largely ignored. As 
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discussed in Chapter 3 Japan's success was built on very different foundations. The 
Lancashire firms made attempts to defend their competitiveness through measures 
they were very familiar with but it was all in vain. As discussed in Chapter 1 and 3, 
history has repeatedly shown that failure to change and adapt to environmental 
changes could have a devastating impact on industry. It appears that the Italian 
textile industry is falling into the maturity-trap just as the British industry did. 
In contrast to the strategy of the German textile industry, attempts to increase 
its share in the technical textile sector have been largely overlooked by the Italian 
textile industry. As shown in Figure 4-12, Italy's technical textile consumption has 
only been around 12 per cent Europe's total consumption since 2000 (Ciabatti, 
2007). As for production, Italy has constituted 16 per cent of Europe's total 
production since 2005, leaving it behind Germany, France, UK, and Belgium. In 
terms of employment, the technical textile sector employed 6000 workers in 2004 
which only represented one per cent of employment in the country's textile and 
clothing industry. A study on innovation activities in the Italian textile industry in 
the 1980s and 1990s suggested that R&D activities by textile and clothing firms to 
promote innovation did not play a key role. The purchase of new textile machinery 
remained the most important aspect of the innovation front, followed by design and 
customer demands (Rolfo and Calabrese, 2003). The competitiveness of firms seems 
to be more determined by design and marketing than innovation where it has not 
been proactive for a very long time. 
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The experience of the German textile industry suggests that the development 
of high-technology textiles requires not only the adoption of more modem 
equipment. Equally important is the adoption of knowledge in synthetic fibres and 
advanced materials. The Italian textile industry has been proactive in the 
modernisation of their machinery supported by their progressive textile machinery 
industry which has been the second largest exporter after Germany since the mid 
1990s. In fact, their level of investment in textile and clothing machinery between 
1996-2002 was the highest among the EU countries, with its share in the apparel 
sector being particularly remarkable, representing around 50 per cent of the total 
investment in the EU (Guercini, 2004). This has improved the flexibility of their 
production systems which is critical to enable them to adapt to the increasingly rapid 
changes in the fashion market -the industry's main market. In the adoption of 
synthetic and advanced materials, however, the industry has been trailing behind its 
competitors in the other West European countries, leading to a less-developed 
technical textile sector. As a consequence of this, despite its larger size, productivity 
of the Italian textile industry has been much lower than the Dutch and the German 
textile industries (around 30 per cent) since 2002 (Eurostat Publication, 2005,2006 
and 2007). 
The slow adoption of synthetic polymers and advanced materials by the 
Italian textile industry appears to be significantly influenced by the historical context 
of the development of the industry. In contrast to Germany, Italy has not been 
prominent in scientific research in organic chemistry. The Italian chemical industry 
was built on inorganic chemicals and fertilizer and overlooked the development in 
specialised and high-value added chemicals, including synthetic polymers (Fauri, 
2000). During the formation of the synthetic fibre industry in Europe in the early 
1950s, the interaction between the chemical and textile industry in Italy was 
relatively weak. As discussed earlier, the interaction between the chemical producers 
and textile firms in Germany and the US proved to be crucial to foster the 
development of both chemical industry and technical textile sector in those 
countries. The absence of such an interaction in Italy may have had a consequence of 
the slow diffusion of knowledge which fostered the exploitation of synthetic 
materials into textile products. In contrast, the relationship between fashion 
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houses/designers and textile manufacturers has been well established since the early 
1950s. This may have strongly influenced the development trajectory of the industry. 
The experience of the Italian textile industry shows that the slow adoption of 
polymer and advanced material technologies has led the industry to focus on a 
narrow range of markets, mainly exploiting the properties of natural fibres. As 
argued earlier, such a concentrated market poses a threat to the industry if global 
demand changes. Broader market segments and a greater variety of technologies can 
help the industry to manage the risk that will arise because of changes in technology 
and demand and be more flexible to respond to such changes. This factor may have 
contributed to the problem the industry is now facing as its established market has 
started to change. 
Only in recent years has the industry begun to appreciate the importance of 
technical textiles for the future of its textile and clothing sector. From the trade 
balance data in 2004, technical textiles constituted 19 percent in the textile sector or 
9.4 percent for the total textile and clothing sector (Sistema Moda Italia, 2004). The 
country's increased commitment to R&D has been shown through the commitment 
of around £3 to £5 billion annual funding starting from 2003 to find new solutions in 
technical textiles. Attempts to improve the industry's technical knowledge and skills 
in technical textiles are expected to enhance their capability in the development of 
new products and processes in more competitive markets. Nonetheless, the Italian 
current technical textile products remain limited to some traditional markets, mainly 
home textiles, clothing, and sports, all of which have become much less competitive 
because of competition from producers in developing countries. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that the evolution of the textile industry is highly 
influenced by continuous changes in technology and demand. This reveals that the 
industry is far more dynamic than it has been widely believed. In fact, the industry is 
shifting towards a knowledge-based industry and riding itself from the image of 
being traditional and mature it has long been referred to. 
This suggests that textile firms are exposed to new opportunities offered by 
emerging technologies and markets. Materials science and engineering has proved to 
play a central role in the advancement of the textile industry. The technology fosters 
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product customisation for niche markets. Consequently, the market for the textile 
industry has become increasingly fragmented. To capitalise on the development of 
this scientific and technological domain, textile firms have to have the capability to 
adopt and use relevant knowledge and know-how to develop competitive products. 
This, however, requires not only new technical capabilities but also changes in R&D 
and technology strategy, business and marketing practices and organisational 
structure and routines. These organisational capabilities help textile firms to optimise 
the exploitation of their new technical capabilities so as to be more competitive in 
the new competitive environment. 
The German chemical industry with its long history of innovation in 
synthetic polymers has been successful at the transfer of knowledge and know-how 
to the textile industry much earlier than their competitors in Europe. A solid 
relationship between the chemical, engineering and textile industries which has been 
established since the 19th century has helped the textile industry to continuously 
change to adapt to changing external conditions. The German textile industry has 
managed to become more akin to a high-technology industry and has maintained its 
leadership in the development of technical and high-tech textiles since the 1960s. 
Italy, the largest textile nation in Europe, on the other hand, has been caught 
out by the effects of competition from low-cost competitors which has overwhelmed 
the industry. Its customers have also changed their preferences to high quality at 
affordable price and are no longer willing to pay premium prices for fashion 
products. This suggests that their strategy to base their competitiveness on quality 
and design which has been very successful since 1970s appears to have run its 
course. The industry's stakeholders, however, remain adamant that the change is 
temporary. A more radical approach to build up new capabilities in high-technology 
textiles is deemed to be less important than incremental improvements to improve 
the industry's responsiveness to the fluctuations in demand -through the adoption of 
flexible production systems. From the experience of the British textile industry it 
appears that that the Italian textile industry is falling into the maturity-trap. 
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5 
Marzotto: Falling into the 
Maturity-Trap? 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Italy is the largest textile and clothing producer in 
Europe and prominent for its quality, design and luxurious appearance. The industry 
has grown significantly since the Second World War. The war provided new 
opportunities to local manufacturers as imports from major competitors, that is, 
France and Britain, were disrupted ()White, 2000). This initiated the rapid growth of 
the Italian fashion industry. 
In contrast to its counterpart in Britain, the Italian textile industry has focused 
on its domestic and European markets rather than exports to low-cost countries at 
least until the early 1980s. As its markets demanded higher quality, more fashionable 
and frequent changes the industry built up a capacity to produce high quality 
fashionable products with flexible production. The adoption of new equipment has 
been the main source of technical innovation and the natural fibres have been the 
main raw materials. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, flexibility has been the distinctive feature of the 
Italian textile industry (Djelic and Ainamo, 1999). The structure which is made up of 
a large number of small enterprises operating in networks has enabled the Italian 
fashion houses to reconcile flexibility with almost limitless production capacity. The 
setting also allows for the production of a wide variety of products within a 
relatively short time period. As a result, the firms have been able to avoid price 
162 
Chapter 5 Marzotto: Falling into the Maturity-Trap? 
sensitive product lines and focus on niche markets rather than economies of scale for 
efficiency (Guercini, 2004). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the prominent reputation of `Made in Italy' was 
built up after World War II following the introduction of the pret a porter collection. 
It was developed from the combination of America's mass production technique 
with Italy's prominent craftsmanship (White, 2000). Hereafter, the Italian textile 
industry has experienced a radical transition from a craft-based production into a 
large-scale, automated production system. Continuous adoption of the American 
machinery has improved the productivity by 400 per cent within less than two 
decades and the industry achieved the highest productivity in Europe by 1987 
(Antonelli and Marchionatti, 1998). 
The Italian textile and clothing sector enjoyed substantial growth from 1976 
when other European leading textile producing countries, that is, France, United 
Kingdom, and (West) Germany, were stagnant or in decline. Unlike in Britain and 
France, it appears that the Multi Fibre Agreement positively affected the Italian 
textile and clothing industry. During the period of protection, a large number of 
Italian fashion houses emerged, signifying the rise of the Italian luxury fashion 
industry. 
Following its success in the 1970s and 1980s, the industry encountered 
difficulties because of the recession in the 1980s, intensified competition in the 
single European market (EU) and gradual liberation of industrial protectionism in the 
developed countries. Moreover, a new wave of low-cost competitors and the growth 
of large retailers which tended to place large orders for more standard styles and 
quality have unsettled the foundation of the industry as it was built up to compete in 
an entirely different environment. Consequently, the industry started to experience a 
long-term contraction. Production declined by around 30 per cent between 1997- 
2006, about 100 000 firms disappeared between 1990-2006 while the loss of 
employment reached over 3 per cent per year between 2001-2006 (Camera de 
Nazionale della Moda Italiana, Jan-2006). Although exports have showed a steady 
increase since 2003, the pace of imports increased at a faster rate. Hence, the trade 
balance has gone into a sharp decline (Figure 5-1). 
163 







y Q 40 Production s 






2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Year 
Figure 5-1. The performance of Italian textile and clothing sector, 2001-2006 
Source: Sistema Moda Italia, 2007 
Since the late 1990s, the Italian textile industry appears to have moved 
towards maturity. The industry has become highly concentrated as a large number of 
acquisitions have taken place since the late 1990s. Currently there are only five large 
groups of high fashion firms which own the majority of luxury fashion labels. Cost 
pressures have forced the firms to relocate its production to lower cost countries, 
more than two decades after Germany initiated the approach. Benetton, for instance, 
set up factories in Croatia, Hungary, Spain and Portugal; and Marzoto established 
plants in Lithuania, Tunisia and Czech Republic. More alarmingly, according to 
Galloni et al. (2005), the vast majority of luxury labels such as Valentino, Gucci and 
Armani have made parts of their collections in North Africa or Eastern Europe. They 
reveal that a number of Italian textile and clothing executives believe that the main 
lines of luxury brands will be entirely relocated within the next 15 years. The quality 
of `Made in Italy' which has long been the industry's mark of quality for decades is 
in jeopardy; hence the call for new innovative solutions to save the industry from a 
bleak future. 
This change shows that the dynamism of market demand and economic 
development in different countries may potentially affect the domination of Italy in 
the fashion market. The luxury product market which has been assumed not to be 
164 
Chapter 5 -Marzotto: Falling into the Maturity-Trap? 
affected by cost-competition has shown a sign of change. Customers have started to 
shift to lower-priced alternatives. 
Mr. Sergio Tamborini, the CEO of Marzotto, argued, however, that a large 
scale of relocation of production can only occur in the clothing sector. It was 
relatively unproblematic to move garment production abroad as it only needed small 
sewing machines. For textile production, on the other hand, it involved large 
machines and high investment which did not make relocation an attractive option. 
He maintained that the textile sector, particularly in the high-end market, was more 
immune from competition from low-cost countries or to outward processing than the 
clothing sector. 
His argument, however, appears to ignore the fact that textile technology for 
the traditional textile market has reached maturity so that any firm with sufficient 
financial resources can buy the latest equipment. Relocating textile production may 
be problematic, but buying the most modern equipment for China (or India) is not a 
problem given the growth rate of China's GDP (10 percent in 2007,9.8 percent in 
2008). Furthermore, the size of the Chinese population (1.2 billion people) and the 
rapid growth of the country's middle-class provide it with sufficient cheap labour 
and a vast domestic market. Moreover, a significant number of Chinese students 
have received a Western education and work experience in Europe and the US over 
the past decade. This undoubtedly will foster the growth of skilled talent. If a 
Chinese firm can buy IBM and an Indian firm can buy Jaguar, it is possible that 
troubled a Western luxury fashion firm can be taken over by firms from the 
developing countries when they are facing financial difficulties. 
The experience of the Italian textile industry shows that an industry with a 
dominant power in a market segment that is widely believed to be immune from 
cost-competition has stumbled in the face of the emergence of new low-cost 
competitors and a shift in demand. It appears that the decline of the Italian textile 
industry paralleled with that of the French made-to-measure collection when it was 
challenged by lower-priced alternatives offered by the Italian textile industry. Thus, 
history may repeat itself if the Italian textile industry can not find viable solutions to 
its problems. 
The case study of Marzotto examines the capability of a traditional textile 
firm operating in the high-end market segment to adapt to a changing competitive 
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environment. The study found that the firm recognised that market changes were 
happening at faster rate than ever before. Surprisingly, however, the firm's strategy 
to respond to such changes appears to be highly influenced by its past strategies 
which have brought success to the firm. Using the maturity-trap and the dynamic 
capabilities framework, it is argued that the firm's strategy is insufficient to maintain 
its competitiveness in the long-run. Marzotto shows organisational inertia that is 
very likely to lead to the maturity-trap. Under such circumstances the firm may 
become vulnerable to a changing competitive environment. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The next section briefly discusses 
the background of Marzotto. Later on, the firm's perception about innovation and the 
strategy to achieve its business objective are discussed. In section four, the detailed 
process of resource configuration by which the firm has diversified its business is 
examined. The implication of this to the evolution of the firm's competencies and 
the dynamic capabilities are elaborated on. 
5.2 Marzotto 
Marzotto has long been known as one of the largest textile and clothing 
companies in the world, and the largest textile manufacturer in Italy. The firm was 
established in 1836 by Luigi Marzotto in Valdagno (Veneto) as a manufacturer of 
woollen fabrics. It belongs to the founder family who purchased the share from the 
Milan Stock Exchange back into the family's ownership. Marzotto employed 3300 
people and made E6.5 million in profit (2007). 
The firm has diversified to include the manufacture of cotton fabrics and 
wool and linen yarns. It competes in four different segments (in accordance to 
quality and price) which are sold in four different brands (Figure 5-2). In terms of 
raw materials, the firm maintains its established traditional products in wool and 
cotton. Between 1973-2005, the firm diversified into clothing and luxury fashion 
brands that included Hugo Boss and Valentino. However, the clothing business was 
demerged in 2005. The firm stated it would concentrate on its high-end textile 
markets as it believes that the textile business can provided longer-term competitive 
advantage than the clothing sector. 
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The group employs a decentralised structure, in which subsidiary firms work 
independently (Figure 5-3). The association with the parent firm is mostly for 
coordination and other company-shareholder relationships. Such a structure has 
helped the firm to reduce the complexity with the integration of new firms or 
divestments. 
The firm has experienced two major restructuring programmes to respond to 
changing business conditions. It was down sized after the oil crisis in the early 1970s 
and restructured intensively between 2005-2008 after the demerger of its clothing 
business. The capacity of a number of plants has been reduced while some of the 
remaining plants have been shut down since 2005 leading to the loss of employment 
and financial loss. Thalia was acquired in 2008 to broaden its market portfolio in the 
highest-end of the market (see Figure 5-2). 
5.2.1 Innovation and the Development of Knowledge and 
Competencies 
As to other traditional textile firms in Italy, innovation is seen as the ability to 
continuously produce high quality and fashionable designs demanded by clothing 
brands or fashion designers. For that reason, the firm conducts market research and 
collaborates with clothing brands and fashion houses. The adoption of machinery has 
been the firm's primary source of technical innovation. This confirms the major 
characteristics of the Italian textile firm as discussed earlier. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, textile firms concentrating on the utilization of 
natural fibres tend to limit their market to the traditional clothing market. Marzotto 
has focused on the utilisation of natural fibres from its earliest days and there has 
been no transfer of knowledge from chemical fibre or materials producers to the 
firm. This practice is related to its strategy to remain in the high-end textile market 
where the demand is mainly satisfied by the use of natural fibres. 
As the majority of its technical innovation is mainly developed by its 
suppliers Marzotto's patent portfolio is weak and low in variety (see Figure 5-4). 
Indeed, its only patent in product technology is the development of electric woollen 
blankets with embedded electrically-conductive elements. The rest of the patents are 
related to treatments of wool fibres and product designs. The firm's internal 
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development has been focused on the new combinations of fibre blends such as the 
mixture of cashmere, wool and silk. Together with the equipment suppliers the firm 
focuses its efforts on adopting innovative weaving and spinning processes. The 
activities are designed to maintain the image of luxury, elegance and opulence for 
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Figure 5-4. Patent portfolio of Marzotto 
Source: European Patent Office 
In this textile segment, R&D activities are significantly different from those 
in the technical textile market. The role of technology is focused on process 
technology to improve productivity, quality and flexibility. Customers' inputs are 
highly valued during the product development process. In fact, the firm dedicates 
teams to work together with customers in product development. In production, they 
combined old and new spinning and weaving techniques to create unique products. 
There is no plan on the horizon to adopt new knowledge to create new competencies 
and to add value to its customers. Meanwhile, their competitors such as Zegna made 
an attempt to adopt electronic textiles into its iJacket collection in 2007. 
5.2.2 The Evolution of Competencies 
The competence of the firm, that is, the production of high fashion textiles, 
has been preserved throughout its 174 years history. The firm, however, has not 
stood still. It has diversified its activities to include yarn manufacturing, finishing 
and cloth making through acquisitions. The extent of the diversification, however, is 
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very limited. The market remains concentrated on the high-fashion market. The male 
fashion was the only market up to 2008 and only recently has the firm diversified 
into the female fashion market. This section analyses the process of diversification 
and divestment which has occurred within the firm. It will help us to understand the 
drivers behind the acquisitions and the impact of diversification on the firm's 
competitive advantage. 
Yarns and Fabrics 
The development of Marzotto's yarn and fabric businesses is characterised 
by market expansion and diversification through acquisitions. Acquisitions have 
been driven by emerging opportunities to acquire struggling firms in markets that 
have the potential to grow. 
During the Great Depression the firm found it beneficial to integrate 
backward to include the production of wool fibres and yams. The recession 
following the oil crisis in the early 1970s caused a number of textile firms to fall into 
financial difficulties. Under these circumstances, firms' values diminished and 
opened up opportunities for acquisitions. In 1985, Marzotto acquired the FinBasetti 
Group, one of the most important Italian textile groups. The purchase included a 
controlling interest in Linificio e Canapificio Nazionale, a linen yam producer, and 
Mascioni, a leading textile printing and finishing company. In 1987, the firm 
acquired the state-owned Lanerossi Group, a woollen yarn and fabric manufacturer, 
by which it increased its total revenue by 72 per cent. This acquisition has made 
Marzotto the first fully integrated wool producer which encompassed the entire 
productions process from sheep rearing to suit making. Two years later the firm 
purchased LeBlan&Fils, a linen yam producer from France, and this was followed 
by the acquisition of Lanificio Guabello, a woollen mill, in 1991. 
In the 1990s, however, pressures from new foreign competition increased. 
This forced Marzotto to relocate production to low-cost countries. It opened a 
subsidiary linen factory, Filin in Tunisia in 1993. In 1994, it acquired a wool factory, 
Nova Mosilana, in Brno, Czech Republic to focus on combed textiles made of pure 
wool, as well as to build a bridge into the Eastern European market. The share of 
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overseas production has increased and reached 50 percent of its wool production and 
60-70 percent of its linen production in 2004. 
The relocation of production forced the firm to discontinue a number of 
production facilities in Italy. The woollen combing in Mortara and finishing plants in 
Schio were closed in 2005 and 2006 respectively, while other parts of the operations 
were transferred to Nova Mosilana. Spinning and dyeing operations were transferred 
to the Czech Republic. Around 50 percent of the mid-level products are now 
produced in the Czech Republic and accounts for 70 million metre fabrics worth 
about £8 million. This rationalisation led to the loss of more than 600 jobs. 
High End Fashion Clothing 
One of the fundamental factors that has played a significant role in the 
growth of the Italian high-end fashion industry is its close relationship with the 
textile manufacturers. Large textile manufacturers have financially sponsored 
apparel designers to develop and design clothing made from their fabrics since 1952. 
Marzotto began its relationship with fashion designers by sponsoring a number of 
fashion houses, such as Rivella and Pucci in 1952. But it was not until the 1970s the 
firm integrated forward to start its fashion clothing business. As to the majority of 
large textile firms in Italy, Marzotto exported its apparel collections to the US as part 
of the loan repayment programme to the US government in the 1970s as discussed 
earlier. 
Intensified competition in consumer textiles and clothing, as well as the rise 
of the Italian luxury fashion industry encouraged Marzotto to gradually shift its 
clothing business from consumer clothing to upmarket fashion from the mid 1980s. 
The firm entered designer markets in 1986 by launching M. Missoni under a 
licensing agreement. A major turning point in this division came in 1991 with the 
acquisition of Hugo Boss, Germany's largest manufacturer of menswear. The 
acquisition promoted Marzotto as one of the major firms in the designer fashion 
market. The firm continued to expand its clothing brands throughout the 1990s, 
through licensing (Gianfranco Ferre Studio, GFF Gianfranco Ferre, Gianfranco Ferre 
Forma, M. Missoni, Marlboro Classic) and creating its own labels (UomoLebole, UL 
Trendy, Borgofiori, Marzotto Lab). 
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As with its yam and fabric business, increased cost pressures in the clothing 
market forced Marzotto to relocate 40 per cent of its clothing production overseas 
from 1993. It had to shut one of its local clothing plants in 1993 and complete the 
purchase of a 90 percent ownership in Czechoslovakia's Nova Mosilana in 1994. In 
2000, Marzotto purchased an 84.4 percent stake in Litekas and Calw, a Lithuanian 
woollen garment manufacturer. The acquisition permitted the firm to move part of its 
garment production to low-cost countries. However, intense competition from the 
Far East in more recent years has eroded the firm's profitability in all business units 
except the highest-end segment. It encouraged the firm to expand its high-end 
fashion business by acquiring Valentino in 2002 for ¬133.5 million. The firm was 
successful in the implementation of a revitalisation strategy for Valentino through 
the launch of a new label, Red, to capture emerging youth markets. 
In 2005, the firm decided to demerge the clothing business. It was claimed 
that the complexity of managing two business sectors, each of which requires 
different management, marketing, and strategy forced the firm into the demerger. 
The new firm emanated from the demerger is named Valentino Fashion Group 
which incorporates the Marzotto's fashion brands including Hugo Boss and other 
licenses. Marzotto will remain focused on the high-end textile business. 
After the demerger, Marzotto initiated a major restructuring, rationalisation, 
as well as expansion throughout 2005-2007. This was to improve the utilisation of 
production capacity, the integration of product ranges, and the efficiency of 
marketing and sales. It initiated a joint venture with Verzoletto to manufacture 
woollen yams made of pure wool, acrylics blends, and carded knitwear. Marzotto 
believed that the joint venture would enable the firm to optimise its cost structure, 
improve its competitiveness and enhance its product portfolio. To enter the finest 
woollen fabric market Marzotto acquired Fratelli Tallia di Delfino, a very fine 
woollen fabric manufacturer in 2008. The acquisitions have made Marzotto the 
largest wool producer by volume in Europe. 
5.2.3 Drivers of Change 
The development of Marzotto shows that the firm has remained in the same 
business for the last 174 years although it now is on a far greater scale in terms of 
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production, equipment, brands and numerous market segments. The dynamism of the 
firm has been driven by changes in the competitive environment, especially changes 
in (fashion) market demand and the emergence of low-cost competitors. Recent 
trends have shown that the customers are no longer willing to pay premium prices 
and instead demand fashionable designs at more affordable prices. As customers are 
its main source of information in product development the firm has put an 
established research strategy in place to examine changes in market demand through 
surveys and working with its major customers. The result provides the firm with 
customer feedback about the future trends in design and materials. Marzotto 
responds to the feedback with the development of new products exhibiting new 
designs, blends of fibres and finishing techniques. 
Although customer demand is one of the important sources of innovation, 
relying heavily on this entails substantial risks for the firm's long-term existence 
(Hayes and Abernathy, 1980). Customers may know their present needs but they 
often do not have sufficient knowledge or vision about the trend in the distant future. 
Thus, a customer-driven strategy may be suitable for the short-term development 
programme but may not be sufficient for the long-term one. Relying on this strategy 
may lead the firm into short-termism. As discussed in Chapter 3, short-termism 
could lead firms to fall victim to the maturity-trap. 
As mentioned earlier, the firm's main source of technical innovation is the 
adoption of more flexible equipment with higher productivity. Changes in 
technology which can improve the value of its products or facilitate the 
diversification of its competencies have been overlooked. Hayes and Abernathy 
(1980) suggest, however, that merely buying off-the-shelf equipment will not 
provide an edge for long-term competitiveness or solutions to long-term decline. 
Competitors can purchase the same technology and imitate other firms' products. As 
technology is not the differentiating factor, this will drive competition to efficiency 
and lower costs. 
Indeed, counterfeit goods of high fashion brands have become an increasing 
problem for the fashion industry. For the clothing subsector, the high-street retailers 
can rapidly copy or imitate new fashion trends created by high-end fashion 
designers. In the accessory subsector, particularly handbags, counterfeit goods have 
become a very large business. More alarmingly, a portion of the high-end fashion 
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customers have shifted to counterfeit products as the quality has significantly 
improved while the price is less than one tenth of that of the genuine products. This 
shows that competition in quality and design alone today cannot provide a 
sustainable competitive advantage. Therefore, Marzotto should redirect its business 
and fmd the market where it can achieve a long-term competitive advantage. 
5.2.4 The Dynamic Capabilities of Marzotto 
Marzotto is undoubtedly a responsive firm with a flexible organisational 
structure. Its ability to perform a number of acquisitions, divestment and the 
relocation of production to adapt to changing business environments has been its 
dynamic capabilities. The firm has conducted restructuring processes that involved 
the integration of new firms and the closure of uncompetitive plants without 
interrupting business activities. As a result, it has survived global economic 
downturn(s) in the past. 
However, in today's harsher competitive environment and faster changes in 
market and technology than it was in the past such a capability may not be sufficient. 
As discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, a number of high-fashion firms have been 
struggling to survive and the relocation of production has become inevitable. 
Marzotto's responses which were heavily influenced by deep entrenched traditional 
values date back nearly two centuries may have a devastating result. The 
management cannot appreciate the importance of building new competencies or 
creating new markets away from, yet related to, their traditional competencies or 
markets. Instead, the firm believes that multi-brands and flexibility to produce 
different qualities of fabrics is the strategy to pursue in an uncertain business 
environment. Hayes and Abernathy (1980) argue, however, the concept of corporate 
portfolio which aims to balance the overall risks and returns has made managers to 
become averse to risk and the pursuit of short-term profitability much more 
`desirable'. 
The firm's heavy reliance on the high-end fashion market may have excluded 
it from new developments in the related (but distant) fields. For instance, a number 
of fashion designers have entered sport and outdoor apparel as the markets have 
become increasingly fashionable. They have started to use performance textiles in 
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their sports lines. Those fashion houses have learned new knowledge related to 
performance textiles and may use it for future applications. The application of 
performance textiles in fashion products may foster the creation of new market 
niches. It was discussed in Chapter 4 that recent developments in multifunctional and 
smart textiles can be exploited by traditional textile manufacturers. Burlington 
Industries, for instance, integrated Phase Change Materials into its jumper 
collections to add more value to its customers. 
This suggests that there are alternative routes that Marzotto could opt for to 
diversify its markets and capitalise from emerging markets and technologies. The 
firm's ability to diversify into non-mature markets is crucial for its long-term 
growth. As discussed earlier the high-end fashion market is not immune from the 
threat posed by low-cost competitors. In fact, a number of high-end fashion 
designers have produced their second line collections at more affordable prices to 
increase market penetration. If cost pressures continue to increase those fashion 
designers may have to once again redirect their strategies when they find theirs are 
no longer competitive. 
5.2.5. Implications of the Maturity-Trap at the Firm Level 
It appears that Marzotto is in danger of falling into the maturity-trap. The 
firm shows organisational rigidity and short-termism in their response to changing 
business conditions. The firm remains adamant that the high-end segment is immune 
from competition from low-cost countries. They do not consider that other firms 
from different countries may be able to provide similar quality at lower prices with 
larger financial resources. The experience of the Italian textile industry to penetrate 
high quality textile and clothing which ended the domination of France is a useful 
example to show that the high-end market can fall victim to lower-cost competitors. 
Such an organisational inertia is a consequence of deeply-rooted practices 
and values (Sull, 2000). The firm uses the same strategy (diversification in similar 
markets), implements the same routines (acquisitions), develops cooperation with the 
same suppliers and believe in the same values that the quality associated with `Made 
in Italy' label remains unchallenged. This behaviour may be liable if demand was 
stable but it is not. It is in fact dynamic and changes continuously. 
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Interestingly, as mentioned earlier, the firm recognises that the business 
environment is changing faster than ever as a consequence of new entrants, changing 
technologies and shifting market preferences. The power within the supply chain has 
moved from designers to retailers since 2000. The rules of the game that link 
manufacturers, fashion houses and retailers have also changed. Large retailers which 
have the power to purchase products in large volume and move large orders from 
Europe to Asia and to Africa have put greater pressure on textile manufacturers to 
reduce prices. Manufacturers are forced to work with short-term cost reduction as 
their main driving force than long-term growth. In spite of the recognition of the 
problem the firm insists it must still follow the same strategy. It appears that 
Marzotto suffers from short-termism and overlooks the importance to look for new 
routes for its long-term growth. 
This has parallels with the Lancashire cotton industry. As discussed in 
Chapter 3 the Lancashire firms suffered from short-termism because of their deeply 
entrenched business practices. In the face of a changing business environment 
management was unable or unwilling to fundamentally change their business 
practices. A number of factors that contributed to this were limited knowledge in 
different business areas, deeply embedded routines or procedures, low diversity of 
knowledge and skills and large infrastructure. These are also the underlying factors 
that have put Marzotto into a serious danger of falling into the maturity-trap. Under 
these circumstances, the management maintained the status quo at the expense of 
long-term competitiveness (David, 1986). The only way out of this predicament is 
through collective action which is a huge mountain to climb given the intensity of 
the competition among the firms. 
Marzotto needs entrepreneurial management that can break down the barriers 
that impede radical change. They need to implement an innovative corporate culture 
to escape from the maturity-trap. Given the history of Marzotto, change will not 
come easily. The firm needs a strong leader to turn the firm around. The leader has 
to have the capability to broaden the firm's competencies and anticipate future trends 
that may have an effect on its competitiveness. The theory being this should lead to 
the development of new capabilities that permits greater diversification. A narrow 
market focus makes it vulnerable to changes in the external environment. However, 
these changes have to be complemented with new organisational capabilities. 
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Courtaulds shows that diversification often requires different corporate strategies. 
Implementing the same strategy in a different business environments or different 
markets can lead to organisational inertia. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Marzotto illustrates the behaviour of a firm falling into the maturity-trap. It 
shows that although the firm has recognised the significance of external changes and 
admitted that such change occurs at a faster rate than ever before its response is to 
continue with its old strategies. Such a response is based on the assumption that the 
change is temporary so that continue with what they know best is the best answer for 
the current problems. It ignores the fact that the recent development indicates that 
the change could be permanent. There is no plan on the horizon for the development 
of new competencies and new products away from its traditional markets, despite an 
uncertain future. This behaviour parallels to that of the Lancashire firms which led to 
their decline. 
It is argued that although the response may be necessary to satisfy the current 
needs of its customers it fails to address issues related to its long-term 
competitiveness. Moving up to the higher market segment may help it to move away 
from cost competition. However, as history has shown it cannot stop other low-cost 
competitors to catch up with in quality. Consequently, in the long-run cost 
competition will become inevitable. This strategy, therefore, is a `temporary' than a 
long-term solution. The firm appears to suffer from serious organisational inertia. 
Business decisions to avoid more risky, longer term business at the expense of 
potential emerging markets for long-term growth is a result of short-termism. This 
behaviour has become a disease that has affected the management and caused lock- 
in to the existing business and structure. 
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6 
Royal Ten Cate: De-maturity and 
Radical Change 
6.1 Introduction 
The size of the Dutch textile industry is smaller than those of its main 
European competitors such as Italy, UK, Germany and France. Its revenue was less 
than three per cent of that of the Italian textile industry in 2007 (63.6 billion, down 
from 4.5 billion in 2000). In Europe, its revenue accounted for only two percent of 
the total revenue of the EU textile and clothing sector in 2004 while the employment 
represented 1.3 per cent. Whilst it may be relatively small in size, the Dutch textile 
industry is arguably one of the most successful with one the highest rates of 
productivity in the EU. Compared to the European leader, Italy, its rates of 
productivity has been significantly higher over the last decade. In 2002, Dutch 
productivity was 29 per cent higher and in 2003 it increased to 42 per cent, before 
declining to 28 per cent in 2004, despite the fact that the Netherlands is one of the 
highest-wage economies in Europe' (Eurostat Publication, 2005,2006 and 2007). 
According to one report on the innovative performance of the European textile 
industry (2000-2003), the Netherlands emerged as the overall leader when measured 
in terms of patents and total factor productivity (Marin, et al., 2008). 
The structure of the industry is a result of a long process of industrial 
transformation which began in the early 1960s following a severe decline after 
World War II. As with Britain, cotton textile trading was one of the largest export 
earners for the country's economy during the 19th century. The primary market was 
1 The Netherlands was number two after Luxembourg in terms of average wage in the EU textile 
industry in 2003 (Eurostat) 
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high-volume, low value-added cotton fabric exports to its former colonies. The 
emergence of low cost competitors, particularly Japan and India in the 1930s and the 
independence of the former colonies in 1949 led to a severe loss of market share 
(van der Eng, 1998). In response to this serious situation, there was a wave of 
mergers and acquisitions after 1956 as the industry consolidated, and this was 
followed after 1963 by the relocation of production to reduce costs. Following these 
changes, the industry witnessed a severe loss of employment and the industry 
emerged as the most concentrated in the EU by 19652. The loss of employment was 
the most extensive of any countries in Western Europe (van Geenhuizen and van der 
Knaap, 1994). 
Despite the loss of the competitive advantage and the change in market 
conditions, the majority of firms attempted to defend their traditional businesses and 
eschewed the opportunities to develop new markets. It appears that its major reliance 
on cheap cotton product markets for the former colonies and highly concentrated 
industrial structure caused inflexibility and inertia. These were, in fact, also the 
primary factors of the demise of the British cotton industry as previously discussed 
in Chapter 3. The industry took a similar approach to that of Britain by opting for 
mergers and acquisitions than the relocation of production in response to the 
changing environment. It is argued here that the Dutch textile industry fell into the 
maturity trap, along with its counterpart in Britain. 
Against the considerable industrial decline, a small number of innovative 
traditional textile manufacturers have re-emerged to become high-technology textile 
manufacturers. Those firms produce a wide range of higher value added textiles in a 
number of sectors such as the military, aerospace, automotive and medical. They 
have concentrated on niche markets and produced new products based on new 
materials. The Dutch technical textile sector is now 
in a strong competitive position 
both within Europe and globally. Evidence of its prowess can be found in the fact 
that Royal Ten Cate is the world leader in geotextiles and pioneered the use of 
synthetic fibres in the market through its one of 
its subsidiaries, Nicolon (John, 
1987). The firm has also emerged as a prominent armour producer in Europe. Other 
Z By the 1980s, Britain replaced the Netherlands as the most concentrated textile industry in the EU, 
whereas Italy and Germany were the least. Currently, the 
Netherlands stand somewhere in between 
the two extremes (Euratex Bulletin, 2000-2003). 
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firms such as Desso-DLW, together with Ten Cate, are among the major global 
suppliers of synthetic grass. Gamma Holding, a large cotton textile manufacturer up 
to the 1960s, has emerged as a prominent figure in the belting and mattress ticking 
markets. Eurocarbon has modified its competence in the manufacture of braided 
fabrics for the shoe lace market to offer solutions for industrial markets made of 
glass, carbon and aramid fibres. Furthermore, the Dutch carpet industry is the second 
largest in Europe after Belgium and the third in the world behind Belgium and the 
US. It shows that those firms have managed to shift their businesses to produce 
products in demand for markets in which they are competitive. 
These firms have undertaken a strategic redirection (Doz and Prahalad, 
1988) by shifting their core competence away from manufacturing traditional textiles 
to developing high value added textiles. In other words, they have initiated the 
process of de-maturity and bypassed the maturity-trap by which those firms regain 
their competitiveness. A strategic change of this nature involves a radical 
transformation of both strategic3 and organisational4 aspects of firms so they are 
configured until completely in line with each other. By initiating the process of de- 
maturity firms have to be aware that they will often have to restructure, change their 
perspectives of their markets and invest heavily to modify and broaden their 
knowledge base. Therefore, compatibility between the strategic and organisational 
aspects of the firm, or `internal fit', appears to be absolutely critical to improve the 
likelihood of success in any form of strategic redirection. 
This chapter seeks to contribute to the development of the theory of 
innovative enterprises by analysing the attempts made by a mature firm to initiate the 
process of de-maturity and bypass the maturity trap. The case study of Ten Cate 
vividly illustrates the way in which a mature textile firm with a very long tradition 
can radically transform itself over an extensive period of time. This was achieved 
through the creation of a series of new competencies and capabilities that have 
enabled it to adapt to changing technology and market trends and to overcome 
organisational inertia. It is argued here that the creation of new competencies and 
capabilities is fostered by a radical change in its knowledge-base and know-how 
through the adoption of new knowledge and technologies, the development of new 
3 The strategic aspects include technology-product-market portfolio. 
4 Organisational aspects refer to the firm's process and structure, 
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products and access to new markets. By initiating the process of de-maturity the firm 
also had to restructure its organisation, change its strategic perspectives of the 
markets and invest heavily to renew and broaden their resource base. All of those 
changes have to achieve internal fit as discussed earlier. 
De-maturity, however, is only a beginning of a continuous process of change. 
It has to be followed up with new investment to continuously create new capabilities 
and competencies and reconfigure the resource-base5 to improve the `evolutionary 
fitness' of the firm. This has to be complemented with the ability of the management 
to strategically select the areas of new investments which can generate new paths of 
growth. These are in fact the essence of the dynamic capabilities of the firm which 
have been identified as the foundation of sustainable competitiveness (Helfat, et al., 
2007, Teece, et al., 1997). 
The key issues will be addressed by this case study are the factors that drive 
change, the process or mechanism to create new competencies and the capability to 
continuously initiate and manage change. These improve our understanding of the 
foundations of the sustainable competitiveness of the firm. In what follows, the 
periods of strategic redirection occurred in Ten Cate and the nature of the change is 
outlined. The third section of the chapter describes the firm's strategy to undertake 
such changes and its pathways to generate new knowledge and reconfigure its 
resource-base. These mechanisms have radically changed the direction of the firm 
and fostered to bypass the maturity-trap. In section four, the detailed process of new 
knowledge generation and the factors that contribute to the process and relationships 
among them is discussed. The implication of this for the evolution of competencies 
and capabilities of the firm and their impact on de-maturity are elaborated on. 
6.2 Royal Ten Cate 
Royal (Koninklijke, in Dutch) Ten Cate (`Ten Cate') is one of the world's 
leading producers of technical textiles. This publicly quoted firm based in Almelo is 
s We use the definition of resource base by Helfat et al. (2007) which refers to ...... "tangible, 
intangible, and human assets (or resources) as well as capabilities which the organization owns, 
controls, or has access to on a preferential basis......... we consider capabilities to be resources in the 
most general sense of the word. By this we mean simply that resources are something that 
organization can draw upon to accomplish its aims" (Heflat, et al. (2007, p. 4). 
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the oldest Dutch industrial firm whose history can be traced back to 1766. The firm 
is the combination of a merger between two textile firms, H. Ten Cate Hzn & Co of 
Almelo and Koninklijke Stoomweverij, NV (KSW) of Nijverdal, in 1957. 
Throughout its 243 year history, Ten Cate has transformed its business away from its 
original roots and against the main trend of firms in the industry. From 
manufacturing cotton fabrics for traditional textile markets, Ten Cate has emerged as 
a leading firm in high performance textiles, supplying a diverse range of global 
(niche) markets derived from advanced and functional materials (Figure 6-1). In 
2008 the firm surpassed £1 billion turnover for the first time in its history and 
employs over 4000 people. 
Royal Ten Cate 
Holding 
Advanced Textiles and II Geosynthetic and Grass II Technical Components Composites 
TenCate Protective Fabrcs I TenCate Geosynthetic I TenCate Enbi 
TenCate Outdoor Fabrics II TenCate Industrial Fabrics 
Aerospace Composites I TenCate Grass 
TenCate Armour Composites 
Figure 6-1. Current organisational structure 
Source: Annual Report, 2008 
The current organisational structure is decentralised with a mere 30 people 
working for the Holding Company whereas the rest work for 55 operating firms 
(wholly or partly owned subsidiaries) that are managed within three sectors. 
The firm's transformation has only been achieved by going through a series 
of transitions characterised by four distinct periods as shown in Figure 6-2. The first 
strategic change occurred in 1841 in order to expand its market to the Dutch former 
colonies through the acquisition of a firm which had long been the supplier to the 
market. Following the loss of its market share in the colonies the firm undertook the 
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second strategic redirection to shift the main market from the former colonies to the 
domestic and the European markets through a series of mergers and acquisitions. 
Throughout the first three periods, the adoption of new technology was not as 
important as market expansion and restructuring. The fourth strategic change which 
began in the early 1970s provided the foundation for the development of new 
capabilities to foster continuous change. During this period, the firm built new 
competencies away from its traditional roots primarily through acquisitions, 
divestments, reorganisations and R&D. Later, however, was not as crucial as firm 
acquisitions. It was probably due to its lack of `capacity' to conduct R&D in new 
markets. The firm learned and built up its R&D capabilities from the acquired firms. 
In the subsequent period of strategic change, R&D, particularly in advanced 
materials has become central in the process of new competence development, 
together with acquisitions. In fact, in 2004, the firm announced its attempts to shift 
its core competence from the manufacturer of technical textiles to the developer and 
producer of functional materials. Such a shift was combined with the modification of 
its core growth markets to protective fabrics, aerospace composites, antiballistic 
materials, artificial grass and geosynthetics. The firm therefore is currently 
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Chapter 6-Royal Ten Cate: De-maturity and Radical Change 
6.2.1 Innovation and the Development of Knowledge and 
Competencies 
Innovation involves the generation of new knowledge. When the new 
knowledge is very different from the existing one and is enhanced and expanded 
to create new competitive advantage it becomes a firm's new competence. 
Diversification or a shift of core competence involves a modification of the 
resource-base. This does not only involve changes in know-how and physical 
resources but also in innovation strategy, business practices and organisational 
structure. Firms need to make new investments to modify and reconfigure their 
resource-base and adopt new approaches to access the important new knowledge. 
Through a combination of external acquisitions, internal R&D and disposal of 
uncompetitive businesses Ten Cate has shifted its core competencies to respond to 
new business environments. Because of the greater complexity of knowledge 
required to develop future products and the exponential rise in R&D costs Ten 
Cate has recently adopted new approaches to generate and commercialise new 
knowledge. Networks of alliances and 'specification selling', the new approaches 
in innovation activities, are explained in the following sub-sections. 
This section analyses the pathways or mechanisms for the generation of 
new knowledge and the reconfiguration of the firm's resource-base. The 
discussion reveals how Ten Cate creating new paths away from its original roots 
and escape the maturity-trap. It has been found that continuous generation and 
modification of knowledge has allowed the creation of a significantly diverse 
resource-base. It has provided the firm with a number of new alternative paths 
ripe for exploitation. Diversity improves the evolutionary fitness of the firm, the 
core aspects of the dynamic capabilities framework (Helfat, et al., 2007). 
Research and Development 
The importance of research and development (R&D) to the firm has 
evolved in accordance with changes in the firm's core businesses. The firm's 
recent strategic change to enter markets which are driven by scientific research 
(advanced materials developer) has led to an increase in R&D expenditure. This 
indicates the growing importance of R&D to the firm. Another R&D indicator, 
that is, patent portfolio, shows that the diversity of the firm's patent portfolio has 
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increased considerably since its entry into high-value added textile markets 
(Figure 6-3). Compared to the past, R&D has more recently played a central role 
in the firm's ability to generate new knowledge to support its strategic redirection. 
Prior to 1980, technological innovation was undertaken to improve 
production efficiency and cost reduction. Although the firm started its 
diversification in the 1970s, their core business remained traditional textiles of a 
very standard nature and these were heavily exposed to price competition. In such 
a market, patents played virtually no role to build up the competitiveness of the 
firm than firm acquisitions to achieve economies of scale. As a consequence, the 
firm had no major patent portfolio (Figure 6-3). After 1980 with the 
diversification strategy in full swing, patents became much more important and 
were generated through heavy investment in R&D. Patents have become much 
more of strategic value to the firm than ever before. As illustrated in Figure 6-3, 
the diversity of patent has increased significantly. 
Between 1980-1990, patents in advanced textiles (protective fabrics) and 
composites dominated the patent portfolio. Between 1990-1995, the number of 
patents dropped significantly due to the firm's focus on the consumer plastics 
business. In fact, in 1994 plastic based products accounted for 80 per cent of the 
firm's turnover. Technical development in this market was stagnant as 
development was primarily directed at gaining economies of scale. The firm 
emphasised its growth strategy through market expansion and acquisitions. The 
situation changed in 1996 as new competitors from low-cost countries emerged 
which forced the firm to reduce its activities in the consumer plastics market. The 
firm shifted towards the intensification of technological development in protective 
fabrics and artificial grass and the creation of new competencies in armour 
composites and digital textile finishing processes. The patent portfolio increased 
and diversity widened. The activity in the consumer plastic market was shifted to 
plastic components for printers whose competition required greater 
product/technological development than cost efficiency. This confirms Cohen and 
Levinthal's (1990) contention where R&D improves the absorptive capacity of the 
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Chapter 6- Royal Ten Cate: De-maturity and Radical Change 
Following the strategic redirection in 2004 which signified its greater 
commitment to long-term scientific research the firm has significantly increased 
its collaboration with the University of Twente and other specialised firms. The 
firm actively supported the establishment of the Materials Valley, a platform and 
infrastructure for research collaboration and knowledge sharing in advanced 
materials, in 2004. This was followed by the establishment of the Thermoplastic 
Composite Research Centre, a new research centre within the Materials Valley on 
2009. New research fields that will potentially have a fundamental impact on the 
firm are also performed in the centre. For instance, the firm is currently looking 
into materials that will reduce its dependence on oil-based raw materials. 
Considering the vital role of the intangible assets derived from such research, the 
firm announced a more aggressive intellectual property protection system in 2004 
which includes the joint ownership of patents together with its partners. The new 
system has resulted in a significant increase in the patent position of the firm. 
Such a new platform of R&D platform shows the importance of the Open 
Innovation paradigm for the firm's future long-term growth (Chesbrough, 2006). 
This is substantiated by the fact that the firm is connected to different networks 
associated with different fields or technologies. For instance, for collaborative 
research in the application of advanced materials in textiles the firm plays an 
important role as the Chairman of the Governing Body of the European New 
Textile Technology Platform. In another instance, the firm joined a network to 
develop the future technology roadmap in Personal Protective Equipment. This 
network involves a range of different firms with different technological 
competencies ranging from nanotechnology and biotechnology to advanced 
production technology, micro systems and electronics. The road map provides 
guidance to the members as to which technologies they need to invest, the method 
to acquire complementary knowledge and the alternative pathways to exploit the 
technologies. The firm believes that such a new paradigm will permit access to 
breakthrough knowledge generated external to the firm and translate the 
knowledge into competitive technologies and products. The strategy allows the 
firm to expand the industrial uses of its materials knowledge and technology 
outside their current markets. Engaging with 
different strategic networks helps the 
firm to reduce the uncertainties associated with emerging markets and 
technologies. Networks allow some degree of control over an uncertain 
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environment (Mattsson, 1988), avoid dependency on one particular emerging 
technology and reduce the risk of failure due to the high level of uncertainty of the 
rate and direction of new technologies (Rosenberg, 1996). 
The period between 1980-2004 appears to be critical in the firm's strategic 
redirection. The first milestone indicated a move away from short-term cost 
reduction to mid-term new product development and diversification. This resulted 
in the development of diverse products derived from materials and technologies 
that were new to the firm. The adoption of fibre glass and composites for 
protective clothing, nylon and polypropylene for geotextiles and polypropylene 
for carpet backings are a few examples. The second milestone marked the 
fundamental shift towards long-term R&D and the open innovation paradigm. 
This change advanced the firm's capability to develop high valued added products 
derived from R&D resulted in high value added, high performance products 
including composites for body and vehicle armour and synthetic grass. 
Expenditure on R&D has increased significantly since 20056. In 2006 the 
expenditure increased from £5.8 million in 2005 to £8.1 million. In 2007, the 
figure increased to £8.2 million before declining in 2008 to £7.9 million. These 
figures also include government funding which totalled £8.6 million in the past 
five years. 
Expenditure on R&D reached a peak in 2007 when it hit 1 per cent of 
turnover7. The level of expenditure is comparable with one of its competitors, 
Gamma Holding, but was higher than the average rate in the country which was 
only 0.6 per cent between 2000-2003. Germany and Belgium, the leaders in 
technical textiles in Europe, however, have a significantly higher rate which 
reached 1.2 per cent (Marin et al., 2008). It indicates that although Ten Cate is 
considered as one of the most innovative textile 
firms in the Netherlands its 
European competitors appear to be more aggressive in R&D. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, Freudenberg's R&D expenditure reached 3.8 per cent of its 
turnover in 2008. This was perhaps due to Ten Cate's recent large investment in 
acquisitions to generate new knowledge. However, the sustainability of 
6 The firm's accounting system prior to 2005 did not show R&D expenditure as a separate cost 
posting from personnel and operating costs. 
Consequently, the precise amount of expenditure can 
be presented. 
7 The R&D expenditure as the percentage of turnover between 2008-2005 was 0.7,0.9,1 and 0.8 
per cent respectively. 
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acquisitions as a means to generate new knowledge in this fast-changing 
environment is questionable. In particular as the firm aims at leadership in 
technological development, the knowledge it requires may not be available in the 
market. Therefore, Ten Cate may need to improve their scientific and 
technological capacity through R&D to compete at the global level in the future. 
Acquisition of External Knowledge 
As discussed earlier, the firm has developed an established capability in 
acquisitions as a means to broaden its strategic knowledge portfolio. In fact, this 
was established long prior to the development of its R&D capacity. The firm 
called this 'buy-and-build' strategy. The strategy focuses on building and 
strengthening its strategic resource-base through acquisitions of firms (including 
joint ventures). Synergies and complementarities with its technology portfolio to 
encourage growth are two factors that determine acquisitions. Indeed, Teece 
(2007) suggests that acquisitions should consider co-specialisation and 
complementarities between the resource-base of the firm and of the target firms. 
This allows the firm to generate idiosyncratic new knowledge. The firm has 
regularly modified its resource-base through acquisitions and divestments 
although it appears that the 1980s and 2000s are the periods during which it was 
used intensively. This corresponds to the periods of the firm's strategic redirection 
(Figure 6-2). Therefore, the firm uses acquisitions as one of the primary means to 
fundamentally change its resource-base. 
To complement the R&D and buy-and-build strategy, the firm developed a 
`fix-it-exit' strategy to balance its business portfolio. The strategy involves 
attempts to improve the performance of businesses that no longer fit with the 
current core markets before being offered for sale. R&D, buy-and-build and fix-it- 
exit strategies allow the modification and reconfiguration of resources and asset 
positions of the firm. This is argued by Teece et al. (1997) as the underlying 
factors that underpin the long-term competitiveness of firms operating in an 
environment of rapid technological change. The strategies therefore suggest 
continuous change and diversity of resources allow 
it to develop a broad 
technology-product-market portfolio believed to be beneficial in a rapidly 
changing environment. It has been argued that continuous change and a diversity 
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of resources help the firm to initiate the process of de-maturity and bypass the 
maturity-trap. They help to promote agility, reduce inertia and improve 
responsiveness or evolutionary fitness. 
Such a strategy however requires adequate (often large) financial 
resources, the persistent attention of the top management and capabilities to 
integrate the new organisations into the existing systems (Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001). Helfat et al. (2007) suggest that gains from acquisitions can only 
be appropriated by firms that possess the resources and capabilities to allow them 
to exploit the acquired assets. Therefore, in addition to the three factors above 
firms have to have the capability to generate `unique' knowledge from the 
acquired and existing knowledge to create new competitive advantage. 
The firm has certainly built these capabilities over time. Learning from the 
evolution of Ten Cate, it is evident that acquisitions are not necessarily 
detrimental to the performance of the firms involved as it has been widely 
believed (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). Although it is true that Ten Cate had to 
sell a number of its acquired firms, it was undertaken to maintain its evolutionary 
fitness. In other words, divestment of businesses that were no longer in line with 
its new direction or losing their competitive advantage due to market saturation is 
one of the firm's strategic actions. In fact, acquisitions and divestments provided 
the firm with an organisational dynamic capability, that is, divestment-based 
capabilities to help the implementation of fix it-exit strategy. This capability has 
rarely been discussed in the literature of dynamic capabilities. 
Management of Innovation 
In Ten Cate, the implementation of the above strategies is guided by the 
value chain management business model. The business model is developed to 
provide general guidance for all departments on the manner in which businesses 
should be run (Figure 6-4). The business model comprises of four cornerstones 
and the linkages among them. Innovation is the core value of the firm which has 
been built up since the 1970s. It is undertaken to fulfil latent needs of current and 
potential costumers through product differentiation or specialities, as well as to 
improve the efficiency of the production process (cost reduction). 
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Partnerships in new developments and 
L End user marketing applications Innovation 
Market Technology 
External Value chain management Internal 
Product Process 
- Two-track stategy 
Differentiation Cost leader 
Figure 6-4. Value chain management 
Source: Annual Report, 2008 
This two-track strategy is in fact the implementation of product life cycle 
management. Ten Cate is aware that emerging textile producing countries, 
particularly China and India, have the ability to catch up with the performance of 
the Western manufacturers in high-technology textiles, with an advantage of 
significantly lower costs. The availability of the latest technologies in the market, 
the mobility of human resources and China's rapid-growing economy 
complemented with lower labour costs are amongst the factors that can contribute 
to the rapid catch-up. As a response, firms in developed countries have to 
continuously create new knowledge to provide better solutions for existing and 
new problems. Such a condition puts greater pressures on the product life cycle 
which has shortened rapidly in recent years. Consequently, the time available to 
sell new products and recover new investments has shrunk considerably. 
Under such circumstances, Ten Cate has to possess cutting edge technical 
capacities, a diverse knowledge-base and the capabilities to foresee the trend in 
technology and the requirements of the end users ahead of its competitors. To 
shorten the development process the firm develops new specifications together 
with its customers. In many cases, the firm proactively develops new 
specifications and persuades the end customers in the value chain (not only their 
immediate customers) to adopt the new solutions. Such a proactive new product 
development strategy is referred to `specification selling'. This practice brings 
about new relationships between suppliers and customers beyond the traditional 
practice. This new relationship requires suppliers to have the capability to read the 
future needs of the end users rather than only concern itself with the requirements 
of their immediate customers. Specification selling is claimed to be one of the 
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unique capabilities of the firm that helps them to shape (rather than imitate) the 
future development of the relevant markets. It is argued that it demonstrates its 
entrepreneurial capability. 
Meanwhile, the firm has learned from its previous experience that market 
maturity is inevitable; therefore to maintain leadership in maturing markets the 
firm implements a cost leadership strategy. Cost leadership can be achieved 
through lean production, distribution, marketing and administration or by the 
transfer of production facilities to lower cost countries. For instance, the market 
for outdoor fabrics in Europe and US has become saturated in recent years which 
forced the firm to implement a cost-leadership strategy. Due to the growth of the 
Asian markets, the cost-leadership strategy was implemented through the 
relocation of production to China. It helps the firm to work on tighter margins and 
benefits from economies of scale. The remaining assets in Europe are used to 
pursue the development of military markets (military tents and uniforms) where 
competition is based on product performance. This shows that the firm possesses 
a certain level of flexibility to allow the transfer or reuse of resources for different 


















Ear Z ý y--1 t 
Qc r 
o y OO 
2- 2 
c 






































































Chapter 6- Royal Ten Cate: De-maturity and Radical Change 
In addition to innovations which results in the configuration of resource-base, 
Ten Cate believes that investment in human resources is equally crucial to maintain 
long-term competitiveness. The firm has a programme called the People Programme 
aimed to strengthen the corporate culture that promotes openness to new ideas, 
flexibility and a proactive attitude towards change. One of the programmes, Active 
Programme, was developed to strengthen innovative capabilities, entrepreneurship 
and management's focus on mutual cooperation. One of the objectives is to initiate 
synergies and interactions between managers in different businesses. The 
programme focuses on generating viable businesses and is regarded as a `seedbed'. 
The programme gets managers (with an MBA degree) from different subsidiaries to 
work together to generate new businesses. The ideas have to be supported by at least 
one of the existing operating firms who examines whether the ideas are worth 
pursuing. The group has to present to three members of senior management who will 
decide the necessary resources to be invested to take the ideas forward. Thus, the 
investment in human resources also encourages new applications of the existing 
technology portfolio, synergies and new business development. 
6.2.2 The Evolution of Competencies 
It has been discussed that the firm has experienced four strategic redirections, 
bypassed the maturity-trap and initiated the process of de-maturity. Furthermore, the 
firm has developed processes to undertake continuous change to improve its 
evolutionary fitness. Such a strategic change requires continuous modification and 
reconfiguration of the resource base to provide the firm with a sufficient knowledge- 
base and resources to move away from its established technological and market 
paradigm. It has been argued that this can be achieved by broadening the resource- 
base of the firm by means of external knowledge acquisition, R&D, and divestment 
and that the firm has to possess strategic dynamic capabilities to orchestrate such a 
transformation. 
This section explains the implications of a broadened resource-base to the 
evolution of the competence of the firm. In particular, it examines the strategy and 
process of acquisition, assimilation and combination of knowledge to generate new 
knowledge and the impact of such processes on the transition of the firm's 
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technology and competence. The emphasis is on the evolution of the business groups 
that have major roles in driving the transition towards high-performance textiles 
(advanced composites, geotextiles and geosynthetics, protective fabrics, artificial 
grass and digital inkjet printing). 
It has been identified that the adoption of new materials technologies has 
been the major driver in the evolution of its competence. The firm has continuously 
adopted and developed materials with distinctive characteristics and added values as 
a means to create a competitive advantage in all markets it is active in. This has 
broadened the diversity of its knowledge-base and market and product portfolio. It is 
revealed that the foundation of its newly acquired competence in materials 
development was developed from its traditional competence in the manufacture of 
traditional textiles. The traditional competence has been radically enhanced and 
combined with different technological domains to generate the new competence. 
Traditional Textiles 
Ten Cate's first business was linen fabric trading after which it expanded to 
the manufacture of cotton fabrics in 1841 by means of an acquisition. Following the 
merger with KSW of Nijverdal in 1957 the firm diversified its business into several 
different markets including fabrics for fashion and household markets. However, as 
the firm's competitiveness in the various markets started to decline in the 1980s and 
the business was finally abandoned in the 1990s. 
Advanced Composites 
With the firm's traditional business was on the verge of decline, an 
opportunity appeared in 1961 to take a ten percent stake 
in Pierre Genin & Cie, a 
French woven glass producer. Interestingly, the opportunity arrived not as a result of 
a deliberate attempt at diversification but came about by accident as the firm was 
invited by one of its partners, JP Stevens, who planned to broaden its business into 
fire resistant fabrics made of glass fibres for the European market. Although Ten 
Cate had no knowledge of the corresponding technology and business, its reputation 
as the largest textile firm in the Netherlands earned the trust from its partner. This 
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was the firm's first alliance in the field that was not related to its traditional core 
business. 
For Ten Cate, a participation as one of the shareholders in a firm whose 
competence is very different from its traditional competence may be the most 
efficient approach to make rapid entry into a new market. By 1963 Ten Cate had set 
up a number of looms in place for the production of cloths made of glass fibre, 
targeting curtain and non-flammable fabrics as the initial markets. Access to fibre- 
glass technology enabled the firm to appreciate the different markets of the 
technology. It was granted a license to produce windsurfing boards made of fibre- 
glass reinforced composites in 1973. By 1980 the firm had established itself as a 
leading producer of windsurfing boards. 
The new access to this new market and technological knowledge was 
proactively used by Ten Cate to learn and build up capabilities in composites. In 
1974, Ten Cate licensed the processing method for pre-impregnated materials made 
of resin-impregnated polyacril with an intention to replace the maturing fibreglass. 
However, due to the high production costs, the resulting products only made modest 
sales. The firm attempted to develop different materials with carbon fibre 
reinforcement which resulted in its first breakthrough composite technology to 
replace polyacryl in 1979. The new materials were lightweight and stronger and 
were cost efficient (one-twentieth of that of pre-impregnated polyacryl). The new 
materials also helped the firm to seize new opportunities in sports equipment, aircraft 
and the automotive sector. The competition in glass-fibre reinforced polymers that 
had long been subject to price-based competition forced the firm to gradually shift to 
composite fabrics made of various materials, notably carbon and aramid fibre- 
reinforced polymers. As the share of glass fibres in the firm's products decreased 
significantly the Ten Cate Glass business unit was changed to Ten Cate Advanced 
Composite in 1989. 
This new capability in composite materials, particularly in thermoplastic 
composites initially obtained from licensing windsurfing boards in 1973, allowed the 
firm to develop the basic technology for Cetex® -thermoplastic reinforced 
laminates- in the 1980s, in cooperation with Delft University. Standard Cetex® 
products which feature polyetherimide (PEI) or polyphenylene sulphide (PPS) 
matrix with various reinforcements such as fibreglass, carbon or aramid allow the 
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firm to customise solutions for a range of customers. Thermoplastic composite 
materials used in Cetex® was a breakthrough technology offering lower cost 
solutions for noise reducing materials than the established thermosetting composites 
for aircraft applications. It changed the technological paradigm in the market as 
thermoplastics can produce one panel, non-splice acoustic liner for airplanes' engine 
air-intakes so that the airplanes can have a very low noise profile. The traditional 
technology used two to three panels which caused acoustic disturbance due to the 
spliced joints between the panels. 
The first application of Cetex® in the aircraft market was developed together 
with Stork Fokker and Airbus for the Airbus 340. The technology fit in with the 
aviation industry's requirements because of its lightness, mouldability, rigidity and 
lower production cost. The Boeing 787 and the Airbus A380 use thousands of 
components made of Cetex® technology8. The same composite materials can be 
used in different applications that include high-quality sports equipment such as the 
super-light frames for sports bikes and golf clubs, and medical equipment including 
extremely robust orthopaedic prostheses and orthoses. It shows that adoption of new 
materials into the existing systems fostered the development of new competencies by 
which it diversifies beyond its current markets and technologies. 
The firm's knowledge in thermoplastic composites was further developed to 
provide solutions in the armour market. Although the demand for armour in the 
1990s was in decline following the end of the Cold War in 1991 (see section 3.5 of 
Chapter 3) Ten Cate foresaw the market would increase in the future9. It established 
a new business, Ten Cate Armour, to produce body armour made of thermoplastic 
composites. A number of acquisitions have been made since the late 1990s, all of 
which were directed at leveraging its knowledge and technological portfolio and 
pursuing market diversification. In 1998, for instance, Ten Cate acquired 68 per cent 
of Ares Protection of France, a producer of antiballistic composites. Ares 
manufactures personnel and armoured vehicle protection and holds the 
8 There are roughly 1500 different part numbers made of Cetex PEI or PPS composite on an Airbus 
aircraft. This number is expected to grow significantly with the Boeing 787 and Airbus 380 as aircraft 
firms demand for more thermoplastic composite parts. 
9 As discussed in Chapter 3, Courtaulds closed down its activities in carbon fibres and composites 
including its business in the army market. Interestingly, Ten Cate just entered the market in the early 
1990s. While Courtaulds disappeared after it was acquired by AkzoNobel, Ten Cate has emerged as 
one of the leading suppliers in composites for armour. 
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manufacturing rights of the Liba patent, an Israeli technology for a new generation 
of antiballistic materials made of ceramic-polyurethane materials. Furthermore, to 
secure its operations in the US, Ten Cate acquired 100 per cent of Bryte Technology, 
an advanced composite maker for aerospace and electronics industries in 1999. The 
acquisitions were motivated by the transfer of ownership of the patent portfolio and 
know-how of the acquired firms rather than the market expansion because both firms 
are research-led organisations whose sizes are relatively small with individual sales 
of £1 OM annually. 
Ten Cate proved to be accurate in its prediction about the future market for 
armour. Following the terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001 there was a surge in 
demand in this market. The firm aggressively implemented its buy-and-build 
strategy to rapidly foster the development of new solutions and gain technological 
leadership. For instance, Ten Cate acquired a Danish firm, Roshield, which is a 
leading provider of tailor-made antiballistic vehicle protection and personal armour 
in 2007. Roshield specialises in the design and management of armour upgrading 
programmes. Ten Cate also acquired a US firm, Composix, in 2008 to broaden its 
technology portfolio in the advanced armour solutions made of fibre-reinforced 
composites and ceramics for military personnel and vehicle protection including 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protection (MRAP) for armoured personnel carriers, 
aircrafts, ships and tactical vehicles. Its capability in developing innovative products 
and in prototyping and designing production processes has received recognition from 
the US Government as one of their partners in armour development. This helps the 
reinforcement of Ten Cate's market position in the US. 
Ten Cate established collaboration with DSM to develop vehicle armour 
products made of the combination of TenCate's ceramic strike face and Dyneema®. 
The new product has been used by the Dutch military forces in Afghanistan since 
October 2009. 
Ten Cate has been expanding the market of its composite business outside 
the aircraft and military fields. Other growing markets such as aerospace, satellite 
communications and oil and gas are deemed to be attractive. Therefore, the firm 
acquired a US firm, Phoenixx TPC, a technology 
leader in unidirectional 
thermoplastic composites (UD) for aerospace, oil and gas exploration in 2007 and 
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two US based firms, YLA and CCS Composite, in February 2008. These firms 
manufacture thermosetting advanced composite materials for various markets. 
The evolution of Ten Cate's composite business clearly shows that the firm 
has been able to modify its composite technology portfolio to enable it to developed 
tailored products for different needs. The firm has moved up the value chain from 
manufacturing cotton textiles to developing advanced materials for high performance 
products. This evolution has been driven by its innovative capabilities to adopt new 
knowledge through different routes (primarily acquisitions) and by its 
entrepreneurial capabilities to read the future development. As active acquisitions 
and divestments must have caused organisational turbulence its success shows that it 
has developed capabilities to manage integration of external organisations and the 
disposal of its uncompetitive businesses. 
Geotextiles and Geosynthetics 
Coastal protection is critical and remains so for the Netherlands given that a 
significant proportion of the country is below sea level. A disastrous flood which hit 
the country in 1953 boosted the market for coastal protection. One of the firms 
which has been successful in developing new products for this market is Nicolon. 
Together with AKU, a Dutch chemical firm, the firm developed polyamide-based 
sand bags for bank protection in 1957. It is reported that it was the first application 
of synthetic polymers in the field (John, 1987). Ten Cate purchased Nicolon in 
response to an invitation for an acquisition from Van Heek, Nicolon's major 
shareholder, in 1969 (but the transfer process was not finalised until 1974) following 
the firm's financial difficulties that has led it to go bankrupt. 
Under the management of Ten Cate, development focused on the creation of 
stronger, more advanced industrial textiles, particularly tough industrial textiles used 
to reinforce and retain dike soils. Geotextile tubes made of thermoplastic polymers - 
coated polyethylene and polypropylene- were developed as a replacement for 
polyamide due to the latter's low resistance to biological substances and chemicalslo 
and its tendency to lose its strength (up to 30 per cent) on swelling in the aqueous 
medium (Lebedev, 1992). In 1980 Ten Cate-Nicolon expanded their business to the 
'o Materials with high level chemical resistance is necessary as geotextiles are often used for 
construction roads where the soils contains a pH of 5 or less 
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US market. In 1986, Nicolon Corporation, the US arm of Ten Cate Nicolon acquired 
Bradley Materials which boosted their presence in the US geosynthetic markets in 
civil engineering. In 1991, the firm acquired a US based firm, Mirafi, a producer of 
polypropylene-based materials used in roadbeds and drainage systems. The US has 
become the firm's largest geosynthetic market. The market in the US, however, has 
become saturated over the past few years. As a result, the firm has had to relocate a 
certain amount of production capacity to China which started its operations in 2008. 
Meanwhile, the existing plants in America and Europe are being modified to produce 
less cost-sensitive products for military markets. 
To expand its geographical market, product and technology portfolio in 
geosynthetics, Ten Cate acquired Polyfelt, an Austrian firm, the market leader in the 
field in 2005. Polyfelt develops and produces natural geotextiles and geosynthetics 
such as tarpaulins and foils to stabilise supports for roads, railways and dams and has 
been a partner of Ten Cate since 1999. Polyfelt has production sites in Austria, 
France, Malaysia and Australia. As a result of this takeover, Ten Cate has become a 
leading global player in the geosynthetic market. 
The evolution of competence in the field shows a resemblance to that of 
composite materials. Akin to the initial process of new path creation in glass fibre 
technology, the acquisition of Nicolon was not motivated by Ten Cate's prior 
knowledge and resources, but rather, by an opportunity to acquire a potential 
business at an affordable price. Similar to its composite business, further 
development of the geotextile and geosynthetic business was advanced through a 
combination of acquisitions and internal R&D aimed at broadening its technology 
portfolio and reinforcing market position. Ten Cate has been modifying its resource 
base through the creation or acquisition of new resources that enables it to tap into 
growing markets whilst reconfiguring the existing resources through divestment, the 
relocation of production and the modification of assets. The capability helps the firm 
to maintain its evolutionary fitness. 
Protective Fabrics 
Ten Cate Over-All Fabrics, a denim workwear division originally built in 
conjunction with JP Stevens, has evolved and 
is now known as Ten Cate Protective 
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Fabrics. The firm's earliest involvement in protective fabrics was through Ten Cate 
Glass which produced fire resistant fabrics made of fibreglass. However, as 
fibreglass has become very mature, the firm had to seek a substitute technology. The 
firm was intrigued by the superior performance of Nomex®, a high performance 
fibre produced by DuPont used in a heat and flame retardant racing suit worn by 
Niki Lauda (the former Formula 1 driver). The racing suit saved the driver from fatal 
injuries due to fire during practice in 1976. In 1978, Ten Cate Over-All Fabrics 
pioneered the adoption of Nomex® in Europe. 
Despite the high production cost, Nomex® found niche markets for high- 
performance protective clothing because of its superior properties. The firm added 
Proban® (Rhodia), PBI (PBI Performance Products) and Kevlar® (DuPont) into 
their protective fabrics. By 1985, the firm was able to introduce its own 
PBI Kevlar® outer shell called KOMBATTM. In the same year they developed a 
quilted aramid thermal barrier for the Fire Service for the first time before entering 
the airline seat market in the following year. The developments in this new field led 
to the closure of Ten Cate Over-All Fabric division in 1988 and the end of the glass 
fibre production in 1989. All the assets were then transferred to Ten Cate Protective 
Fabrics. 
Following the reorganisation of the division, Ten Cate focused on developing 
a series of different products for heat resistant and fireproof fabric markets made of 
different fibres. In 1992, they introduced ADVANCETM, the first 
NOMEX®/Kevlar® outer shell, and in 1997, launched COMFORTBLENDTM, the 
first Nomex®/Lenzing FRTM fabrics. In 1999, they introduced MILLENIATM, 
Zylon® blended outer shell. Active product development derived from the 
combination of different fibres and finishing techniques allowed the firm to 
customise the products for a range of different customers. 
To strengthen their technological and market position, Ten Cate developed 
collaboration with Southern Mills, the leading supplier of heat resistant and fireproof 
fabrics in the USA in 1996. The firm was acquired by Ten Cate because of financial 
difficulties dating back to 2004. Currently, Ten Cate is now one of the largest 
suppliers of flame resistant fabrics for US military uniforms. 
In contrast to the initial development of Ten Cate Advanced Composites and 
Geotextiles, the Protective Fabrics business was created through a deliberate search 
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to tap into emerging opportunities in fire resistant fabrics. It was helped by its 
previous knowledge in fibreglass fire proof fabrics as the basis to appreciate other 
opportunities in the adjacent market and encouraged investment. The development of 
this business is greatly driven by new opportunities which emerged as a consequence 
of the advancement of high-performance fibres. Ten Cate licensed the technologies 
and built its own production facility to facilitate learning. 
Contrary to the evolution of competence in composite materials and 
geotextiles, the protective clothing has been developed primarily through internal 
R&D rather than by external acquisition. It is probably due to the domination of a 
few large fines in the technology market, notably DuPont, which made technological 
competition in the field limited. In other words, other firms in the field use similar 
technologies. Therefore, Ten Cate developed its own products derived from a 
combination of technologies from different sources -or cospecialisation- as soon as 
the necessary resource base was in place. This allows the firm to position itself 
distinctly from large competitors. 
As discussed earlier, cospecialisation relates to a combination of technologies 
to create a new or significantly enhanced product value. As Ten Cate did not conduct 
basic research, cospecialisation appears to be critical to create unique solutions for 
their customers. Such a capability proved to be vital to turnaround Southern Mills 
from being a bankrupt firm into a profitable business. Under the direct supervision of 
Ten Cate, Southern Mills combined technologies within Ten Cate's technology 
portfolio to develop `Defender M', its latest 
innovation in flame protective military 
combat uniforms. The product is the result of the combination of antiballistic 
composite technology (Ares), fibre-reinforced composites and ceramics technology 
(Composix) and heat resistant and fire proof fabric technology from Southern Mills. 
Such a novel combination not only enables protection from heat and fire but also 
from bullets without the requirement for any additional layers. It is in fact a unique 
new solution in the market which attracted the US Army. Such a strategic 
deployment and utilisation of resources was masterminded by the chairman, Mr. de 
Vries, which illustrates the importance of top management's capabilities in creating 
synergies among its asset portfolio to 
fulfil latent demand (Helfat, et al., 2007). This 
capability is described by Teece (2007) as 
fundamentally entrepreneurial and is 
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critical to create a new playing field in a fast changing environment and improve the 
evolutionary fitness. (Teece, 2007) 
Artificial Grass 
In 1969 Thiokol Coorporation, a US-based carpet backing firm, was looking 
for a partner in Europe to develop and sell polypropylene-based carpet backings to 
replace those made of natural fibre jute. Shell, the supplier of polypropylene for 
Thiokol, named Ten Cate as a possible candidate. The firm's experience with the 
acquisition of Nicolon through which the firm successfully generated new growth 
encouraged it to accept the invitation for collaboration with Thiokol. This 
collaboration shows that reputation once again played an important role in the 
selection of partners. Ten Cate's lack of critical technological knowledge of the 
field, that is, processing technology to transform polypropylene pellets into yams 
through blown extrusion, did not hinder the collaboration. 
An attempt to obtain government research funding was turned down in 1970, 
despite the fact that it was a pioneering research project in the Netherlands with 
immense opportunities. The firm arranged the necessary resources independently to 
set up Thikolon-Ten Cate in 1971. The investment turned out to be strategically 
crucial as the business became the largest contributor to the firm's annual revenues 
in the early 1970s. The joint venture was acquired and became a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Ten Cate in 1977. 
Meanwhile, Thiokol Chemical in Nijverdal was seeking to develop 
polypropylene-based artificial grass in 1975. Artificial grass is a complementary 
component for carpet backing as, together, they can significantly enhance the value 
of each product. The performance requirements in this market were complex, 
including dyeability, stability of the materials, against heat and ultraviolet lights, 
strong bonds for the backings, an effective drainage system and function in wet and 
dry environments. The established technology (asphalt) could not deliver on these 
requirements while polypropylene showed promising properties. It required five 
years of development, however, before the 
firm finally constructed artificial grass - 
Thiolon®. 
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However, artificial grass was not Ten Cate's core business until the 2000s 
when it made several acquisitions to tap into the growth in demand. Ten Cate 
Thiolon acquired Nymplex, an extrusion firm with expertise in co-extrusion 
polymers, and a US based Polyloom Corp, the pioneer of polypropylene fibrillated 
yarn for synthetic turf and indoor-outdoor carpeting in 2000 and 2001, respectively. 
The acquisition helped Ten Cate to gain the necessary technologies to compete in 
this market, particularly in the US, as the market shifted away from polyamide-based 
to polypropylene-based. Polypropylene allowed a broader range of applications of 
synthetic turf as the technology offers better performance to fulfil the needs of more 
demanding customers. 
The market for artificial grass has continued to grow in recent years. In 2007, 
the global market was ¬1.25 billion, growing at 20 per cent per year (www. 
amiplastic. com). Ten Cate's market share was around 20 per cent. The new 
regulation introduced by the European Football Association's (UEFA) which 
permitted football matches being played on artificial grass for the first time in 2005 
boosted Ten Cate's grass business. In addition to R&D, Ten Cate continues to apply 
their buy and build strategy to accelerate the acquisition of technology and expand 
into different markets. In 2007 the firm acquired Mattex Leisure Industry based in 
Dubai. This acquisition allowed market expansion into low cost, large volume 
artificial grass markets such as home lawns and gardens. These markets complement 
their existing customised, higher value added artificial grass markets such as football 
pitches and golf courses which are served by the production in Europe and USA. To 
ensure comprehensive solutions for a variety of markets, Ten Cate broadened its 
patent portfolio by acquiring a Dutch firm, Edel Grass Synthetic Turf System which 
was its former partner in an artificial multi-turf research project in the EU Research 
Framework programme 6 in 2005. 
Demand in this market varies considerably as it is determined by a number of 
factors including the type of market (lawn, sports, parks) and weather conditions. 
The lawn market prefers durability rather than playing characteristics while for 
sports the latter is of a greater importance. Even within the sports market, different 
parameters of playing characteristics (ball roll, sliding 
friendliness and rotational 
friction) of each sport require different performance characteristics of synthetic 
grass. As the overall performance is particularly 
determined by the components used, 
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Ten Cate has broadened its technology portfolio through acquisition and internal 
development to serve different demand characteristics. In the sports market, the firm 
currently provides synthetic turfs for football, tennis, hockey, golf, American 
football and multisport pitches. 
To complement the acquisition of technology, Ten Cate teamed up with two 
leading synthetic turf marketing firms, GreenFields and FieldTurf Tarkett, to market 
the latest generation of synthetic turfs. GreenFields is a critical partner because of its 
extensive markets in football pitches, being appointed as the principal contractor for 
a number of large future projects, including the 2010 World Cup in South Africa by 
The Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). In addition to this 
market expansion, the collaboration enhances Ten Cate's present patent position in 
the field as the firm has also acquired the patents of GreenFields. 
The carpet backing business, akin to the glass fibre and geotextile businesses, 
was initiated as a result of a forward looking management and its entrepreneurial 
capability to seize new opportunities. The firm was encouraged by its expectation of 
the future opportunities and the rewards for being the pioneer in the market and 
being an early adopter in Europe. This encouraged the management to take a risk 
and build the capability in polypropylene-based carpet backings without government 
backing. 
The move into the synthetic turf showed the firm's intention to enhance the 
value of their carpet backing business by integrating a cospecialised asset (synthetic 
turfs) into the carpet backings. Since the firm has built the capability in the 
polypropylene processing technology from their activities in carpet backings and 
geosynthetics, selecting polypropylene as the basic materials to make synthetic turf 
allows the firm to align their resources, gain the advantages from increasing returns 
and reduce time to market. Later on, polypropylene was used in a wide range of 
products including plastic containers and composites, thus leveraging further the 
application of polypropylene. According to Teece (2007) and Helfat, et al. (2007), 
making interrelated investments in intangible assets and utilising the same 
technology for different products and markets is a critical dynamic capability. It will 
improve the efficiency of production systems that can have a significant effect on 
cost savings. 
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Plastics-Based Technical Components 
There were two reasons that encouraged Ten Cate to enter the plastic 
packaging market although it was not related to its established competence in textile 
technology. The first was the plastic packaging boom affected by progress in 
logistical systems, global trade and the growth of the supermarkets in the early 1980s 
in which products were packaged in small plastic containers. The second was the 
opportunity to reinforce its plastic processing capability which up to 1977 was 
limited to rotation moulding to produce polyethylene windsurfing boards. Following 
several years of employing rotation moulding, the firm discovered that the method 
was suitable to produce smaller articles that were then made of aluminium such as 
fuel containers, sea buoys and toilet cubicles. For such products, the replacement of 
aluminium with plastics offered superior advantages which included durability and 
were maintenance-free. In 1985 Ten Cate Rotomoulding was established to serve 
these markets. 
In 1978 Shell was seeking partners to develop a replacement for expensive 
lubricant cans. The performance requirements were very demanding which included 
being chemically inert, resistant to changing temperatures and stackable. Although 
the selected materials, polypropylene, was in Ten Cate's favour (they had the 
capabilities in the polypropylene processing technology for carpet backing and 
geotextiles), the production technique which involved blown extrusion, a difficult 
technique that needed considerable time for trial and error to determine the amount 
of air required for the extrusion, was beyond the firm's technical capacity. After two 
years of developing a capability in blown extrusion, Ten Cate approached Shell to 
offer collaboration in a joint venture named TtC Moulding. 
In 1983 Ten Cate acquired Plasticum, a struggling injection moulding firm 
who manufactured aerosol packaging, caps and closures. The acquisition thus 
leveraged the firm technology portfolio in plastic processing technology for small 
items (rotation moulding, blown extrusion and injection moulding) which allowed 
them to diversify their range of products in a number of different market segments. 
Throughout 1990s Ten Cate implemented an aggressive expansion strategy. 
As a result, plastics represented 80 per cent of the group's sales in 1994. However, 
the wave of production off shoring to the Far East and China for consumer products 
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coupled by the economic slowdown after the September 2001 terrorist attack forced 
Ten Cate to scale down their operations in consumer products. The firm shifted its 
plastic production to more specialized areas such as specialised rollers for printers 
and photo-copiers (Ten Cate Enbi), and self-adhesive and heat seal base materials for 
labels and label materials (Multistiq). Nevertheless, since the attempt was not 
sufficient to keep the operation in Europe and the US, Ten Cate transferred the 
production facilities of Ten Cate Enbi to Mexico, Hungary and the Far East in 2000 
followed by closures of operations in the Netherlands, USA, UK, Switzerland and 
France. Furthermore, Ten Cate dismantled their plastic business, which began with 
selling TC Moulding UK and NL in 1998 and 1999, respectively, and subsequently 
Plasticum US and France in 2001 before the final divestment of the Ten Cate 
Plasticum group as a whole in 2006 for E20 M. The firm divested Mega Valves 
group in 2005 followed by Synbra in 2006. Ten Cate Enbi is the only business 
remaining in the technical component business. 
The plastic business demonstrates three stages of the evolutionary process 
throughout its course, each of which is characterised by different dynamic 
capabilities. The first stage was capability building characterised by distant search 
and learning by doing. The search to replace aluminium products showed the role of 
prior knowledge in plastic rotation moulding in the creation of the new business. 
Thus, the concept of absorptive capacity is indeed applicable in this case. The 
subsequent development of the capability was built through the combination of a 
joint venture, acquisition and internal R&D from which a portfolio of technological 
capability was built. The next stage was expansion, extension of production capacity 
and differentiation to adjacent markets by means of establishing foreign subsidiaries, 
the purchase of high capacity machinery and developing specialised products. The 
third stage was divesting uncompetitive businesses after attempts to diversify into 
specialised markets such as printer rollers, self-adhesive labels, drugstore products 
and the health sector could not prevent market maturity. Increased pressures on 
margins forced the firm to relocate production to Asia and closed 
down operations in 
the developed countries (cost reduction), before divesting the entire plastic 
packaging and other technical component 
businesses. 
The evolutionary path provides us with an element of dynamic capabilities 
that has rarely been discussed in the literature on the dynamic capabilities of firms, 
209 
Chapter 6- De-maturity and Radical Change: Royal Ten Cate 
that is, divestment-based dynamic capabilities. These capabilities encompass the 
ability to sense changing technology and market that will affect the maturity of 
existing businesses, reorganise the resource base (including relocation) to improve 
the firm's performances, separate the business from the current structures, and sell it 
at a reasonable, if not a profitable, price. 
The divestment of the plastic packaging and technical component businesses 
was largely influenced by an increase pressure in competition. It appears that the 
firm's unique capability in combining resources to enhance value and create unique 
solutions (for example, composite technology and protective fabrics for Defender M, 
or carpet backings and synthetic turf) did not fit in with its plastic component 
business. It assumed that its markets (packaging for consumer products) and 
technologies (injection moulding, rotation moulding and blown extrusion) were not 
complementary to other business units, all of which were textile-based. 
Consequently, as the firm redefined its strategic growth areas where synergies 
among the technology portfolios were central to the decision, the divestment of the 
plastic business in 2005 seemed to be a rational solution. This ended the firm's 
activity in mass-produced consumer products. 
Industrial Inkjet Printing 
Ten Cate believes that functional/multi-functional textiles derived from the 
exploitation of nanotechnology in surface treatment will be one of the key 
technologies in the future of textile technology. Unlike the majority of textile firms 
that use coating or dispersions to incorporate nanomaterials onto fibres or fabrics to 
impart functionalities into textiles, Ten Cate uses inkjet printing. The firm began 
their research in the field in the late 1990s which culminated in eight patents filed in 
2004-2005. The underlying technology is the method to continuously deposit 
droplets of functional finishing agent on fabric surfaces using continuous inkjet 
techniques. A patent related to the composition of finishing materials specifically 
developed for this purpose has also been filed. Some examples of new technical 
possibilities potentially emanated 
from this technology include fabrics that can; 
change colour; fabrics with solar cells; and 
fabrics that function as sensors. The 
technology is developed to facilitate the creation and improvement of new 
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performance across business units, including advanced composites and synthetic 
grass. For instance, the potential synergy between inkjet printing technology and 
advanced composites proposed by Ten Cate for the future development of the 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) has been accepted by the consortium of the EU 
PPE road map development. It shows the strategic thinking of the top management 
orchestrating resource deployment to create and enhance values of the individual 
technology, or, the managerial dynamic capabilities (Helfat, et al., 2007). 
In addition to the variety of functions the technology can impart into fabrics, 
the method is claimed to be superior compared to the traditional methods in terms of 
performance quality, flexibility, efficiency and environmental benefits. This 
technology would enable more even and precise quantities of the materials to be 
deployed on fabrics, more accurate arrangements according to design specifications 
(patterned deposition of substances), simultaneous deployment of different 
functional materials in one production run, and production of small quantities 
without additional costs (mass-customisation). As a result, considerable timesaving 
could be achieved, coupled with a major reduction in waste and the elimination of 
water consumption. The technology is expected to offer advantages in the future 
which involve water and energy savings in the order of 70 per cent to 90 per cent and 
a reduction in the use of chemicals by approximately 60 per cent. Therefore, if such 
a performance could be realised, the technology would be the firm's future platform 
in surface functionalisation. 
Following its involvement in the Digitex, a research programme under the 
EU Research Framework 6 in 2004, Ten Cate acquired 75 per cent of the share of 
British firm, Xennia Technology which was one of the partners in the programme, 
who owned the proprietary technologies for the development of inks/coating fluids 
and the related steering technology (software). The rest of the shares are owned by 
UK based firm Xaar, a specialist in inkjet printheads (nozzles) which is a 
complementary technology for the inkjet technology. The synergy between Ten Cate 
and Xennia is that Ten Cate can use Xenia's technology to co-develop new ink jet 
technology for functional textile applications, the domain that Xenia lacks. 
Therefore, the combined expertise of the two firms enables the generation of 
potentially critical knowledge and technology 
in the textile finishing sector. 
211 
Chapter 6- De-maturity and Radical Change: Royal Ten Cate 
Figure 6-6 shows the timeline of transitions in technology, product and 
market achieved in Ten Cate. Certainly, Ten Cate has transformed itself from a 
mature cotton fabric producing firm to a diversified high-technology textile firm 
through a lengthy process of reconfiguration of capability, technology and market. 
The case study shows that such a reconfiguration is a result of the creation of new 
capabilities and competencies in different fields involving generation, assimilation, 
cospecialisation and elimination of knowledge and know-how. Acquisitions appear 
to be the primary approach at least at the beginning of the process of de-maturity. As 
the necessary resource base is in place, the absorptive capacity of the firm increases 
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6.2.3 Drivers of Change 
The case study shows that the firm's ability to continuously change to adapt 
to changing business environments is the fundamental factor of its sustainability. 
From a cotton fabric manufacturer the firm has diversified broadly and moved up the 
value chain to produce high-performance products derived from R&D. In fact, the 
firm now positions itself as a developer of advanced materials for high-performance 
textiles. The continuous adoption of polymer and composite technology appears to 
be central for the development of the firm. This has fostered the creation of new 
competencies and the improvement of the existing competencies which have enabled 
the firm to diversify its products and markets. 
Its openness and ability to change are not the only factors to create and 
maintain competitiveness. Timing and strategy determine the result of change. In the 
majority of cases, Ten Cate entered new markets early, that is, during the early phase 
of commercialisation of the related technologies. Figure 6-7 above shows the 
sequence of market entries by Ten Cate against the introduction of the related 
technologies into the market. The first commercialisation of glass fibre was in 1956 
(see Figure 4-2) and Ten Cate already had started to commercialise the technology 
for the protective clothing market in 1963. Similarly, the firm started to build a 
competence in carbon fibre composites in the mid 1970s less than 10 years after the 
first commercialisation of the technology by Courtaulds, the leader in the carbon 
fibre market until 1990 (see section 3.5 in Chapter 3). Whilst Courtaulds closed its 
carbon fibre business, Ten Cate enjoyed new growth from its carbon composite 
products for military applications in the 2000s. 
The figure also demonstrates that the firm has accelerated its diversification 
process since entering the technical textile market. Its first new competence beyond 
the established traditional textile manufacturing was created when its 
competitiveness started to decline. The subsequent diversification started while its 
existing markets were still growing. The 
firm did not wait for its current market 
share to decline. Rather, it continuously creates new competencies and markets prior 
to the maturity of its established technology and market. It suggests the firm's ability 
to bypass the maturity-trap through the continuous creation of new competencies to 
generate new growth. 
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Interestingly, the method for the creation of new capabilities up to the early 
1980s was not the result of a deliberate plan to seize new markets. The new 
capabilities were also not built up based on its established knowledge as often 
suggested in the literature (e. g. Teece, et al., 1997, Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, 
Nelson and Winter, 1982, Helfat, et al., 2007). Instead, it was mostly driven by 
opportunistic decisions to acquire growing firms. Only after the 1980s did the firm 
start diversification programmes through a deliberate search (licensing and internal 
R&D) combined with acquisitions that led to the development of new competencies 
in composite materials, artificial grass, protective clothing, geosynthetics and 
functional digital printing. 
It appears that the firm built up its foundational knowledge through 
acquisitions prior to the 1980s up to the point where the necessary capacity and 
capability to conduct independent R&D was met. This is very apparent from the 
evolution of its competence in composite materials. Following a series of 
acquisitions and technological licenses the firm started to develop its own 
technologies built upon its previous knowledge from the acquired firms. From 
processing fibreglass, the firm adopted different thermoplastic composite 
technologies, ceramics and thermosetting and thermoplastic advanced composites. 
Its broad technology portfolio helps the firm to customise solutions for different 
customer requirements which in turn provide further diversification and development 
trajectories. 
The emergence of new markets such as armour and sports has also played an 
important role in the evolution of the firm's competence. Complemented with its 
acquisition capabilities, the firm rapidly modified its technology portfolio to fulfil 
the new demand in this market. Its early adoption of different armour technologies in 
the early 1990s has enabled it to be one of the leaders in the market when there was a 
surge of demand in 2001. The early adoption provided the firm with the foundational 
knowledge and know-how. Had the firm not actively broadened its technology 
portfolio early on, it would not have captured the emerging opportunities whose 
stringent performance requirements can only be 
fulfilled through a combination of a 
set of different technologies. Thus, cumulativeness of and 
diversity of knowledge 
and know-how have improved the firm's evolutionary 
fitness (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990) which helped the firm to seize opportunities ahead of its competitors. 
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Finally, the research suggests that fundamental changes have been driven by 
the entrepreneurial approach of one particular figure, that is, the CEO. It was 
reported that since his appointment in 1998 the process of reconfiguration and 
diversification of the firm's competencies has been accelerated. It is perhaps related 
to the firm's strategy in the development of new competencies. As acquisitions often 
involve a major financial commitment and are highly dependent on the tacit 
knowledge of the top-level management, routines for acquisitions are difficult to 
develop. Consequently, the dependency on top management is high. 
6.2.4 The Dynamic Capabilities of Ten Cate 
It is evident that Ten Cate has the capability to sustain its competitiveness 
over a substantial period through continuous change despite facing challenges from a 
changing external business environment. Arguably, the firm has developed dynamic 
capabilities that are fundamental to its sustainable competitiveness. Its dynamic 
capabilities appear to be developed through its solid experience with acquisitions, 
divestments and R&D. As discussed earlier the firm seems to emphasise acquisitions 
for strategic redirection -de-maturity- and not R&D. Given the organisational 
complexity related to acquisitions and external integration (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 
1987, Chatterjee, et al., 1992) it appears that the firm has overcome the problems. 
Such an experience has improved its flexibility and adaptive character to varying 
circumstances. 
There are four critical capabilities that have been identified that contribute to 
the effective implementation of de-maturity through acquisitions. First, is the 
entrepreneurial management that encourages risk taking to enter new, unrelated 
markets and to invest in new technologies that are away from its established 
knowledge. Such a path breaking change liberates firms from bounded rationality 
(Karim and Mitchell, 2000) or organisational rigidities (Vermeulen and Barkema, 
2001). It confirms Teece's (2007) and Helfat, et al. (2007) arguments that firms are 
shaped but not necessarily ̀ trapped' by its past and that new investment can change 
the course of direction. This fording suggests that the path-dependent aspect of 
absorptive capacity which argues that firms need prior related knowledge in order to 
recognise new opportunity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) seems to be weakly 
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supported, at least in this case. Without prior knowledge in fibreglass, geotextiles or 
synthetic turf, Ten Cate was able to build capabilities in the field through a minority 
ownership or acquisitions which allowed access to knowledge in the relevant 
technology and market, and encouraged learning. It appears that the entrepreneurial 
capabilities of the management, adequate financial resources and networks of 
business partners that enabled access to new resources and learning can compensate 
for the lack of prior knowledge. 
The second is the firm's capability in the selection of partners for 
acquisitions". For Ten Cate, one critical objective when it wants to select a partner 
is to broaden the firm's technology portfolio and market position. Therefore, 
synergies between the existing and targeted technologies and markets are critical 
factors that determine acquisitions. Prior to an acquisition, Ten Cate initiates 
collaboration, alliances or intensive contacts to explore the potential synergies 
between the two different firms. The acquisitions of Thiokol, Southern Mills, Mirafi 
and Xennia are examples. Furthermore, acquisitions should consider other strategic 
complementary knowledge in the context of technology as a system. As an 
illustration, one of the reasons Ten Cate acquired 75 per cent (rather than 100 per 
cent) of Xaar's ownership in Xennia is to keep the association with Xaar who owns a 
critical complementary technology and yet allow the firm to dictate the future 
development of the technology. This view, therefore, enhances the concept of the 
acquisition-based dynamic capabilities (Helfat, et al. 2007). 
The next factor is capability to implement synergies to enhance the value for 
customers or to create new markets. One illustration of this is the acquisition of 
Phoenixx and YLA which was motivated by the firm's desire to complement its 
thermoplastic composites with thermosetting composites for aerospace and oil and 
gas sectors. By appropriating a set of different technologies, the firm can customise 
solutions for broader customers within the market segments. In another instance, the 
acquisition of Ares and Composix broadens the firm's market base in the armour 
market as it allows the firm to enter both personnel (Ares) and vehicle (Composix) 
armour. In addition, the unidirectional thermoplastic composite of Phoenixx enables 
the creation of new products for Cetex® product lines as it permits the production of 
" The interview indicates that a number of factors including price, hidden value, geographical 
position, technology, people and competitors are taken 
into consideration in the partner selection. 
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lightweight thermoplastic composite fuselage 12. This new technology reinforces the 
market for Cetex® products in the aviation industry. Teece (2007) refers to this as 
cospecialised assets, that is, joint uses of different technologies to significantly 
enhance the value of products or create unique products. As the technology portfolio 
is historically dependent, cospecialisation can generate idiosyncratic assets from 
which unique products can be developed. The ability to select external technologies 
and combine them with internal technologies within a firm's portfolio by which the 
end product's value is significantly enhanced is an important dynamic capability. 
This kind of synergy also permits the efficient and effective use of resources which 
would have an impact on cost savings. 
It is important to note that synergies are not only a crucial factor in 
acquisitions but also in divestment. The divestment of the plastic packaging business 
is an example. Divestment-based capabilities are as equally important as acquisition- 
based capabilities in that it shows the leader's capabilities to achieve evolutionary 
fitness by disposing of uncompetitive businesses. This helps to reduce the firm's 
liabilities and transfer the resources to other growing areas. This capability needs 
firms to overcome barriers commonly impede sales of business assets that include 
sunk costs, resistance from the labour union and even sentimental reasons due to 
historical legacy (see Chapter 7 about the traditional leather business of 
Freudenberg). 
The fourth factor is the capability to manage organisational turbulence as a 
consequence of acquisitions. The literature contends that the difference in culture, 
management style and knowledge-base can have detrimental effects on acquisitions 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987, Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber, 1992). 
The firm's first shift to a decentralised structure in 1990 appears to have contributed 
significantly to its ability to manage the adverse effects of integration. The 
decentralised organisation is designed to have a rather horizontal structure (flat) 
comprises of networks of organisations -globally interconnected organisations and 
people- such that it is flexible and easily reorganised (changing, adding or removing 
firms or partners). Such an organisational form is strongly characterised by 
coordination rather than hierarchical control and places greater emphasis on 
'2 The body of an airplane, containing the cockpit, passenger seating, and cargo hold but excluding 
the wings 
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knowledge rather than scale and scope, and on human resources and self-organising 
than corporate planning and bureaucracy (Whittington and Mayer, 1997, as in 
Pettigrew and Fenton, 2000). Therefore, the acquired firms can maintain the 
necessary culture and management style which are deemed to be beneficial for their 
growth and yet have to develop routines for coordination. 
The implementation of the networked organisation however entails inherent 
challenges which may hinder performance improvements (Ruigrok, et al., 2000). 
The complexity of managing coordination of a large number of constituencies in a 
network is rather significant. Firms have to balance between coordination and 
autonomy, build up synergies among organisations or divisions (strategic 
coherence), and share innovative culture across organisations. Furthermore, the 
management of a networked organisation requires a new understanding on the role 
of cross-divisional management in which the management in one business has a role 
to provide opportunities for other organisations or divisions in the network. In Ten 
Cate, the role of top management is critical to encourage synergies and promote the 
corporate culture across the firm. For instance, the management has been able to 
create new synergies among different firms specialising in different technologies, 
located in different countries to develop new products and improve the performance 
of the firms involved (see for example the development of Defender M). 
Other critical capabilities required to successful acquisitions of knowledge or 
technology are those related to the availability of resources, the degree of 
complementarities and timing. The first two factors determine the means of 
acquisition (internal R&D, licensing, joint venture, alliances or firm acquisition), 
although one pathway (alliances) could lead to others (joint venture or acquisition). 
Timing, on the other hand, relates to the managerial dynamic capabilities in 
predicting the time needed for the development process, for the potential users to 
accept the new products and for the competitors to catch up the firm's progress. 
According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), timing is critical particularly for the 
technologies operating in fast moving fields because it could lead to two 
contradictory implications. Investing early on 
in an unproven technology, whilst 
offering the advantage as the first mover, entails the risk of financial loss if the 
technology never takes off and of missing the opportunities to gain advantages from 
other (competing) technologies. On the other 
hand, investing at a later stage of 
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technological development, whilst less risky, may deny the opportunity associated 
with the early exploitation of the technology. The competitors' advances in 
mastering the technology and their domination of the market can obstruct the 
opportunity for the late comers. Courtaulds' unsuccessful attempt in the 
commercialisation of synthetic fibres as discussed in Chapter 3 is a useful example. 
To manage the risk associated with the adoption of technologies Ten Cate 
now tends to invest in a number of emerging technologies and engage in a number of 
different strategic networks. This gives the firm access to different technologies that 
belong to other organisation without the obligation to invest heavily in each of them. 
In other words, the approach permits access to knowledge on a preferred basis. This 
is an attractive alternative particularly when costs and the complexity to manage 
diverse knowledge hinder innovation. Such a research strategy permits lower levels 
of risk, cost and complexity but it also requires shared profits and ownership. 
Consequently, R&D and business strategies need to be adapted to meet the challenge 
of the new paradigm. 
This new approach exhibits the open innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 
2006). In today's competitive environment firms have to collaborate and build 
alliances with, or license from other firms in order to have accesses to technologies 
generated from outside the firm. Helfat et al. (2007) suggested that network of 
alliances is a simpler and less-expensive method 
for acquiring external knowledge 
than acquisition. However the method is only applicable when the extent of the 
necessary contacts (similarities or synergies) allows them to work efficiently and 
effectively. In the case of greater points of contact are required, acquisition usually is 
more favourable. 
This new approach may create a new stream of dynamic capabilities that has 
never been discussed in the literature. The 
dynamic capabilities to manage successful 
alliances have to include the capability to manage 
interaction, transaction and 
transfer of knowledge from the network to the individual members. Governance 
associated with contractual, ownership and monitoring 
issues as well as trust and 
reputation are also critical. 
This section shows that dynamic capabilities evolve as a consequence of 
attempts to improve the 
firm's evolutionary fitness in a changing business 
environment. The capability 
links the firm's technological capabilities with 
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organisational capabilities. Organisational capabilities can be viewed as a measure to 
improve the impact of the firm's technological capabilities to its performance. 
Therefore, it is argued that the capability to adapt the organisational capabilities in 
accordance to the development of the firm and the future path it is pursuing is a 
unique and important dynamic capability as it will eventually enhance the 
evolutionary fitness of the firm 
6.2.5 Implications of De-maturity at the Firm Level 
It is evident that Ten Cate has by passed the maturity-trap and initiated the 
process of de-maturity. The firm has built up its dynamic capabilities through its 
solid experience with acquisitions, divestments and R&D. The firm started to 
diversify its knowledge-base and know-how in the 1960s during which its traditional 
business, traditional textile manufacturing, began to lose its competitive advantage. 
Interestingly, the foundation for the process of de-maturity was built through its 
tradition in acquisitions and learning from the acquired firms rather than R&D as 
suggested by Abernathy et al. (1983). It excels 
in screening the potential partners, 
price negotiation, firm integration, synergy 
building and divestment. The 
implementation of this capability has an impact on the radical change and increased 
diversity of the firm's resource-base. This is a behaviour which differentiates the 
firm from the majority of struggling firms in mature industries where more radical 
responses are often eschewed despite attempts to 
defend their mature businesses 
have failed (Abernathy, 1978, Sull, 2000). Meanwhile, its R&D capabilities were 
built later as the firm learned from the acquired firms which had R&D capacities. 
Acquisitions have enabled the firm to break its technical and cognitive 
constraints. Acquisitions help the firm to appropriate complementary 
knowledge and 
other resources that are distant 
from the current ones. This helps the firm to create 
new knowledge and capabilities away 
from its traditional businesses, providing the 
firm with alternative pathways to initiate de-maturity. Diversity increases the 
probability to initiate de-maturity. 
In fact, diversity improves the firm's ability to 
adapt to changing external conditions as 
it allows the firm to develop new 
combinations of technologies to generate new 
knowledge. However, acquisitions 
need to be managed so that the acquired 
knowledge can be assimilated and 
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integrated to the existing systems from which a new combination of knowledge -or 
cospecialisation- to provide unique solutions for customers can be generated. 
Furthermore, there are a number of factors which have been identified to be 
highly relevant to the process of de-maturity through acquisitions. First, is the 
importance of business networks to appreciate opportunities in distant fields. The 
prior related knowledge suggested by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) as the 
prerequisites to appreciate new opportunities could be in the form of the knowledge 
of the partner firms as illustrated in the case of JP Stevens for glass fibres and 
Thiokol and Shell in carpet backings. In other words, prior knowledge does not have 
to be generated internally. 
The reputation of Ten Cate as the largest and most successful textile firm in 
the Netherlands appears to play a significant role in attracting new partners for new 
projects. The partner firms persisted with collaboration with Ten Cate although the 
latter did not possess the necessary capabilities in the new fields. Reputation should 
be complemented with entrepreneurial management who have the capability to 
sense and appreciate distant opportunities and are willing to take the risks to 
orchestrate and deploy the necessary resources to seize them. Learning by doing is a 
critical process to build capabilities in new fields through acquisitions. Learning can 
be undertaken through a combination of alliances, collaboration and internal R&D. 
It is important to note that de-maturity is not a one-off process. Rather, firms 
have to constantly reinvent themselves through the continuous creation of new 
markets, products, knowledge and technologies. This allows firms to adapt to 
changing competitive environment or, moreover, to shape the environment 
(evolutionary fit) and avoid the maturity-trap. The evolution of advanced 
composites, protective clothing and artificial grass shows the manner in which Ten 
Cate has continuously reinvented its businesses to remain competitive in a changing 
environment. To sustain such a strategic change 
for a considerable period, firms 
need a set of dynamic capabilities beyond the knowledge generation capability. 
Organisational processes and structures that permit the management of change and 
quick decision making; routines that allow communication and share of knowledge; 
and a flexible approach to long-term investment 
(as opposed to short-termism to gain 
quick profits) are amongst organisational capabilities required to manage and 
reinforce changes. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
The case study shows that the capability to continuously change to adapt 
changing business environments is the foundation of long-term competitiveness. It 
illustrates that the firm has a certain level of innovative capabilities to enable it 
continuously change and adapt to different business environments. Ten Cate has 
developed its innovative capabilities through solid experience in acquisitions arid 
divestments. The development of innovative capabilities of this nature suggests that 
acquisitions are not only for market expansion and diversification, but, more 
importantly, for learning new knowledge and the development of new capabilities. 
Acquisitions have been the primary means to initiate de-maturity. The firm has 
experienced a series of organisational turbulence as this approach often requires 
radical change in the firm's organisational structure and routines. The firm's 
experience of managing the turbulence has enabled it to break organisational inertia, 
resulting in a highly adaptive firm. 
This capability has been complemented with capabilities in R&D which have 
been built up as the firm entered markets where competition was determined by 
product performance than lower costs. R&D 
is often performed to generate new 
combination of knowledge belongs to the acquired and existing firms. In so doing 
the firm has been able to continuously generate idiosyncratic capabilities. The 
diversity of its competence helps the firm to adapt to changing business 
environments. 
To develop such capabilities, the management has to have the courage to 
expand into technology and market 
domains that are not related to the firm's 
established knowledge. The case study shows that such a shift requires a set of 
dynamic capabilities which include technological and organisational capabilities. 
Whilst technological capabilities are required to ensure fitness between the product 
performance and demand, organisational capabilities are to ensure the optimum 
benefits from the technological capabilities. Similar to technological capabilities that 
are improved and diversified over time organisational capabilities also experience 
changes in accordance to the 
development of the firm's competencies and strategies. 
Those capabilities have to be built up over a long period and embedded into the 
firm's culture. 
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7 
Freudenberg: De-maturity and 
Incremental Change 
7.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the German textile industry is the largest technical 
textile producer in Europe and generates the second highest added value behind the 
European leader, Italy (Eurostat, 2007). Its productivity, however, has been 
significantly higher level than Italy by an annual average of 30 per cent between 
2002-2004 (Eurostat, 2005,2006,2007). This suggests that the industry has 
significantly reduced its labour requirements by advanced equipment to produce 
higher value added products. Indeed, 40 percent of its production is for technical 
textiles, the market segment that has a much higher added value than other segments 
(clothing textiles and household textiles). The industry has transformed itself from a 
low value-added industry into an increasingly high technology industry. 
One of the critical factors which facilitated such a transformation was the 
diffusion of synthetic materials into the textile industry which commenced in the last 
two decades of the 19th century. As discussed in Chapter 4, synthetic materials have 
played a central role in the competitive advantage of the European textile industry 
since the turn of the 20`h century. Germany was one of the earliest countries to 
experience the widespread diffusion of synthetic materials into the textile industry 
with the adoption of synthetic dyes. Although the dye was invented in Britain its 
diffusion in the country was limited to a few firms due to its strong patent laws 
which encouraged monopolistic markets. In Germany, on the other hand, a lack of 
patent laws allowed any firm to adopt the new technology, hence, intense 
227 
Chapter 7-Freudenberg: De-maturity and Incremental Change 
competition. This did not only facilitate diffusion but also forced inefficient firms 
out of the market. The adoption of synthetic materials into textile products was 
reinforced by the government's strategic research agenda to reduce dependency on 
imported natural materials, particularly during the years leading up to the Second 
World War. The government forced textile firms to progressively integrate synthetic 
materials into their products and to invest in synthetic materials production. As a 
result of the policy, most German textiles had some synthetic content by 1939 
(Hoschle, 2004). On the contrary, British textile firms concentrated on regaining 
their market share in the cheap cotton product market through cost reduction (see 
Chapter 3). 
The early diffusion of synthetic materials into the textile industry permitted 
the German textile industry to accumulate larger stock of relevant knowledge than its 
competitors. As the rate and direction of technical change is determined by the stock 
of knowledge and investment at any given point in time, those with a greater stock of 
technological knowledge has a greater advantage (Rosenberg, 1994). This appears to 
be the underpinning factor of the transformation of the German textile industry and, 
moreover, of its sustainable competitive advantage. However, this advantage has to 
be complemented with an openness and ability to change, an entrepreneurial attitude, 
a long-term vision and a flexible approach. 
Despite its competitive advantage, it does not necessarily mean that the 
industry not been hit by competition from low-cost countries. During the transition 
process, as with the other EU countries, the German textile industry experienced a 
severe decline after the end of World War II with the emergence of low-cost 
competitors. The loss of employment reached over 260 000 between 1970-1986, the 
second highest figure after Britain (Nelson, 1987). In such an unfavourable situation, 
Germany attempted to arrest the decline through the improvement of productivity by 
means of rationalisation and outward processing to low-cost countries which started 
in the 1960s (Dolan, 1983). Despite the loss of employment Germany maintained its 
competitiveness in its respective markets and competed 
favourably with the low-cost 
countries. In other words, Germany's strategy compensated for the loss of 
employment with the less rapid decline 
in its competitiveness (Shepherd, 1981). 
Germany's strategy to compete with low-cost countries was once again very 
different to that of Britain. The latter chose mergers and acquisitions to reduce 
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capacity, consolidate the market and integrate the whole production stages. As 
discussed earlier Britain suffered from long-term decline because the strategy failed 
to restore its competitiveness in the mature market. In brief, whilst the loss of 
employment in Germany could be attributed to improved labour productivity, 
Britain's rapid industrial contraction was predominantly caused by a severe loss of 
competitiveness. 
This suggests that Germany's performance was the result of the industry's 
innovativeness rather than government protection. In contrast to Britain and Italy, 
Germany resisted protectionist measures as the government had less interest in the 
protection of an industry that contributed little to the country's economy (Dolan, 
1983). In fact, the country's agreement to join the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) 
was not to seek for protection but, rather, to comply with the obligation as a member 
of the then European Community following the community's ratification of the 
agreement. Its industrial policy, however, encouraged competition rather than 
protection of uncompetitive firms (Toyne, et al., 1984). Textile firms were forced to 
improve their productivity through rationalisation and relocation of production to 
defend their businesses. 
Germany's R&D and industrial policies encouraged a radical shift of the 
knowledge-base at the industry level which involved changes in technology and 
production, distribution systems, organisational structure and value chain. The shift 
helped the industry to create new competencies and capabilities in the development 
and commercialisation of technical textiles whose performance criteria were very 
different from their traditional markets. The diversification into higher value added 
textile markets permitted the industry to escape from the harsh cost-based 
competition in the traditional textile market. This provided the industry with an 
alternative route for growth when their traditional market collapsed in the 1960s- 
1980s. 
The experience of the German textile industry shows that a mature industry 
can be rejuvenated to become a knowledge-based industry. The rejuvenation 
involves the shift in the basis of competition from cost advantage to technical 
performance. This is in fact the fundamental concept of de-maturity. Firms within 
the industry have experienced a strategic redirection characterised by a radical shift 
in competencies and core businesses. As is discussed later, such a transformation 
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was achieved through the creation of a series of new competencies and capabilities 
over an extended period of time. This was helped by a radical change in the firm's 
knowledge-base complemented with reconfiguration of its strategic resource-base' 
through new investment. 
The following cast study vividly illustrates a transformation at the firm level. 
Freudenberg started its diversification strategy from leather tannery into higher 
valued added products in seals in 1934 and this was followed by the development of 
nonwovens in 1936. Up to now the firm has successfully maintained its leadership in 
seals and nonwovens for diverse applications although the current technology is very 
different from the traditional one. In nonwovens, the firm has adopted various 
synthetic fibres (including polyamide, polyester and polypropylene), processing 
technology (such as dry-laid, spun-bonded, wet-laid, spun-laced and electrospinning) 
and finishing technology (including a range of coating and plasma technologies for 
surface modification). Its wide range of technology and capability portfolio allows 
the firm to combine different materials and technologies to develop a vast range of 
products for various applications, ranging from apparel and garment to the energy 
and medical sectors. This shows the firm's ability to continuously develop new 
products derived from new technology to catch up with the pace of changes in the 
market and technology. 
The creation of new competencies and capabilities has provided Freudenberg 
with alternative paths of growth which have helped the firm to adapt to changes in 
technology and market trends (evolutionary fitness). This has also fostered the firm 
to overcome organisational inertia, a common affliction of large mature firms (Sull, 
2000). The main argument of this chapter is that a strategic change of this nature 
requires a radical transformation in the strategic2 and organisational aspects of the 
firm (Doz and Prahalad, 1988). As argued in Chapter 6 whilst technological 
innovation is vital to the creation of new competencies, organisational capability is 
required to direct and manage the process of change and to assure that the process 
can continuously provide firms with new pathways to improve and create new 
' Resource-base includes knowledge-base, skills, processes and machineries (Helfat, et al., 2007). 
2 The strategic aspects of the firm include resources (the diversity of knowledge and know-how, 
capabilities and human resources), capital (including equipment and other facilities) and networks. 
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competitive advantages. Indeed, Freudenberg believes that its ability to initiate and 
manage continuous change is the foundation of its long-term success. 
The case study discusses the transformation of Freudenberg Nonwovens 
which originated as a leather tannery to become the world's oldest and largest 
nonwoven producer. In particular, it analyses the factors that drive and foster 
organisational transformation, the mechanism to build up new competencies and the 
capability of the firm to continuously initiate and manage the process of change. In 
the following section, the current state of Freudenberg and the need to initiate radical 
change is proposed. Later on, the firm's strategy to undertake such changes and its 
pathways to generate new knowledge and reconfigure its resource-base are 
discussed. In section four, the detailed process of resource configuration and the 
creation of new competencies by which it radically changes the direction of the firm 
and avoid the maturity-trap will be examined. The implications of this on the 
evolution of competencies and the dynamic capabilities of the firm which has had an 
impact on the firm's de-maturity and sustainable competitiveness are elaborated on. 
7.2 Freudenberg & Co 
Freudenberg is a family-owned business and belongs to 300 members of the 
family of the founding father, Carl Johann Freudenberg. In 1849 he started his 
business empire by establishing a leather tannery business in Weinheim. In 1934 
Freudenberg started the diversification process followed by a comprehensive 
transformation processes. The firm is now one of the oldest and largest producers of 
nonwoven fabrics for a variety of applications, in addition to being a major global 
producer of seals, vibration control technology components, and chemical specialties 
(lubricants). The Freudenberg Group operates under a decentralised structure 
comprises of a parent firm and four business areas, within which 14 business groups 
and two divisions are managed Figure 7-1. The business groups oversee 434 firms 
which run their businesses autonomously. The parent firm controls, coordinates and 
monitors the activities of the firms and provides advice and support to the business 
groups. The group had a turnover 
in excess of E5 billion and employed 33 000 
people in 2008. The nonwoven business contributed to over 15 per cent of the 
turnover during the same period. 
231 
Chapter 7- Freudenberg. - De-maturity and Incremental Change 




F. un Sm" - vshrron Cavd Vibsa+ic EuiaM Fw nbsr9 
TMndogy Eurour 
F,. od. nb. 9 NOK 'I ýgý yam, 
GorwW PW*wMftO ý-i--ý 
pdit. k 
Nonwoven Business Household Products 
Area Business Area 
Specialties and Others 
Business Area 




Frwdrnbup FM IM 
T. . kny 
Figure 7-1. Organisational structure of Freudenberg 
Source: Adaptation from the website of Freudenberg & Co 
Freudenberg NOK II Fre denberg Niw 
MMUhonla F{ TMmtlopM 
Cop.. %W E&W. F-Mft" Si v os 
M. ný msnt 1 
The production of seals and nonwovens has emerged as the firm's new core 
businesses since 1960 and replaced its traditional competence in leather processing. 
It took the firm 30 years to establish the new competencies and gain global market 
leadership. In recent years, however, the consumer nonwoven market has reached 
maturity and been effected by cost pressures. The contribution of nonwoven business 
to the firm's turnover has fallen from 40 per cent in 1980 to 15 per cent in 2008. It 
appears that Freudenberg needs to revive the nonwoven business. There is an urgent 
need to develop new competencies away from its current mature markets, 
capitalising on emerging technologies and markets just as it did 75 years ago when 
the nonwoven business was initially established. In other words, Freudenberg needs 
to repeat its historical feat if it is going to manage a successful strategic redirection. 
Indeed, the firm's experience demonstrates that the modification of 
knowledge and resource-base from which new competitive solutions for emerging 
markets can be developed is the only way to thrive. 
However, the complexity to 
master a range of technologies and the 
intensity of the competitive environment 
today is very different from that in the 1930s. Thus, a more prudent consideration 
concerning the new direction to pursue and avenues to achieve 
is critical. To 
increase the likelihood of success in any new direction, the new capabilities should 
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be built up upon the firm's greatest strength, that is, its diversity of knowledge and 
technology portfolio. In addition, the firm should have a system in place to 
encourage radical change whilst defending its current businesses and to ensure that 
the change proceeds and is managed properly. 
Indeed, Freudenberg established Freudenberg New Technologies (FNT) in 
2006 to nurture the generation of new competencies derived from emerging 
technologies away from the firm's current core competencies. There are currently six 
new businesses operating in markets that are very different from the current 
businesses and yet related, to some degree, in their basic market or technological 
knowledge. Among the six new businesses, two of them have reached the start-up 
stage, Fuel Cell Component Technology and Biodegradable Nonwovens. Although it 
is far from clear whether this attempt will lead to a new strategic redirection, it is 
apparent that the firm is preparing itself for a strategic change 
in the future. It shows 
its ability to take action well in advance to safeguard its future against uncertain 
threats and to equip itself with the necessary resources to harness emerging 
opportunities. Without a doubt, Freudenberg 
is a highly entrepreneurial and dynamic 
organisation. 
7.2.1 Innovation and the Development of Knowledge and 
Competencies 
Innovation has been the foundation of the firm since its early days. Its 
prowess was demonstrated by the 
fact that the firm was the first tannery for polished 
leather in Germany and the pioneer of the adoption of the chrome tanning process in 
Europe. Chrome tanning replaced the long-standing industry standard, vegetable 
tanning, in the late 19`h century. The firm was also central in orchestrating a 
fundamental change in the leather trading systems in Europe from a weight-basis to a 
surface-basis. In the 1930s the 
firm was the first firm to produce leather seals in 
Germany and nonwoven fabrics in Europe. The tradition continues up to the present 
day as the firm continuously creates new competencies to address demand in 
emerging markets. Certainly, the 
firm has built up an `innovative culture' aimed at 
leadership in the relevant technologies and markets since the 19th century. 
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Freudenberg has learned from its 161 year history that long term success can 
only be achieved through managing innovative activities in such a manner so that a 
continual stream of innovative products can be produced. Technological innovation 
on its own is insufficient to attain and retain long-term competitiveness. Innovation 
has to be embedded in the corporate culture and supported by entrepreneurial 
management. As Hamel & Prahalad (1991) argue top management needs to be 
finely committed to innovation and demonstrate entrepreneurial leadership. They 
have to devise the appropriate organisational structure and use strategic resources 
efficiently to promote and sustain the competitiveness of the firm. Therefore, the 
necessary infrastructure (including networks), resources, and organisational 
processes and capabilities have to be in place to encourage innovation and support its 
implementation. In other words, the benefit of technological innovation to the firm's 
competitive advantage can only be harvested if it is complemented with 
organisational innovation. 
The rest of this section analyses innovation as the means to generate new 
knowledge and competencies in Freudenberg. Subsequently, the manner in which 
the firm encourages and manages a continuous process of innovation from idea 
generation to commercialization is discussed. It is argued that the generation and 
adoption of new knowledge can help the firm to increase the diversity of knowledge 
and technology portfolio. This can generate new competencies to create new paths 
away from its original roots and bypass the maturity-trap. A diverse knowledge and 
technology portfolio can improve the firm's resilience in a changing business 
environment. In other words, diversity improves the evolutionary fitness of the firm, 
the foundation of a sustainable competitive advantage (Helfat, et al., 2007). 
Research and Development 
Research and development (R&D) has played a central role to the firm's 
transformation. Its central function is to generate new knowledge and know-how that 
can potentially create competitive advantage in the short, medium and long term. 
R&D translates new knowledge and know-how into competitive products through 
the new product development process. Its commitment to R&D is demonstrated by a 
consistent increase in R&D expenditure (Figure 7-2). The average percentage of 
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R&D expenditure in relation to turnover (R&D intensity) was 3.5 per cent, 
surpassing the industry's average ratio both at national and European levels between 
2000-2003 (Marin, et al., 2008). 
Figure 7-2. Research and development expenditure of Freudenberg Nonwovens, 2002-2008 
Source: Freudenberg Annual Report, 2002-2008 
Formal R&D programmes started in 1934 to support the first diversification 
attempt in the development of leather seals. The firm realised that its entry to the 
automotive seal market has shifted its competitive environment. While in the patent 
leather market the firm competed to improve the product's aesthetic appearance 
before technical performance, the new market demanded the opposite. Therefore, 
Freudenberg established the Main Laboratory and Central Workshop to lead R&D in 
new products and processing technology, respectively3. This new organisational 
function allowed the firm to monitor the development of technology and competition 
in the new market. The information could be used by the management to take the 
necessary action to anticipate (rather than respond to) changes in market and 
technology. This R&D function has become one of the main sources for the creation 
of the firm's new competitive advantage. This strategy is very different to the 
strategy of Courtaulds as discussed in Chapter 3 when it did not change its strategy 
3 The Main Laboratory has developed to become Freudenberg Research Service while the Central 
Workshop is now Freudenberg Systems and Tool Engineering. 
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to adapt to the new competitive environment following its entry to the rayon fibre 
market. 
An increase in R&D activities has to be complemented with better protection 
of intellectual property (IP) that may arise from such activities. Freudenberg started 
to introduce IP protection in its organisation following the diversification into higher 
value added products and the intensification of R&D activities. Figure 7-3 
demonstrates the number and variety of patents in nonwoven technology. 
The number and variety of patent applications reached a peak between 2000- 
2004. This suggests that the firm has intensified its attempts to generate new 
technological solutions and broaden their applications. The new technologies are 
generated from new combinations of existing technologies and from the assimilation 
of new and existing technologies. For instance, to harness the opportunity in the 
battery separator market for hybrid cars, the firm generated new knowledge by 
combining its know-how in multilayer hybrid-structured nonwovens with new 
know-how (to the firm) in nickel-metal hydride (Ni/MH) finishing technology. The 
latter was acquired through the acquisition of a UK firm, Scimat. The firm has 
recently integrated emerging technologies such as nanotechnology, electronic 
textiles and biodegradable polymers into its research programmes in order to build 
new capabilities in existing and growing markets. It includes cleanroom filtration 
made of hybrid synthetic nanofibres and the Atmospheric Pressure Plasma Liquid 
Deposition Technology (APPLDT) - for the deposition of very thin layers of 
functional materials on nonwoven fabrics and polymer films. A recent trend in 
exploiting biodegradable polymers is also being investigated for the development of 
electro-spun webs made of lactic acid. 
Since the early development of nonwovens in the early 1930s the firm has 
filed a number of patents. As the initial market for nonwoven was to substitute 
leather products, the reappearance of leather post World War II appeared to halt the 
development of nonwoven. No patent applications were published between the mid 
1940s to mid 1960s. The number of patents and the diversity increased with the 
development of technical nonwovens in the 1970s. There was another significant 
increase after 2000. 
Increased patent diversity indicates an increase in the variety of knowledge 
accumulated by the firm. Diverse 
knowledge and technology provides an 
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opportunity to develop synergies -or cospecialisation - among the firm's 
idiosyncratic assets to develop unique products and technologies (Teece, 2007 , 
Helfat, et al., 2007). As discussed in the previous chapter, diversity will improve the 
firm's absorptive capacities and improve its ability to recognise new opportunities 
beyond its traditional boundaries (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This in turn can 
encourage investment to harness the opportunities. Investment in different 
knowledge domains will have an impact on the modification and reconfiguration of 
the resource-base which a prerequisite for strategic redirection or de-maturity. 
Indeed, the firm's previous experience indicates that an increase in knowledge and 
technology diversity helped the firm to initiate de-maturity from leather tannery to 
nonwoven and from consumer nonwovens to technical nonwovens. Thus, diversity 
is a critical factor for evolutionary fitness and sustainable competitiveness. This 
argument will be analysed in greater detail in the next section. 
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Acquisition of External Knowledge - the Open Innovation 
Paradigm 
In more recent years, the modification of knowledge and resource-base 
has been achieved through a combination of R&D and acquisition of firms whose 
capabilities complement those of Freudenberg. The acquisition of Evolon®, the 
first commercial microfibre nonwoven spunlaced fabrics, in 1999 is an example. 
Following a nine year collaborative research effort with Rhone Poulenc, the 
original owner of Evolon®, Freudenberg decided to acquire the firm as the 
technology was believed to be the next generation of nonwoven technology. 
Evolon® was built on a breakthrough technology whose underlying knowledge 
and capability was not held by Freudenberg. In other words, Evolon® involves 
technology whose trajectory is very different from that owned by the firm (Dosi, 
1982). 
It took the firm over 15 years to bring Evolon® to the market. The 
development and commercialisation cost Freudenberg a great deal. Without a 
strong belief in the future of the technology the project may have been 
abandoned. It was in fact a great challenge for the management to balance the 
incremental improvements associated with its short-mid term strategy and the 
breakthrough technology with its long-term strategy. In an era of rapid 
technological and market changes, hedging one's bet on a specific technology 
will certainly increase the likelihood of failure. However, the complexity of 
technological systems, the cost and the uncertainty entailed in the development of 
emerging technologies made the task of minimising the risks very challenging. 
Therefore, Freudenberg has recently adopted a network of alliances, in the 
development of new scientific knowledge and technological know-how that are 
very different from its existing businesses. Freudenberg believes that networks of 
alliances help the generation of innovative ideas on how new technologies can 
benefit the firm in the future. Partnerships, collaborations and alliances with 
customers and other suppliers within the potential value chain are crucial to gain 
some control over the uncertain environment (Mattsson, 1988). This approach 
allows each member to employ a range of different combinations of technology 
to develop different combinations of product features. This approach allows the 
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firm to test the market and find the most promising markets prior to a 
commitment of major investment. 
Indeed, as argued by Rosenberg (1996), there are two major uncertainties 
associated with new technologies, that is, technological feasibility and eventual 
applications. Emerging technologies often come about in a very basic form and 
its future applications are unknown. Rosenberg suggests that the exploration of a 
wide variety of alternative paths will help to manage the uncertainties. However, 
as the cost of R&D has increased exponentially, relying solely on internal 
development to develop different technological routes is very expensive and 
risky. Thus, the development of networks of alliances to allow access to various 
knowledge and know-how belongs to other firms without the obligation to own it 
(which has an effect on costs) is an attractive and viable route (Helfat, et al., 
2007). 
The STELLA project, which will be discussed in the next section, 
illustrates this approach. In this case, a team of people from different disciplines 
work together as knowledge integrators and learning agents. Knowledge 
integration is a major part of new technology and product development processes 
out of which difficulties inevitably arise. It involves a number of complex 
experiments and employs different problem solving techniques. Successful 
alliances obligate firm members to possess certain complementary assets and 
capabilities that allow interaction and transaction of knowledge from which 
unique, hard-to-imitate-capabilities could be generated (Helfat, et al., 2007). The 
management of alliances has to manage the aspects that may generate conflicts 
from such a collaboration that include common objectives against individual 
firm's interests and the degree of freedom to access knowledge that belongs to 
other firms. In addition to contractual agreements, trust and reputation could be 
the safeguard of alliances. The capability to build and manage alliances is 
referred to as relational capabilities (Helfat et al., 2007). Such an R&D strategy 
resembles the open innovation paradigm as 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
Management of Innovation 
As discussed in the preceding section, in the world of rapid market and 
technological change, management is confronted with the dilemma in the 
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development of a technology strategy. The balance between technological 
development for the short and long term has to be achieved. Factors such as 
uncertainty, costs, internal competencies and the means to acquire new 
knowledge influence the process of decision making. The lack of capability to 
manage technological development was one of the fundamental weaknesses of 
Courtaulds (Coleman, 1980). In a highly diversified firm such as Freudenberg the 
complexity to manage innovation activities is great as each business needs 
different technological routes and pursues different markets with different 
characteristics and competitive environments. Therefore, the firm decided to 
introduce a decentralised structure in 1995 under which each firm operates 
autonomously to help to reduce the complexity and minimise inflexibility. 
The firm has learned that R&D activities that are associated with existing 
businesses have to be separately managed from those that can potentially create 
new businesses. The separation is crucial as the existing businesses tend to 
neglect developments that are not directly related to their technologies and 
markets. Freudenberg manages its R&D activities into two different categories: 
1) vertical research programme, that is, those undertaken within business units or 
firms. The R&D is aimed at the improvement and the defence of the 
competitiveness of the associated business units by means of continuous 
improvements; and 2) horizontal research programme refers to research projects 
that are not related to the existing business groups or involve a combination of 
capabilities across business groups or have an impact on several business groups. 
This is the long-term R&D programme and performed by Freudenberg Research 
Service4 (FRS, formerly Central Research) with objectives to create new 
businesses and introduce radical innovations to the industry. 
FRS manages five per cent of the annual R&D budget while the rest (95 
per cent) is deployed for R&D programmes within the existing business units. 
Although the budget for the creation of new businesses is comparatively very 
small, the option to expand it remains open subject to the progress of each new 
" FRS is responsible to undertake research projects that have no direct links with the existing business units, 
or that require synergies across-technological 
domains, including plasma coating technology and stretchable 
electronics. They are the research partner 
for all Freudenberg firms and subsidiaries in developing 
technology that have an impact across business units. 
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development. This demonstrates the firm's openness to change whilst 
maintaining its prudent approach. 
As mentioned earlier, the management and commercialisation of new 
businesses away from the existing ones is the role of Freudenberg New 
Technologies (FNT) business group. Its mission is to reinforce and sustain 
Freudenberg's strength in innovation. It focuses on consolidating group-wide 
technical know-how, especially that of interdisciplinary technologies, to develop 
new products and technologies. FNT are responsible for three main tasks: 
creating internal new businesses (internal corporate venturing); acquiring 
promising technology developers whose products fit Freudenberg's interests 
through Freudenberg Venture Capital (external corporate venturing); and 
partnering with relevant business units in developing new products and process 
through the Freudenberg Research Service. Other tasks include obtaining public 
funds, technology scouting and screening, internal and external network support, 
promoting the development of the next generation of technology professionals 
and creating an open and innovation-friendly atmosphere. Other business units 
focus on the evolution of their core businesses through product improvements 
and expanding the share of different markets. Meanwhile the Management Board 
is responsible for providing the necessary guidance and advice for acquisitions. 
Freudenberg's innovation model is illustrated in Figure 7-4. 
FNT is a critical business unit for the management of new competencies 
and the generation of capabilities through the mid-long term R&D programmes. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, without a long-term technology strategy Courtaulds 
paid the price. The business unit also helps the firm to reduce the risk of the 
maturity-trap as it continuously seeks new pathways to pursue new areas of 
growth that are important to its future. As 
discussed earlier, networks of alliances 
are particularly crucial to this function. An 
FNT office in Brussels has been 
established to facilitate the development of networks within the EU. 
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Figure 7-4. Freudenberg's 3-Pillar Innovation Model. 
Source: Barth, T., & C. Wolf (2007, p. 4) 
Separating the long-term developments from the short-term developments 
appears to be a sensible approach to ensure both programmes progress 
simultaneously. As discussed earlier, they have different characteristics that 
include the degree of uncertainty concerning technological feasibility and 
applications, costs and the appropriate approaches to obtain relevant new 
knowledge. Consequently, simultaneous programmes may be difficult to be 
implemented within individual business units. In fact, Christensen (1997) 
suggests that large firms are often too occupied with incremental innovations to 
satisfy their current customers (short-term development) to the extent that they 
overlook new external developments that may disrupt their technologies. 
FNT can only benefit the firm when it can generate synergies between 
and among business units from which unique developments may be created. 
Communication channels between FNT and other business units have to be 
established. For that reason, the Management Board launched a number of 
innovation management programmes. The first programme was launched in 1992 
through the GROWTH Programme (Get Rid of Waste through Team Harmony), 
a joint programme with its joint venture partner in sealing technology, Nippon 
Oil Seals Corp., (NOK) Japan. The programme attempted to implement the 
Japanese management system `Kaizen' to achieve a lean manufacturing system 
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and continuous improvement through cross-departmental teamwork. More 
recently, the firm launched its Innovation Offensive programme in 2003. Its aim 
is to initiate specific measures for innovation programmes, particularly those that 
concern the exchange of information (communication) and methods to achieve it. 
One result has been the introduction of the Innovation Forum (2003), a series of 
events created to facilitate communication and synergies among individuals or 
groups across business areas. In addition, the Global Innovation Forum (2008), a 
similar event but involving external experts to build a network in a specific 
technological domain, was also launched. It is a forum in which individuals or 
groups can present innovative projects and invite other business areas to join the 
projects when necessary. The scope of the Innovation Offensive programme has 
been continuously expanded since 2004 and now includes strategy, R&D 
indicators and human resources. In 2004, the programme introduced an 
innovation monitor, that is, a procedure to assess innovation projects and to 
estimate potential sales generated from innovation activities. In 2005, the R&D 
indicator - the number of patents, new products and process improvements- was 
introduced. 
Following the introduction of innovation management procedures in 
2005, the firm has conducted a thorough assessment and, subsequently, realigned 
its innovation strategy. The result indicated the need for undivided attention from 
and participation of the senior management in innovation programmes. Thus, the 
firm established the Freudenberg Innovation Committee (FIC) whose members 
are the Chief Technology Officers (CTO) of all business groups. They are 
responsible for the identification of key markets and trends in technologies of 
interest to Freudenberg and in fostering the development of new products. The 
FIC leads the assessment of the strategic direction the firm is likely to pursue in 
the future and provides judgments which technologies it should invest in. This is 
in fact the managerial capabilities argued by Helfat, et al. (2007) and Teece 
(2007) as one of the dynamic capabilities critical to enable the firm to identify 
future opportunities and threats and to take the necessary action. To reinforce 
such a strategic organisational capability the firm assigned a top executive to 
coordinate its new approach in the management of innovation in 2003. 
Freudenberg believes that support from all employees is critical to the 
firm's success in innovation. Innovation should be integrated in the firm's culture 
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and values (to be the leader in the relevant fields) and is shared across the 
organisation. The firm provides the necessary facilities and infrastructure to 
encourage individuals to leverage their knowledge and capabilities through 
training and development programmes; to communicate their innovative ideas 
across the entire organisation; and to join teams involved in new product 
development projects. Now, a large number of innovative ideas come from the 
employees and not from the top management. 
Innovative ideas, however, will not benefit the firm if they are not 
translated into competitive products and successful in the market. The firm has 
developed routines to accelerate the progress from idea generation to 
commercialisation whilst managing the risks associated with new developments. 
The routines involve four milestones as demonstrated in Figure 7-5. The typical 
duration is three months to reach the end of the project stage with a E30,000 
budget until end of the pilot stage. 
Milestone 1 Milestone 2I Milestone 3 Mlledone1 
Idea description Feasibi4ty, check 
Q Feasibility study El Prototyping El 
Customer value State of the art 
Q Patent position EI Customer El 
Competition 
Market and market 
access evaluation 




Was evaluation cwvw 
Preliminary El 
busmass plan 
Exist strategy EI 
Figure 7-5. S tage-gate process in the Business Development Unit 
Source: Wendelken and Wolf (2008, p. 6) 
To complement changes in business strategy and practices as a 
consequence of a shift in the R&D paradigm, the firm also changed its approach 
when it comes to commercialisation. Freudenberg can no longer restrict itself to 
beating a single path to the market. Chesbrough (2006) contends that failure in 
commercialisation among high technology firms was, in greater detail, more 
affected by market uncertainty than by technical uncertainty. He suggested that 
Xerox's failure to commercialise a number of its cutting edge technologies was 
caused by its traditional paths to market and by the need to serve its existing 
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markets. It lacked a systematic process for exploring and evaluating alternative 
business models. In Freudenberg, this is the role of the FNT. The business unit 
develops the paths to markets -licensing, spin outs, sales, joint ventures- deemed 
to be suitable for individual product technologies. 
It is evident from this case study that the capability to manage innovation 
is equally crucial as the capability to develop new technologies. While 
technology dynamics are crucial to the improvement of technical fitness, 
organisational dynamics are the underlying mechanisms to initiate, guide and 
progress changes and to improve the firm's evolutionary fitness. Together with 
the entrepreneurial capabilities of the management, they constitute dynamic 
capabilities described by Teece et al. (1997) as the determinants of long-term 
competitiveness. 
7.2.2 The Evolution of Competencies 
This section analyses the process of building (and termination) of new 
(and obsolete) competencies as the firm's response to the changes in technology 
and demand. It helps to explain the impact of the modification and the creation of 
new competencies on the ability of the firm to break away from its traditional 
roots and avoid falling into the maturity-trap. 
The development of the knowledge-base that fosters the evolution of 
competence from leather tannery to nonwoven fuel cell components is exhibited 
in Figure 7-6. The study finds that technological change in the nonwoven 
business has been driven by the adoption of new materials (including polyamide, 
polyester and polypropylene) which is combined with different manufacturing 
methods from fibre extrusion to finishing processes. The firm possesses the entire 
set of technologies in nonwoven manufacturing (dry-laying, wet-laying, 
spunlacing, spunbonding and electrospinnng techniques). The possible end 
products derived from the combination of different materials and processing 
methods and finishing processes are vast. This enables the firm to have a diverse 
range of products to meet the requirements of an equal number of niche markets. 
The firm has the capability to customise different performance requirements for 
different groups of customers from the users of interlinings to diapers and from 
air and liquid filtration to wound compresses. 
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Leather Products 
Freudenberg's leather tannery business was the leader in Europe up to the 
1920s when new competitors from developing countries managed to catch up 
with the German firm in quality. In 1927 the firm hired qualified chemists, Hans 
Siegert and Egon Elöd, to improve the quality of its patent leather so that its 
products could be sold to the high-end leather market segment. However, the 
Wall Street Crash in October 1929 followed by the Great Depression and World 
War II had a significant adverse impact on Freudenberg as well as Germany's 
leather industry in general. The firm suffered from a significant loss of export 
markets and from the disappearance of the leather raw materials market. The firm 
lost 75 per cent of its turnover and was left with a large inventory (1.5 million 
pieces of raw leather) of no monetary value. 
The firm made attempts to generate a temporary source of revenue during 
the difficult period as its traditional markets had disappeared. It learned that there 
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was an opportunity to substitute imported leather seals for the automotive 
industry as imports were blockeds. As the raw leather market had also 
disappeared, the newly hired chemists developed leather seals from the tannery' 
waste -a variety of shapes of leather scraps and pieces- in 1929. The automotive 
and machine-tools industries found Freudenberg's leather seals offered better 
performance and lower prices than the imported products. 
The leather market reappeared after World War II. Freudenberg resumed 
its leather business and expanded domestically and internationally while the seal 
business flourished. The leather business reached at peak in the 1950s and 1960s 
during which Freudenberg was among the world's largest tanneries. From the 
1970s onwards, however, the German leather industry reached maturity. It 
suffered from continuous decline mainly due to several structural problems which 
included: the emergence of new competitors particularly from South America; 
increased production costs; a changing market in which demand for leather 
upholstery took over the share of the leather apparel market; and plummeting 
demand following the oil price crisis in 1973. Under such conditions, 
Freudenberg was forced to downsize significantly its leather operation and close 
its international operations. 
Despite the ominous losses, the management agreed not to abandon the 
leather business on the grounds that the business was part of the firm's historical 
legacy. To overcome the maturity problem, Freudenberg moved into top-quality 
calf leathers for more fashionable products. However, in more recent years, the 
luxury segment has been adversely affected by the global economic slowdown, 
particularly post September 11ý' 2001. The loss making leather business, which 
only contributed to 0.5 percent of sales in 2001, was terminated in 2002. 
Freudenberg's leather business had finally come to an end after 154 years. 
In contrast, a temporary research project to developed leather seals from 
the tannery's waste turned out to be a decisive milestone in the firm's long-term 
growth. The seal business grew significantly and has replaced leather as the 
firm's core business since the 1970s. Freudenberg remains the leading supplier 
for the market it created 80 years ago. Its success rests on its ability to provide 
In the introduction it was mentioned that the German government imposed on firms' conditions 
to reduce dependency on imports. This created new opportunities for the local manufacturers to 
supply substitute products. 
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competitive solutions to changing needs. The firm has continuously developed 
new products and processes as well as added functionalities to its seals. The 
automotive and engineering seal markets have stopped using leather materials. 
The firm adopted a range of synthetic materials to replace leather including 
synthetic rubber, silicone and metals which will be discussed in the following 
section. One of its most recent innovations has been to incorporate sensors into 
the seals to enable the seals to monitor the rate of wear of the related components. 
Synthetic Rubber 
Access to new markets -the automotive and machine-tools 
manufacturing- through the development of leather seals facilitated a new 
learning ground for the firm. It learned that the market needed radial shaft seals 
which led to the development of `Simmering', one of Freudenberg's most 
successful innovations, in 1932. However, the relatively low thermal stability of 
leather shortened its lifetime. Leather was therefore replaced with oil-resistant 
synthetic rubber (Buna) from IG Farben in 1934. This strategy is presumably 
related to government policy which imposed the adoption of synthetic materials 
on a wide range of industries. As a result of the adoption of synthetic rubber, the 
firm generated new know-how that was very different from its traditional one 
(leather processing). A new capability in the production of radial shaft made of 
synthetic rubber had been created. 
In 1938, the firm established a crucial collaboration with IG Farben in the 
development of synthetic rubber 'Perbunan' to be used in a new type of seal 
made of high precision metal and synthetic rubber components. Following this, 
the firm had to adopt new production systems with higher technological 
complexity, and to have a better understanding of the science of synthetic rubber. 
The Main Laboratory and Central Workshop played a vital role in the 
development of the new technology. The application of synthetic rubber was 
expanded to include rubber soles 
(to replace leather soles) and floorcoverings. 
The firm continuously improved its knowledge in synthetic elastomeric materials 
6 The products include simmerings, mechanical seals, membranes, high-precision moldings, 
bellows, dust caps, hydraulic accumulators, O-rings, hydraulic and pneumatic seals, cylinder head 
gaskets, frame gaskets, silicone seals, vibration control technology, special seals and brake 
components. 
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and developed new products with the new materials. Processing advanced 
elastomeric materials that include silicone and fluororubber is one of 
Freudenberg's key competencies used across its business areas. 
Arguably, the firm has experienced a strategic redirection through the 
development of new competencies (the manufacture of leather and synthetic 
rubber seals) and access to new markets. The change was driven by adverse 
economic conditions which forced the firm to seek alternative sources of growth. 
This was facilitated by the emergence of new demand and was achieved through 
the adoption of new knowledge and know-how to harness new opportunities. As 
the complementary know-how was not internally available, the firm acquired new 
knowledge to the firm through the recruitment of new highly-trained scientific 
personnel and research collaboration with its supplier (IG Farben). Interestingly, 
the opportunity was seized on by combining their traditional competence in 
leather processing with new chemical processes brought in by the new partner. 
This shows the importance of cumulative nature of technological change in the 
strategic redirection (Rosenberg, 1994). 
The new capabilities however can only benefit the firm when there is a 
market for its application. Therefore, technological innovation has to be 
complemented with an entrepreneurial organisation that can read emerging 
opportunities and to take the initiative ahead of its competitors. The utilisation of 
leather waste to develop leather packings to address the shortage of supplies prior 
to World War II shows the firm's entrepreneurial capability. The further 
development of this new capability, that is, the processing of synthetic rubber and 
other synthetic elastomers, and the links with the new markets (automotives, 
machinery manufacturing, construction) and their value networks (suppliers and 
customers) provided the firm with a new path for its future development. This 
shows the firm's innovative capability to look 
for and tap into alternative sources 
of revenue and to develop new capabilities accordingly. This development 
marked the firm's first attempt to initiate the process of de-maturity. These, 
indeed, are the characteristics of an organisation with dynamic capabilities 
(Teece, et al., 1997). 
Its entry in to the new market may -to some extent- be helped by the fact 
that competition was confined to local producers as the major competitors from 
the US had withdrawn from the market. This was in part because of the relatively 
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low intensity of competition the firm managed to become a leading supplier of 
the seals market within ten years from the first adoption of the technology. The 
more important factor to its success was its innovative and entrepreneurial 
capabilities. Without those capabilities such an opportunity could not have been 
harnessed. 
More importantly, those capabilities have enabled the firm to diversify 
into a new market, nonwoven fabrics, in which Freudenberg was the first to 
introduce the innovation to the market. As shown in Figure 7-6, its know-how in 
synthetic rubber (particularly in the aqueous emulsions of rubber and latex) 
helped the firm to develop a breakthrough technology, that is, nonwoven 
technology. Its pioneering technology has modified the knowledge-base of the 
firm and reconfigured its resource base (through new asset acquisitions and new 
recruits). 
Nonwovens 
Nonwoven (or Vliestoffe in German) is a term created in the US in 1942 
to classify a group of textiles produced by unconventional methods, that is, 
beyond knitting and weaving (Albrecth, et al., 2006). Initially made of natural 
and cellulosic fibres, the arrival of synthetic fibres such as polyamide, polyester 
and thermoplastic polymers opened up new market opportunities and advanced 
the development of technology in this area. Various applications of nonwovens 
have been introduced and a number of processing technologies have been 
invented. Nonwoven technology has facilitated a market breakthrough through 
the creation of the disposable market whose applications ranges from tissues and 
diapers to wound dressings and tissue engineering. The major applications of 
nonwovens include; disposable diapers; filters; industrial cleaning; and 
disposable medical fabrics for surgical drapes, gowns, and sterilization wraps. 
The production of nonwovens is deemed to fit to the requirements for textile 
7 The definition of nonwoven adopted by ISO 9092 and CEN (EN 29092) is "a manufactured sheet, web or 
matt of directionally or randomly oriented fibres, 
bounded by friction, on/or cohesion, and/or adhesion, 
excluding paper and products which are woven, 
knitted or tufted, stitch-bonded incorporating binding yarns 
or filaments, or felted by wet-milling, whether or not additionally needled. The fibres may be of naturals or 
man-made origin. They may be staples or continuous 
filaments or be formed in situ". Manufacturing 
methods to produce nonwoven are dry-laying, wet-laying, spunbonding, meltblowing, SMS (a combination 
of spunbonding and meltblowing) and electrospinning. 
The critical objective of development in this sector, 
to which significant efforts have been and will be directed, is to supersede traditional textiles in apparel and 
household applications. 
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manufacturing in the developed countries as the most labour intensive part of 
textile production, weaving, knitting or sewing, is eliminated. Thus, the 
production of nonwovens is highly productive and cost-effective. 
Freudenberg is now the largest and the most diverse nonwoven-producing 
firm in the world. It possesses 23 production facilities in 13 different countries, 
employs around 4700 people distributed in a large number of firms and generates 
annual revenues of 6778.2 million in 2008. Its diversification into nonwovens 
appears to be a radical departure from its traditional leather tannery business. In 
reality, however, the firm experienced the change in a more evolutionary way. 
The new knowledge and know-how in nonwovens was originally acquired from a 
Dutch patent in 1936. The application of the knowledge was built on its 
established know-how in producing leather seals from leather offcuts and on its 
competence in processing rubber and latex. The know-how was used to lay fibres 
and bond them together to make layers of nonwoven sheet. The initial market 
they pursued was also the market they knew well, that is, the leather substitute 
market such as bags, school satchels, cartridge cases and the like and for military 
uses. Thus, during the development stage, the firm had the necessary information 
about the performance criteria to achieve. This approach to learn about the new 
technology was less risky as one of the dimensions of uncertainty (the market) 
was kept at a low level. This shows that a radical departure from the established 
businesses can be progressed through evolutionary changes of technology and 
market at the firm level. 
The initial nonwoven technologies (and the outcomes) are very different 
from the current ones. The technology has experienced extended improvements, 
complemented with the arrival of various synthetic fibres (and filaments) and 
finishing techniques, which enables the firm to expand its practical applications. 
As shown in Figure 7-6 the firm has continuously adopted new processing 
technology which enabled it to highly diversify its products and markets. As the 
leader in the field, Freudenberg worked closely with the equipment suppliers and 
customers during the technology and product 
development processes. 
To briefly illustrate, immediately after the Second World War during 
which the leather market reappeared, the 
firm shifted its nonwoven business from 
leather substitutes to interlinings and cleaning cloth (consumer nonwovens) using 
the dry-laid processing technique and natural fibres (mainly cotton). The arrival 
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of synthetic fibres and filaments in the 1950s allowed the firm to develop 
products for technical uses. Filtration was the first diversification into technical 
nonwovens. The development in this sector was driven by its vital joint venture 
with two Japanese firms, Dainippon Ink & Chemicals Industry and Toyo Rayon 
Corporation (Toray) named Japan Vilene Company in 1960. The capabilities of 
those firms which were complementary to Freudenberg's technology fostered the 
development of various technical nonwovens. This is discussed in the next sub- 
section. 
Technical Nonwovens 
Interlinings had been the dominant revenue generator for Freudenberg 
nonwoven between the 1960s-1980s. The markets were not only for garments 
but also for shoes and backing materials for synthetic leathers. However, since 
the early 1980s the importance of consumer nonwovens has been superseded by 
technical nonwovens as the former approached maturity and the competitive 
advantage gravitated towards low cost producers. By 1991 the consumer 
nonwovens only contributed to 18 per cent of total turnover, while the technical 
nonwovens represented 26 per cent. Activities in this new sector began in 1957 
when nonwoven for filtration was developed and by 1978 the firm had developed 
a range of products for various industrial applications including electrical 
insulation, battery separators (electrical), linings for floppy disks (computer), 
soundproofing materials and waterproofing materials (construction), tufiback 
(carpeting), air and liquid filter (filtration), plaster backings, wound compresses, 
diapers and ostomy bags (health and medical). 
The capability to produce such a diverse range of products was a result of 
intensive R&D programmes, diverse knowledge and technology portfolio and 
being proactive in the creation of new markets. As discussed earlier, the firm 
continuously adopted new processing and finishing technologies and new 
materials to produce a wide range of products with desired performances. For 
instance, the adoption of the dry-laid method and polyamide fibres fostered the 
development of interlinings for various applications. The cost-efficient 
spunbonded polyamide nonwoven technology was developed internally in 1965 
which enabled Freudenberg to enter the diapers market. This was then followed 
253 
Chapter 7- Freudenberg: De-maturity and Incremental Change 
by the adoption of other new processing methods including: wet-laid polyester 
nonwovens; spunlaid nonwovens; lightweight spunbonded polypropylene for 
filtration and automotive carpet backings; water-jet-stabilised continuous 
microfiber spunlaces for apparel and cleaning industries; and electrospun 
nanofibre nonwovens for very fine filtration. 
As mentioned earlier, the development and commercialisation of water- 
jet-stabilised continuous microfiber spunlaces (Evolon®) is an interesting case 
study. Rhone-Poulenc developed a process to convert polyester and polyamide 
chips into bi-polymer filaments in 1990. The bi-polymer filaments were split into 
microfilaments and subsequently tightly entangled and consolidated to make 
nonwoven fabrics. The method did not require binding agents or solvents, which 
was unique and significantly advantageous for cost savings and environmental 
benefits. More importantly, it eliminates the stiffness of nonwoven fabrics, a 
breakthrough development which increases the likelihood to compete with 
traditional fabrics. Following nine years of collaborative research with Rhone- 
Poulenc, the technology was acquired by Freudenberg in 1999. 
The initial market for Evolon® was its established markets, that is, 
interlinings and automotive filters. Despite the unique production process, 
environmental benefits and vast potential applications Freudenberg's existing 
customers were slow to adopt the new products. This was due to the expensive 
production cost (it was produced in a semi commercial plant, hence, limited 
capacity and high costs), extensive R&D costs (over 15 years of R&D), uncertain 
technical problems and quality issues of the end product. The firm was faced by 
typical uncertainties related to the implementation of new technologies as 
described by Rosenberg (1996). Although Freudenberg frequently experienced 
uncertainties during the development and commercialisation of new technologies, 
the commercialisation of Evolon® was considered to be very problematic. The 
firm struggled to find a potentially lucrative application. 
Freudenberg changed its strategy and established an autonomous firm to 
manage the development and commercialisation of the technology. The firm 
found that Evolon® could be a direct competitor to conventional textiles. The 
finding astonished the management as several attempts have been made to 
improve the existing nonwoven technologies to compete with traditional textile 
markets (clothing and household markets). In fact, competing with traditional 
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fabrics had been the long-term strategic plan agreed among the nonwoven 
producers. The advantage of the new technology was that it reduced the stiffness 
of nonwoven fabrics significantly. This type of performance attribute is 
something that cannot be provided by the existing technologies. Moreover, the 
new technology offers higher strength to weight ratios, drapeability, has a soft- 
feel and is easy to clean. These properties are unattainable using other nonwoven 
technologies. 
The market redirection was a great success. The technology competes 
favourably with woven and knitted fabrics as well as with staple fibre 
nonwovens. The application in the traditional textile market includes interlinings, 
workwear, footwear, and home furnishings, in addition to various industrial 
applications. 
ýý 
Polyester and Polyamide 
chips are spun into endless 
segmented filaments 
The filaments are split into 
microfilaments with water jets 
Figure 7-7. Evolon® 
Source: www. evolon. de 
The water jets simultaneously 
entangle and consolidate the 
microtilaments, creating fabrics 
The most recent technology adopted by Freudenberg Nonwovens is the 
emerging biodegradable polymers and nanotechnology. Biodegradable polymers 
have been developed to address demand in tissue scaffolds. The firm has made 
several new developments to revive maturing markets including the development 
of carpet backings made from recycled PTE bottles (Lutradur Eco) in 2008. 
Meanwhile, Freudenberg envisages nanofibers as a complimentary technology to 
advance its nonwoven high-technology filter technology for dust removal, liquid 
filtration and membranes for bioreactors. The individual basic knowledge and 
technical know-how to produce filters made of synthetic nanofibres, that is, 
nanofibre forming and finishing technologies, and filter design and 
manufacturing, has been accumulated within the firm for a number of years. The 
capability to form nanofibres has been developed in recent years as an 
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advancement of their established capability in bicomponent splitable microfiber 
and electrospinning methods that have been acquired since the end of 1980s. 
An opportunity to develop high value added products derived from the 
combination those capabilities arrived with the recent emergence of demand for 
cleanroom filtration complemented with higher industrial standards introduced 
by the German government. The firm launched Viledon NanoPleat cassette filters 
for cleanroom filtration made of hybrid synthetic nanofibres (probably made of 
bicomponent fibres comprise of polyester and thermoplastic materials in the form 
of a sheath structure, core structure, an island structure or a side-by-side 
structure) at the end of 2007. The product sets new standards for indoor climate 
control technology, marrying fine filtration and large capacity to hold dust with 
energy-saving and longevity. Additional performance features such as being 
corrosion-proof, highly resistant to chemicals, 100 per cent moisture-resistant and 
microbiologically inert were added to offer greater added values to customers. 
Such a combination in performance, addressing primary and desired (secondary) 
requirements, is part of the product development strategy to offset significant 
price increases associated with the introduction of new technology in products for 
existing markets. 
These new developments are still at the early stage of commercialisation. 
As with the early commercialisation stage of nonwovens and Evolon®, the future 
of these technologies remains uncertain. The current products may or may not be 
the eventual that are the most profitable. The technologies might not even find 
markets in the longer-term. In the case of the latter, the management has learned 
from the firm's experience that investment in knowledge and know-how is not a 
waste of resources. Reserved knowledge and know-how might find the 
application in or be a complementary for a completely different market in the 
future. With this belief, investment in R&D has been of strategic importance to 
the firm. 
Adverse economic conditions do not hinder investment in R&D. The rise 
in the oil price in 2007 followed by the collapse of sales of the US automotive 
industry in 2008 caused a fall in sales by four per cent. This forced the firm to 
discontinue a number of production facilities to cut its losses caused by 
overcapacity. Instead of eliminating investment in R&D during the crisis, the 
firm vigorously sought out new emerging markets in which its vast knowledge 
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and know-how in nonwovens could be applied. Its nonwoven fuel cell component 
technology (filters and gas diffusion layers) whose initial development was 
designed for the automotive industry was redirected to address the need for the 
stationary market in Japan (portable and household products) as the market in the 
country has been growing. To enter this market, Freudenberg teamed up with its 
Japanese partner firm, NOK. 
The development of nonwoven business of Freudenberg shows its 
relentless efforts to develop new products and create new niche markets. An 
adverse economic environment does not hinder the firm from changing and 
innovating. In fact, the firm has managed to continuously find new growth in 
both in good and poor economic conditions. This shows its resilience to changing 
economic and business conditions. This can only be achieved through an 
unflinching commitment to continuous change. The fact that Freudenberg was the 
first firm to exploit a Dutch patent in Europe suggests that the firm possessed 
competitive capabilities in the commercialisation of the new technology. It is 
important to note that had the market for leather not disappeared in Germany, it is 
not clear whether Freudenberg would have adopted the technology. Thus, the 
adoption of the breakthrough technology appeared to be determined by the firm's 
assumption about the future market. This suggests that entrepreneurial capability 
is a fundamental factor in the selection of new competencies to be created. 
Electronic Textiles 
In addition to nonwovens, Freudenberg appears to have foreseen the 
potential applications of electronics in textiles and stretchable products for its 
long-term growth that include healthcare, functional clothes and integrated 
electronics. The firm's established knowledge in elastomeric materials was an 
entry point to join a network of suppliers and customers in the field. Engaging 
with such a network is crucial to have access to new knowledge that is far beyond 
its current competencies and to ensure the commercialisation of the resulting 
technology. The firm is currently acting as the consortium coordinator of 
STELLA (Stretchable Electronics for Large Area Application) project, a four 
year European research project (2006-2010) under the 6t' Framework 
Programme. Partners in the project include Philips (NL), CEA (FR) and 
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Technische Universität Berlin (DE). One of the approaches uses textile 
compatible materials, thermoplastic polyurethane, to allow a complete system to 
be applied on various fabric materials. The electronic system can be laminated 
onto fabrics using thermopress. Several prototypes for specific applications have 
been developed, one being `sensing' shoe inserts for patients with diabetes. 
Pressure sensors are being developed to give signals when the inserts need 
replacing. The system would assist in reducing the risk of feet inflammation and 
even amputation due to worn insoles. The electronics can be adapted for any shoe 
size and for each individual patient. For this application, Freudenberg sought a 
partnership with its former business group, Nora System, whose competence is in 
developing rubber floor coverings for a broad range of end uses, including 
nursing homes. 
7.2.3 Drivers of Change 
The case study reveals a number of critical factors that have empowered 
the firm to continuously change over an extensive period. Freudenberg's ability 
to continuously search for new sources of income, its commitment to investment 
in R&D and its flexible approach to effectively and efficiently harness new 
opportunities are the critical factors for change. The evolution of its competencies 
from leather tannery to seals to nonwovens shows that such a radical change 
progressed incrementally through the modification of an existing capability in 
leather processing. The incremental change resulted in new breakthrough 
technologies which were fundamental to the de-maturity of the firm. This shows 
a move away from mature businesses can be achieved through frequent 
modification of the established knowledge-base to serve different markets or 
technological speciation (Cattani, 2006). For the timeline of its technology and 
product trajectories please see Figure 7-8. 
Frequent changes suggest that timing to adopt and commercialise new 
technologies is strategically crucial. Freudenberg appears to implement a first 
mover advantage strategy in the markets it has and will continue to enter. Figure 
7-9 below shows the sequence of market entries by Freudenberg. In all these 
markets, Freudenberg was one of the pioneers in Germany (patent leather 
tannery, leather packings and seals) and globally (nonwovens). The figure 
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demonstrates that the firm continuously creates new competencies and markets 
prior to the maturity of its existing technologies and markets. It suggests its 
ability to bypass the maturity-trap is through the continuous creation of new 
competencies that guarantees new growth. 
The process of change was undertaken through the integration of 
externally-developed chemical processes into the existing competencies; internal 
R&D and collaboration with the suppliers and customers; and, more recently, 
through networks of alliances. The firm carefully selects the most appropriate 
innovation approach for individual R&D programmes. For instance, Freudenberg 
joined the EU funded R&D projects for its fuel cell components and STELLA 
projects. For the adoption of nanofibres into nonwovens, the firm opts to work 
internally or develops partnerships with German firms. Several factors determine 
its approach, primarily the availability of internal knowledge necessary to 
develop the technology, the cost of R&D, its R&D capability to develop 











to ä Cp 
11 
Do -6 c4 p 
co 'ß dOWOC 






rDO DO Oý 
Cp C 












































































N N` N888 
N 
N_ ý. N 
B2 
































Op$ LL W 






















U, 0 0 N 
on 
rn 
- rn c 
ýn w N 
o 




























































Cv C ý' 
w. L S 
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The creation of new competencies was clearly driven by changes in market 
demand and technology. Political conditions and government policies have been 
one of the drivers of market change. Demand that emerged during the interwar 
years and immediately after the Second World War was triggered by government 
policy to encourage the adoption of synthetic materials was Germany's unique 
conditions that other countries may not enjoy. Freudenberg appreciated the change 
and put the necessary resources and strategy in place to harness the new 
opportunity. When the demand for leather substitutes disappeared in 1948, the 
firm shifted its capabilities to the interlining market and replaced buckrams - 
heavily-sized-glued coarse cotton used for stiffening garments. Nonwoven 
interlinings offered important advantages over the woven and knitted interlinings 
because of its flexibility to be designed in accordance to different specifications - 
weight, softness and strength -, simpler production processes and cost 
effectiveness. During the growth period between 1950s-1970s the application was 
expanded into different niches which include shoes and bags. 
As the interlining market started to decline because of cost pressures in the 
1980s, the firm had diversified into technical nonwovens which were initially 
driven by the growth of the Japanese automotive industry in the late 1950s. 
Freudenberg subsequently scaled down the production of consumer nonwovens 
(interlinings) and expanded the production of technical nonwovens (filtration, tuft 
backings, sound proof materials) where technological leadership was its major 
competitive advantage. In a similar fashion, the firm revived its hygiene and 
medical applications as its main markets in the sector such as baby diapers and 
feminine hygiene have recently been forced to reduce prices. The firm leveraged 
its capability to provide solutions for wound dressings and tissue engineering 
where its technological leadership remains its key competitive advantage. 
Such an ability to continuously develop new solutions for niche markets 
rests on its vast knowledge and technology portfolio which is a result of 
continuous modification and investment in new knowledge and technologies. For 
the formation of nonwoven layers alone the firm employs dry-laid, wet-laid, 
spunbonded, spunlaced and elecrospinning techniques. It exploits properties of 
different types of fibres in terms of chemical structure (such as polyamide, 
polyester, polypropylene) and physical structures (microfibers, nanofibres and bi- 
polymer fibres) to tailor specific product performance. A number of different 
262 
Chapter 7- Freudenberg: De-maturity and Incremental Change 
bonding agents and finishing techniques (coating and different methods of plasma 
surface treatment) add up the diversity of the firm's technology portfolio. Such a 
rich technology base provides the firm with immense new opportunities for 
synergies and cospecialisation from which unique, sophisticated solutions can be 
created. The portfolio in other business areas is another source of knowledge and 
technology which can potentially be applied in nonwoven products. It works 
together with its materials and equipment suppliers to develop new products from 
the exploit them through different channels (business units, partnerships, joint 
ventures, spin out). This has fostered the application of nonwovens in, among 
others, automotive, construction, electronics, energy, medical and hygiene, 
computer. 
Finally, the study indicates that being a family owned firm and yet 
managed by professional management and not by family members has a great 
advantage, particularly in the firm's flexible approach to long-term developments. 
The development of Evolon® which took over 15 years of R&D before the 
promising applications were found is a good case in point. Such a commitment to 
deploy resources to such a long-term development project may be more difficult 
to implement in a public firm. Those firms whose performance is constantly 
monitored and scrutinised by the shareholders to deliver results within a limited 
time frame may limit the likelihood to undertake long-term R&D programmes. 
Long-term R&D programmes can only be achieved with the trust and support of 
the shareholders in the management and sufficient financial resources. This 
shows that, parallel to the transition process which occurred in Ten Cate during 
the 1970s and 1980s, continuity and consistency were critical during the process 
of strategic change in Freudenberg. 
7.2.4 The Dynamic Capabilities of Freudenberg 
Undoubtedly, Freudenberg has the capability to initiate and manage 
change over a substantial period of time to sustain its competitiveness despite 
facing challenges from frequent changes in business and economic conditions. In 
addition to its tradition in technological innovation 
its competitive advantage is 
underpinned by its capability to radically change the organisation through the 
modification and reconfiguration of 
its resource base, and reorganisation. The 
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modification and reconfiguration of the resource-base requires specific 
organisational capabilities to swiftly integrate new resources into the existing 
systems and to generate synergies among them. Reorganisation ensures the 
effective and efficient use of the modified resources. As these activities require 
investment the effect is permanent. Therefore, the ability of management to 
identify future paths to pursue where the likelihood of success is greater, the 
knowledge to acquire and the pathways to achieve it is vital. These are argued to 
be Freudenberg's dynamic capabilities that have enabled the firm to sustain its 
leadership in the global nonwoven market. 
At Freudenberg, such an entrepreneurial approach is complemented with 
prudent implementation to minimise risk whilst maintaining long-term R&D of 
strategic importance. The firm has developed an assessment process in place to 
assess the potential risks and benefits (see Figure 7-5). Freudenberg believes that 
even in an economic crisis, removing long-term R&D programmes is 
counterproductive. It contends that firms which significantly reduce R&D 
activities in a crisis will face more difficulties when recovery takes hold than 
those which continue their R&D programmes. This is indeed a crucial element of 
the firm's dynamic capabilities 
The firm's approach to seize new opportunities in leather packings and 
leather substitutes following the disappearance of its main raw materials is one of 
many examples of its creativity and entrepreneurial capability. Instead of scaling 
down its operation, the firm developed alternative materials to replace genuine 
leather. As the leading leather tannery in the country, Freudenberg had a market 
advantage over other firms in the field. However, the advantage could not benefit 
the firm without the ability of management to gather the necessary resources, 
accelerate the creation of new capability in nonwoven manufacturing and bring 
the new products on to markets in a timely fashion. The latter was critical as the 
window of opportunity for this market was narrow (around ten years) as the firm 
understood that the genuine leather would eventually reappear when the war 
ended. Thus, the firm needed to put in the necessary efforts to maximise the 
potential benefits within a limited time frame. Redirecting R&D in fuel cell 
component technology from addressing the needs of the automotive market to the 
stationary market as discussed earlier is another instance. 
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It is further argued that the dynamic capabilities are not only related to the 
creation of a new competence and capability. The new competence has to be 
extended, modified and refined to adapt to changes in market and technology. For 
instance, its competence in nonwovens has been extended to enable it to 
manufacture technical nonwovens. Within the technical nonwoven sector, the firm 
has modified and refined its competence to enable it to develop high value added, 
high performance products. 
Freudenberg operates in a highly diversified market to reduce its 
dependency on a few market segments. This kind of organisation is less 
susceptible to changing economic condition. As explained earlier, the collapse of 
the US automotive market in 2008 affected the demand for Freudenberg's 
automotive carpet backings and filtration. Although the automotive industry was 
its largest customer, the collapse did not have a devastating impact on the firm as 
demand in other markets such as energy and medical increased. 
Building synergies within its technology portfolio is evidently one of 
Freudenberg's critical dynamic capabilities. Such a capability does not only help 
the creation of idiosyncratic solutions as the resource configuration confined 
within firms is historically dependent and non-tradable as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Furthermore, it also plays a role in filtering and directing strategic investment. For 
instance, its decision to enter the gas diffusion layer and filtration markets for fuel 
cells was not only encouraged by the potential growth of the market but also by 
the potential synergies between its nonwoven capability and the competence of its 
partner, NOK. Freudenberg believes that the synergies can produce competitive 
technology which differentiates the firm from its competitors. Freudenberg does 
not pursue other related markets such as membranes, catalysts and electronics for 
fuel cells as the firm does not possess the sufficient know-how to make a 
significant impact on the market. 
7.2.5 Implications of De-Maturity at the Firm Level 
It is evident that Freudenberg has undergone a complete transformation, 
slowly morphing from a leather tannery into a highly diversified knowledge-based 
firm through a long process of transition in technology, product and market. The 
firm has undergone the process of de-maturity. The process of such a strategic 
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redirection was started prior to the maturity stage of its traditional leather 
business, motivated by new opportunities beyond its traditional markets. The 
subsequent changes have been driven by changes in technology, market trends 
and government policy. The firm's established innovative culture has been the 
foundation of its ability to continuously change and adapt to changing external 
conditions. It excels in reading market trends, the adoption of new knowledge and 
the generation of new knowledge. Such a capability has fostered radical change in 
the firm's resource-base, business practice and organisational routines and 
structure. This is the capability which differentiates the firm from the majority of 
struggling firms in mature industries where more radical responses are often 
eschewed despite attempts to defend their mature businesses have failed 
(Abernathy, 1978, Sull, 2000). 
Such a radical innovation provided the foundation for the firm to move 
away from its established competence when the related competitive advantage has 
diminished. The adoption of new technologies into its production systems has 
substantially modified the firm's resource base which included the stock of 
knowledge, skills, processes and machinery. This helped the firm to create new 
competencies to provide new competitive solutions for different markets beyond 
its traditional boundaries. When the leather business started to decline in the 
1960s Freudenberg had already selected alternative paths for its future growth. 
Under such circumstances, Freudenberg could easily shift its resources to the new 
market because the uncertainty associated with the new technology and market 
(nonwovens) had been resolved. Thus, the firm has managed to avoid the 
maturity-trap through broadening its technology-product-market portfolio 
regularly earlier before its traditional business reached maturity. The finding 
suggests that performing (unrelated) diversified activities prior to the maturity of 
the core business can reduce the risk corresponding to resistance to change 
(inertia) in the mature industry or the maturity-trap. 
Unrelated diversified activities do not necessarily mean conglomeration. 
On the contrary, Freudenberg has developed different activities in the fields where 
the firm possessed the underlying knowledge -related to market or technology or 
both- that could increase the likelihood of success. In other words, the 
development of knowledge is path-dependent as demonstrated in Figure 7-6 
(Rosenberg, 1994). The current competencies were combined with the knowledge 
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that was new to the firm to generate new knowledge to enable the creation of new 
solutions for new or existing problems. This implies that path-dependent change 
does not necessarily result in the phenomenon of lock-in as argued by Arthur 
(1989). In fact, it can generate new knowledge as long as the path of change is 
directed to generate new combinations of knowledge to provide solutions to new 
problems. 
Freudenberg develops its knowledge-base through frequent improvements 
and modifications rather than radical changes through a series of acquisitions as 
observed in the Ten Cate case study. It initiated de-maturity through the 
enhancement of its established knowledge and the creation of new combinations 
so that it could be implemented in different markets. This was undertaken through 
the recruitment of new scientific personnel, R&D collaboration with the country's 
largest chemical firm, licensing, updating its processing technologies and joint 
ventures. Therefore, the firm experienced a less radical process of de-maturity 
than Ten Cate. Freudenberg's core business has remained the same over the past 
70 years (seals and nonwovens) although the technology has changed entirely and 
the market is highly diversified. Other businesses have grown but the two main 
business areas still generate the firm's revenue today. 
Nevertheless, the firm appears to have appreciated the importance of firm 
acquisition and network alliances as alternative pathways to add value to the 
fun's portfolio over the past few years. The acquisition of Evolon® and Scimat 
as well as the development of fuel cell filters and STELLA project are examples,. 
All acquisitions and alliances are undertaken to have access to knowledge and 
know-how that are not available internally that can strategically complement the 
firm's established competencies. 
To ensure continuous renewal of its competencies the firm regularly 
updates its routines or creates the new ones to encourage innovation and 
commercialisation of new technologies. The routines, however, have to be 
complemented with the appropriate infrastructure and support from top 
management. The infrastructure is required to ensure the flow of communication 
across the entire organisation, while the support from the top management is 
necessary to ensure the availability of resources. 
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7.3 Conclusion 
Freudenberg is an entrepreneurial firm. It has managed to survive two 
World Wars and the recent major global economic recession. The firm has 
developed dynamic capabilities to continuously change to adapt to changing 
business conditions, thus by passing the maturity-trap. These capabilities rest on 
the firm's high-level innovative capability developed through a long tradition in 
R&D, its unflinching commitment to long-term R&D and flexible approach to 
organisational structure and routines. 
Changes in Freudenberg have been undertaken through frequent 
improvement and less-radical, path-dependent change in technology and 
organisational structure and routines. New ideas are initially progressed through 
small projects which involve low-level financial commitment to test the viability 
of the ideas before a greater commitment is required. In fact, changes and 
improvements are embedded in its routines to ensure continuity and participation 
of the entire organisation. Strategic change is not dependent on a specific figure 
but on accountable organisational processes and capabilities built up over a long 
period of time. The organisational process also ensures the balance between 
incremental and radical innovations can be achieved as they are managed in 
different units. 
The routines that encourage change and innovation are improved and 
diversified overtime to adapt to new conditions. This is shown by the recent 
tendency to include acquisitions and networks of alliances in the mechanism to 
acquire and generate new knowledge. This new development was to provide 
access to diverse knowledge that was not available internally to anticipate the 
future development which was believed to involve complex technological 
systems, exponential increase of R&D costs and shorter technology life cycle. 
The case study illustrates that continuous change does not necessarily 
reduce the diversity of knowledge-base or promote organisational simplicity as it 
has been widely assumed in the literature. Rather, frequent changes and 
technological speciation can lead to radical change in the knowledge-base and 
organisation or de-maturity. The key factor to avoid the maturity-trap or `core 
rigidity' is to continuously modify the firm's resource-base through the adoption 
of new knowledge to provide new solutions to emerging markets. 
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This fmal chapter starts with a summary of why the European textile industry 
was selected as the subject for analysis, followed by a comparative analysis of the 
important findings. This is proceeded by a brief discussion on the implication of the 
findings to the EU programmes for the rejuvenation of the European textile industry. 
Areas where there is scope for further research is then suggested. 
8.2 Summary 
As noted in Chapter 1, the European textile industry was selected as a topic 
for research for three main reasons. Firstly, in contrast to the conventional wisdom 
which assumes that the textile industry is labour intensive and technologically 
stagnant, the European textile industry is highly dynamic. Its growth has been driven 
by the latest advances in science and technology. A fraction of the industry has 
changed its `face' from a traditional to a knowledge-based industry. It is a result of a 
long process of `reverse' transformation from the mature phase to the development 
phase or `de-maturity'. However, the business and economic literature related to the 
textile industry has overly emphasised research on the process of transformation 
towards maturity rather than de-maturity. In fact, the literature appears to assume 
that the process of maturity is irreversible. It is one of the main arguments here to 
show that in contrast to the conventional assumption, the process of maturity can 
indeed be reversed. This gives new hope for textile firms operating in mature 
markets to experience renewed growth. 
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Secondly, Europe, which used to dominate the textile industry through 
Britain in the 19th century and through Italy and Germany from the 1970s, has 
experienced relative decline contraction over the past decade despite the protection 
of the MFA for 30 years. The industry found itself in difficult situation in the face of 
the emergence of new low-cost competitors, changing customers' preferences and 
shorter product life cycles. The industry appears to be heading for potentially serious 
danger if the necessary solutions can not be implemented in time. 
Finally, the EU has shifted its approach to rescue the textile industry from 
protectionism to a more aggressive approach of intensive R&D and innovation 
programmes. The EU believes that the industry should be transformed from a 
traditional to a knowledge-based industry. Arguably, the programme can only 
benefit the industry if a large fraction of the textile firms can take advantage from the 
new inventions resulting from R&D projects. In other words, the diffusion of new 
technologies should be the central issue of the rejuvenation of the textile industry. 
However, the experience of the German textile industry shows that widespread 
diffusion of new technologies required at least two conditions. Firstly, government 
policy needs to provide incentives or other policy measures to encourage adoption; 
secondly, a certain level of innovative and organisational capabilities should be 
possessed by firms to adopt the new technologies to initiate the process of de- 
maturity. Otherwise, the likelihood of falling into the maturity-trap is very great. As 
the industry is predominantly (80 pre cent) populated by small firms with limited 
innovative and organisational capabilities, the attempt to transform the industry is 
going to be a major uphill struggle. Therefore, the firm level analysis to investigate 
the factors and processes by which traditional textile firms fall into the maturity-trap 
or successfully bypass the maturity-trap and initiate de-maturity is the most 
appropriate method to approach the problems. The findings of this thesis are thus 
highly relevant to support the development of EU policy in the rejuvenation of the 
EU textile industry. 
8.3 Assessment of Findings 
Attempts to rejuvenate the industry through the introduction of a new 
innovation policy and the European textile technology platform have started in 2004. 
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However the EU's response is argued to be too slow as the new policy was launched 
towards the end of the protectionist regime. This potentially limits the time available 
for textile firms to learn, adopt and commercialise the new technologies before other 
countries can catch up with the performance of the European textile firms. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the section on the open innovation paradigm discussed how 
technology and product life cycle has been increasingly shortened as a consequence 
of intense competition and distributed knowledge'. As a consequence of this, the 
task to improve fines' innovative and organisational capabilities may be more 
challenging and costly. 
What is quite alarming, inertia appears to have affected not only small textile 
firms but also large textile firms in Europe. Marzotto, one of the largest textile firms 
in Italy, believes that the firm does not need to initiate radical change. It contends 
that the crisis that has been affecting the textile industry is temporary. It believes that 
its old strategy, that is, production flexibility and multi-brand product portfolio, is 
sufficient to adapt to the current condition. Marzotto does not engage in any of the 
textile R&D programmes as it maintains that its prominent competence in design and 
flexible production of high-quality traditional fabrics is sufficient to satisfy its 
customers. 
The strategy, however, may have a devastating impact for two reasons. It 
ignores the possibility that the change could be permanent as its customers may no 
longer be prepared to pay premium prices for luxury products given that a number of 
leading fashion houses have shifted their production to low-cost countries. Thia 
suggests that cost-based competition is no longer an exclusive characteristic of the 
low-end market segment. Although the firm remains optimistic and claims that it still 
enjoys growth, the global trend in the relevant market shows that the future may not 
be very bright. Secondly, the strategy lacks any `unique quality' as it has been 
implemented by the majority of firms in the market for decades. As its competitors 
follow the same strategy and if brands, designs and quality could not improve sales, 
costs may be the only competitive factor. In the long term, cost competition may 
cause a devastating impact on the Italian textile industry. 
'A condition in which knowledge can be accessed from a number of different sources. It is the 
opposite of concentrated knowledge where 
knowledge is monopolized by a few organisations. 
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Other textile firms who have successfully transformed their organisations to 
become high-tech textile firms respond to changes by increasing their R&D budgets 
and diversifying their activities to various sectors and market segments. The case 
study of Ten Cate and Freudenberg illustrates that changes in the business 
environment have encouraged the firms to look for new areas of growth through the 
adoption of new technologies and the commercialisation of new competitive 
products in various markets. They continuously expand the boundaries of the firm 
that include knowledge, know-how, assets and geographical location. Firms of this 
nature are not only responsive but, moreover, anticipate changes. In fact, change is 
embedded in their routines so that employees at all levels are involved in the process. 
This is one of their approaches to escape from the maturity-trap and be more 
adaptive to changing external conditions. This is one of their cornerstones of their 
long-term competitiveness. 
It is important here to explain the fundamental differences between Marzotto, 
Ten Cate and Freudenberg. The summary of the findings can be found in Table 8-1. 
Using a comparative analysis, the following section examines the fundamental 
characters of firms falling into the maturity trap and those who have by passed the 
maturity-trap through continuous innovation and organisational adaptation. 
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Chapter 8- Conclusion 
Victims of the Maturity-Trap 
Chapter 3 analysed the factors that triggered the loss of competitiveness the 
Lancashire cotton industry. A combination of uncertainty, a low-level of investment, 
ineffective government policies, fragmented industrial structure, a lack of collective 
actions, short-termism and inability to accurately recognise trend and change have 
been cited. Above all, the underlying cause of the decline was the industry's distinct 
structure, values and practices that had been very successful over a long period of 
time and had reinforced each other to become deeply entrenched. When the 
environment changed, the managers who could not change the traditional structure, 
values and practices confined their responses to the areas they knew very well. 
Under such circumstances the firms fell into the maturity-trap or were locked-in to 
the existing structure, practices, technology and market. The analysis of the decline 
of a Lancashire's once iconic firm, Courtaulds, confirms that those factors caused 
organisational inertia and its decline. In short, the maturity-trap is a result of 
structural, institutional and managerial (or entrepreneurial) failure. 
It appears, however, that the maturity-trap is no longer exclusively a British 
disease. The Italian textile industry, the leader in Europe, believes the cost-pressure 
and its relative decline in the past decade is temporary. As the Italian textile firms 
relocate their production to low-cost countries to improve their productivity, the 
industry experienced serious contraction. The industry continues to use the same 
strategy it has employed for the past few decades. This is because traditions have 
become a constraint to change, production skills have become entrenched and large 
infrastructure and well established routines have become rigid. 
In the development of technical textiles Italy is behind other European 
countries. Although the technical textile sector enjoys significantly higher 
productivity than the luxury textile sector, Italy's main market segment, the industry 
has not put any significant effort into developing the market. Although the Italian 
textile industry is the largest textile industry in Europe in terms of size and value, its 
productivity is considerably lower-level than that that of Germany and the 
Netherlands which have successfully shifted their textile production to performance 
textiles. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, the industry's relatively slow progress in the 
diversification into technical textiles may have been influenced by its initial strategic 
choice to concentrate on the fashion textile market. This choice may lead to the 
unintentional exclusion of other factors, that is, the diffusion of synthetic materials 
into the textile industry. Although appeared not to have a direct linkage to their 
strategic choice it may cause long-term detrimental effects if the competitive 
environment changes. The exclusion of synthetic materials from the country's textile 
industry's strategic long-term development appeared to have been affected by the 
slow development of organic chemistry in the country. Italy was relatively behind in 
organic chemistry compared to Germany, Britain and France, the other three major 
textile producing countries in Europe. The knowledge in the field developed 
relatively slow as the majority of the country's consumption of special plastics were 
imported. The diffusion of knowledge in synthetic materials to the textile industry 
was relatively slow compared to that in other European countries with strong 
research tradition in organic chemistry (Britain, Germany and France). As a result of 
this, the linkage between the textile industry and the chemical fibre producers was 
not strongly encouraged. This is a strong contrast to the linkage between the textile 
industry, fashion designers and textile equipment producers which has been 
established since the late 1940s. The evolution of the industry is therefore 
constrained within the areas where its `stock of knowledge' was more competitive, 
that is, in design, quality and flexible production systems. This indeed highlights the 
concept of lock-in by Arthur (1989) and path-dependence in technological change by 
Rosenberg (1994). Lock-in suggests low level diversity in knowledge and market (or 
specialisation). The experience of the Lancashire cotton industry demonstrates that 
specialisation may increase the likelihood of firms falling into the maturity-trap. 
Furthermore, the structure of the Italian industry which has been claimed as 
the industry's uniqueness on which its competitive advantage (flexible production 
systems) has been built may potentially hinder the diffusion of knowledge and 
know-how in advanced materials science and engineering. The case study of Ten 
Cate and Freudenberg indicates that the process of de-maturity requires a certain 
level of innovative and organisational capabilities which can not be built overnight. 
Given the industry is predominantly populated by small and family-owned firms, the 
shift may be difficult and require an extensive period of transition. 
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It is suggested in Chapter 5 that the Italian textile industry should learn from 
its own experience when it successfully displaced the French couture concept in the 
fashion market. With its lower-cost solutions the Italian fashion designers introduced 
the pret-a-porter concept and emerged as a new major competitor in the fashion 
textile and clothing market. This shows that the high-end textile market is not 
immune from lower-cost competitors as assumed by the stakeholders of the Italian 
textile industry. The Italian textile industry should learn from its own history which 
has made it competitive or become a dominant power in the first place. It is indeed 
the only way to learn how to escape from the maturity-trap and to initiate de- 
maturity. 
Multi-Faceted De Maturity 
The case study of Ten Cate and Freudenberg illustrates the process of de- 
maturity and continuous change in textile firms. Similar to Marzotto, Ten Cate and 
Freudenberg were originally traditional textile firms with a history of more than a 
century. In a striking contrast to Marzotto, these firms have accomplished a complete 
transformation. Their areas of business have changed entirely and diversified well 
away from the original ones. Those firms have managed to by pass the maturity-trap 
through a continuous extension of boundaries related to every aspect of their 
businesses. This is the foundation for their sustainable competitiveness. 
The analysis between these firms shows the different approaches, processes 
and capabilities required to initiate de-maturity and to lay the foundation for 
continuous change. As with Marzotto, Ten Cate built up dynamic capabilities from 
its solid experience in firm acquisitions and divestments. Interestingly, although both 
firms use a similar mechanism, different objectives and implementation have 
different effects on those firms. Marzotto uses acquisitions for market expansion, 
(low level) diversification and vertical integration of production. On the other hand, 
Ten Cate uses acquisitions not only for market expansion and diversification but also 
for learning about new knowledge and developing new competencies. Acquisitions 
are also directed to build synergies among the capabilities of the individual firms to 
develop new idiosyncratic capabilities. For Ten Cate, acquisitions are used for the 
reinforcement of its existing capabilities as well as for the creation of the new ones 
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whereas Marzotto appears to have used it to only reinforce its core capabilities. 
Consequently, whilst Ten Cate has by passed the maturity-trap, Marzotto is in 
serious danger of falling into the maturity-trap as it shows organisational inertia and 
`core-rigidities'. 
Freudenberg has shown a different path to by pass the maturity-trap and to 
manage continuous change. Freudenberg develops its knowledge-base through its 
solid tradition in R&D. This allows the firm to bypass the maturity-trap through 
continuous/frequent incremental changes and modifications to the resource-base than 
radical change as observed in Ten Cate case study. Technological speciation, that is, 
the modification of exiting capabilities to serve new markets away from its 
established market, has been identified as one of its primary approaches to dc- 
maturity. Joint ventures are more preferable for Freudenberg than firm acquisitions. 
Ten Cate initiated the process of de-maturity through acquisition of firms 
operating in different markets and employing different technologies. As a 
consequence of this strategy, Ten Cate has experienced a series of acquisitions, 
divestments, restructuring and changes in core businesses throughout its history. 
These may have caused organisational turmoil. Freudenberg, on the contrary, 
initiated de-maturity through R&D aimed at the enhancement of its established 
knowledge and the creation of new combinations so that it could be implemented in 
different markets. This was undertaken through the recruitment of new scientific 
personnel, R&D collaboration with the country's largest chemical firm and adoption 
of new technologies. Therefore, the firm experienced a less radical process of de- 
maturity. Freudenberg's core businesses remain in seals and nonwovens over the 
past 50 years although the technology it employs are very different from the original 
technology it used. The market has also changed beyond recognition. Other 
businesses have grown but the two main business areas still generate the majority of 
the firm's revenues up to the present day. 
Ten Cate's model appears to facilitate faster results (radical change) than 
Freudenberg's model. To illustrate this, Ten Cate only required two years to master 
glass fibre processing technology for the protective clothing market (a completely 
new technology and market for the firm) since its participation in the ownership of 
Pierre Genin & Cie, a woven glass producer. In another instance, it took the firm 
only two years to establish itself as the major producer of windsurfing boards in 
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Europe. Freudenberg, on the other hand, required more than a decade to find the 
primary market for its nonwoven fabrics after securing a licensing agreement from a 
Dutch patent. However, the former arguably requires significantly larger investment 
and entails higher risks than the latter. 
The different approaches in knowledge acquisition appear to be related to 
each firm's business strategy. For Freudenberg, as its strategy is to be the first mover 
in the markets it enters Freudenberg has to constantly generate new knowledge 
ahead of its competitors. It may not be able to find the necessary knowledge 
available for acquisition. Ten Cate, on the other hand, tends to be the fast follower. It 
permits the firm to acquire knowledge from external resources but it has to integrate 
the new knowledge and bring the product to market rapidly. In brief, Freudenberg is 
a `knowledge generator' and Ten Cate is a ̀ knowledge integrator'. 
The different approaches also appear to affect each firm's subsequent 
methods to generate new knowledge and develop new competencies. In contrast to 
Ten Cate which appears to be in favour for firm acquisition before R&D 
collaboration, Freudenberg prefers internal R&D, licensing, research collaboration, 
adoption of new processing technologies and joint ventures. The diversification was 
predominantly undertaken through a combination of purchasing new processing 
technologies, internal development, technology licensing, and research collaboration, 
particularly with the suppliers. Nevertheless, the firm appears to have increasingly 
appreciated the importance of firm acquisition and network alliances as alternative 
pathways to add value to the firm's portfolio in the past few years. Acquisitions 
target radical technologies which may revolutionise the industry and whose 
development trajectories are very different from the firm's technological expertise. 
The acquisition of Evolon® and Scimat are two examples. 
These findings suggest that de-maturity can be achieved through a radical 
approach (Ten Cate's model) or a more incremental one (Freudenberg's model). 
Despite the differences, both models require prerequisites to foster de-maturity at the 
firm level. Firms have to possess a diverse strategic resource-base from which new 
alternative pathways for future growth can be built. Diversification of a resource- 
base can only be achieved through continuous learning and investment. Ten Cate has 
developed outstanding capabilities to manage the firm's business portfolio through 
acquisitions and divestment. The firm has the capability to search complementary 
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resources external to the firm which add value to the firm's portfolio and to integrate 
them into the current structure. These capabilities have enabled the firm to overcome 
the complexity and adverse effects of acquisitions. For businesses that have lost their 
competitiveness, Ten Cate reorganises them to increase their market value before 
putting them back on the market. On the contrary, Freudenberg has established a 
solid tradition in R&D and mastered a wide range of science and technology. Its 
extensive technology-market portfolio not only in the nonwoven business but also in 
other business areas such as specialty chemicals and surface finishing technology 
provides the firm with a myriad of possible new combinations that can be exploited 
in the future. 
Another prerequisite is the firm's awareness about emerging markets and 
technologies. It is crucial that firms can commercialise new products earlier than 
their competitors. Both Freudenberg and Ten Cate have changed their diversification 
strategy since entering the technical textile market. Whilst operating in one (mature) 
market, both firms did not put significant efforts into radical diversification until the 
market started to decline. In the new market, new competencies have been 
continuously developed prior to the maturity of their established market and 
technology. 
A diversified resource-base and activities do not necessarily mean 
conglomeration. During the early period of transition, Ten Cate, due to its method 
to acquire new knowledge, appeared to be becoming a conglomerate. However, as 
the firm streamlined its technological capabilities the further development of the firm 
was apparent towards the selected areas that were related to its basic knowledge. 
Freudenberg increases its diversity through a synergetic development process 
involving joint efforts with other business units or external organisations. It has 
developed different activities in the fields in which the firm possessed the underlying 
knowledge -related to market or technology or both- that could increase the 
likelihood of success. 
2 Conglomeration is often called multi-industry company. It comprises of two or more companies 
operating in two completely different businesses or 
industries. 
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Implications of De Maturity on Path Dependent and Path- 
Breaking Change 
As discussed in Chapter 2 path-dependent change does not necessarily lead to 
the phenomenon of lock-in. Deliberate attempts to be different from their 
competitors through the creation of new competencies illustrate the process of new 
path creation. New paths can provide firms with new alternative trajectories to 
pursue in the future to bypass the maturity-trap. 
The findings of this study provide a new insight in the creation of new paths. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the related literature suggests the different impacts of 
incremental and radical change on the creation of new paths. A number of studies 
suggest that a more radical approach through firm acquisitions (Ten Cate's model) is 
necessary to break out from the established trajectories. The incremental approach 
through internal development (Freudenberg's model), on the other hand, is more 
constructive to reinforce the existing resource-base. This study instead reveals a 
rather different fording. It found that both approaches can be implemented to enable 
path-breaking change. Whilst the impact of acquisitions on a firm's radical 
transitions have been widely discussed, the process of incremental acquisitions that 
can lead to path-breaking change has rarely been discussed. This study, to some 
extent, agrees with Narula (2001) that Freudenberg was in the position to create new 
knowledge/know-how in the relevant fields (knowledge generator) as it may not be 
available in the market for acquisitions. In other words, in the pre-paradigmatic stage 
-borrowing Narula's term 
for the period prior to the emergence of a dominant 
design- the availability relevant knowledge/know-how was limited or not easily 
accessible so that the first mover has to develop new knowledge. Consequently, in- 
house R&D, rather than firm acquisition, in combination with collaboration with 
suppliers was the norm to establish a dominant design. When the relevant knowledge 
and know-how have been well understood and diffused into different applications, 
new knowledge and breakthrough technologies could emerge from different sources. 
Evolon® is an example of a new breakthrough technology developed elsewhere 
which can not be developed by Freudenberg itself as the necessary knowledge is not 
internally available. Given the rapid development of knowledge in the field and the 
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importance of the technology to the firm's competitiveness in the future, acquisition, 
rather than internal development, was the most appropriate strategy. 
Without a doubt, de-maturity is crucial for the rejuvenation of the European 
textile industry. It is, however, vital to underline the risk that entails. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, many large firms failed during the transition process. Among the primary 
causes were late responses to undertake new development, the extent of change was 
not sufficient to initiate de-maturity and inappropriate mindset of the management to 
compete in a different competitive environment. Courtaulds' failed attempts to 
commercialise synthetic fibres and carbon fibres are two useful examples. Instead of 
experiencing de-maturity, those firms were forced out of business or being acquired 
by their competitors. 
Traditional textile firms which aspire to undertake the process of de-maturity 
can implement either method which suits their own circumstances (knowledge-base, 
competitive environment, financial resources, networks of customers and suppliers, 
current markets and future markets to pursue). The management, however, has to 
realise from early on that the process could take a number of years continuously and 
cumulatively. The necessary resources have to be in place for the entire period or 
there is a risk the process will fail. 
The de-maturity process may lead to a change of management. As 
demonstrated in the case studies, de-maturity requires management and staff with 
different behaviour, attitudes and mindset. During the process of shakeout conflicts 
and major disruptions may arise. These may delay or, even more, halt the process of 
de-maturity. An unstable environment is very likely to negatively affect the 
performance of the firm which makes it vulnerable to takeovers. 
8.4 Implications for EU Technology Policy 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the EU has introduced a new policy to maintain its 
competitiveness in the textile industry. The policy encourages innovation and new 
quality standards to replace its old strategy of protectionism. The policy includes 
research and innovation; education, training and social issues; environmental issues 
and consumer protection; intellectual property rights; and cooperation with 
Mediterranean countries to allow the relocation of production and outward 
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processing. Among those programmes, the research and innovation programme has 
achieved the most progress. The introduction of the European Technology Platform 
and the instruments to finance innovation in textiles and clothing in 2004 has been 
progressed to create 31 research projects which involved 400 organisations (private 
firms and research centres) and E160 million government research funding between 
2007-2009. 
The research and innovation programme emphasises intense collaboration 
and synergies between firms and research organisations to develop breakthrough 
technologies and to help the industry to reinforce its technological leadership. A 
number of first-stage products generated from the programme have been showcased 
to attract commercialisation projects with the private sector. Whilst crucial and 
beneficial for a fraction of the firms in the industry, the programme is insufficient to 
transform the industry. As discussed in earlier, firms have to have a certain level of 
`absorptive capacities' to appreciate new technologies, and innovative capabilities to 
adopt and commercialise the new technologies. Without the improvement of these 
capabilities the diffusion of new knowledge will be confined within those with the 
necessary capabilities. This will exclude textile firms with low-level absorptive, 
innovative and organisational capabilities which can not appreciate the importance 
of and take advantage from the new technologies for their long-term growth. 
Unfortunately, the majority of the European textile firms fall into this category. 
The emphasis on research collaboration and synergies is highly beneficial to 
foster the generation of new knowledge as discussed in Chapter 6 and 7. This, 
however, can only benefit firms which have the capabilities to be exchanged for the 
collaboration. Moreover, the commercialisation of the new knowledge will be highly 
related to the long-term relationship among the collaborators as each collaborator 
controls a portion of the intellectual property (IP) and complementary resources. If, 
for instance, the collaboration breaks down a number of issues related to IP and 
complementary resources may hinder commercialisation. 
In brief, the EU programme for the rejuvenation of the textile industry may 
have a limited impact on the future competitiveness of the industry. A large number 
of firms cannot benefit from the programme as they do not have the necessary 
capabilities. Unfortunately, the capabilities can not be built overnight. The 
experience from Japan and Germany show that radical industrial transformation 
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could only be achieved through state-led concerted efforts involving all the 
stakeholders (state, banks and industry) towards the acquisition of technology and 
the creation of industrial systems. In addition, entrepreneurial management and good 
leadership have to be in place to help traditional firms to break away from their 
outdated traditions, value and practices and to develop new competencies. Collective 
actions among stakeholders should be encouraged for the improvement of innovative 
and organisational capabilities. 
8.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis analyses the process by which firms in a mature industry can fall 
into the maturity trap and how they can successfully bypass the maturity trap through 
continuous innovation and organisational adaptation. There are, however, a number 
of related areas that are not covered by this thesis but are highly relevant. Areas for 
future research are those related to; the capability of small textile firms to improve 
their innovative capabilities; the sustainability of acquisitions as a means for 
strategic redirection in the face of a very competitive business environment and rapid 
technological change; the affect of being a publicly-listed firm on long-term 
technological development; the effectiveness of collaborative research and networks 
of alliances for the commercialisation of radical innovations; and the application of 
the de-maturity framework on other mature industries. 
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